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My dissertation investigates issues concerning information asymmetry, imperfect 
capital markets, and their impact on foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). 
 
Chapter 1 studies how investors allocate their portfolio equity investment 
internationally. I develop a model to formalize the information signaling mechanism 
of foreign direct investment (FDI): When investors make FDI, due to their control and 
monitoring as insiders, they obtain the information about the returns on overseas 
subsidiaries and thereby extract the information about the returns on FPI. The extent to 
which FDI predicts the returns on FPI is referred to as the informativeness of FDI. I 
construct measures for the informativeness of FDI and find that FPI is more sensitive 
to FDI if FDI has a higher degree of informativeness. 
 
Chapter 2, coauthored with G. Andrew Karolyi, investigates how imperfect capital 
markets and exchange rates affect firms' asset sales worldwide. We show that the 
informational imperfection on the capital markets impacts entrepreneurs' odds to win 
bids through two channels: First, it decreases the maximum amount of loans that 
entrepreneurs obtain; second, it reduces the cutoff level of entrepreneurs' initial wealth 
below which they are credit rationed. We find that the cross-border asset sales 
between a country pair are negatively correlated with the financial development of the 
target country, while it is positively associated with that of the acquirer country. The 
depreciation of the target country currency is associated with a lower increase in the 
cross-border asset sales for a higher level of financial development of the target 
country. 
 
Chapter 3 explores how firms' heterogeneous characteristics, in particular their 
competitiveness on the product market and productivity affect their domestic and 
cross-border corporate asset transactions. I find that firms participate in the domestic 
and overseas corporate asset markets through endogenous self-selection. Specifically, 
firms with high competitiveness are more likely to buy assets on the overseas markets, 
and they are more likely to sell assets on the domestic market. Firms with high 
productivity are more likely to buy assets on both the domestic and overseas markets, 
and they are less likely to sell assets on the domestic market. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
FOREIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT AND INFORMATIVENESS OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Foreign portfolio equity investment (FPI) and foreign direct investment (FDI) have been 
increasing dramatically in the era of financial globalization. One key question on foreign 
portfolio investment is: How do investors allocate their portfolio investment across countries? 
Despite the diversification benefits from cross-border investment, investors still invest 
disproportionately more in domestic stocks than standard portfolio theory would suggest as 
optimal allocation, a phenomenon commonly called the home bias, which is one of the 
unresolved puzzles in the international finance literature. This phenomenon continues to exist in 
both industrial and developing countries (Chan, Covrig, and Ng, 2005; Bekaert and Wang, 
2009).
1
 One explanation offered for this puzzle is information asymmetry (Gehrig, 1993; Kang 
and Stulz, 1997; Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock, 2004; Portes and Rey, 2005; Mondria and Wu, 
2011).
2
 
 
The information-based international capital asset-pricing theoretical and empirical research 
literature shows that foreign purchases of the market portfolio tend to be positively correlated 
with the returns on the portfolio, which is known as the positive feedback trading by foreign 
investors (return-chasing behavior). This finding also suggests that investors may suffer from 
information asymmetry when they invest in foreign stocks (among others, see Brennan and Cao, 
                                                          
1
Table 1.A.1 in the Appendix reports the home bias levels for 27 countries. 
2
Also see Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) for surveys of the home bias literature. 
 
 
2 
 
1997; Froot, O'Connel, and Seasholes, 2001; Karolyi, 2002; Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz, 2004; 
Brennan, Cao, Strong, and Xu, 2005; Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider, 2007; Dichev and Yu, 
2011). 
 
In contrast, researchers find that investors are acting like resident investors and are able to 
alleviate information asymmetry to some extent when they invest in FDI: They gain refined 
information about the returns of foreign subsidiaries (Goldstein and Razin, 2006) and resolve the 
demand uncertainty of their products in the foreign country (Moner-Colonques, Orts, and 
Sempere-Monerris, 2007), FDI can also reveal information about foreign fundamentals (De 
Santis and Ehling, 2007) and can serve as the original information endowment of investors 
(Andrade and Chhaochharia, 2010). These studies call for research on the role of information 
learning in the relationship between FPI and FDI: Can investors extract information from FDI 
about the returns of investing in a foreign country and facilitate their stock investment? My paper 
theoretically and empirically investigates this question. 
 
I first propose a parsimonious model to demonstrate the channel by which FDI facilitates 
information extraction, and then I derive empirical predictions regarding the informativeness of 
FDI signals. Specifically, when investors make direct investment, due to their control and 
monitoring as insiders, they can obtain information about the returns of the overseas subsidiaries 
and thereby extract the information about the returns of making portfolio investment. I refer to 
the extent to which FDI predicts the returns of FPI in the target country as the informativeness of 
FDI. My model demonstrates that the informativeness of FDI reinforces the complementarity 
between FPI and FDI. In other words, when FDI provides more information that helps investors 
predict the returns of the target country, portfolio investment is more sensitive to direct 
investment, which constitutes the testable prediction of my paper. 
 
3 
 
I then empirically examine the effects of the informativeness of FDI on the sensitivity of FPI to 
FDI, which are characterized by the coefficients on the interaction terms between the measures 
of the informativeness of FDI and FDI. Unlike greenfield FDI, which is usually measured at the 
country level, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As), which are an increasingly 
important component of FDI, are recorded at the deal level by Securities Data Corporation 
Platinum (SDC). This rich feature allows me to construct the informativeness measures at the 
country level. Guided by the theoretical model, I aggregate the characteristics of the individual 
cross-border M&A deals and construct four measures of informativeness for each country pair in 
each year.
3
 
 
Using a large country-pair-year sample based on the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey 
(CPIS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), I construct the proportion of FPI holdings. I 
find that the correlation between FPI and FDI is positive and statistically significant, which 
provides the preliminary evidence of learning. More importantly, I find that the coefficients on 
the effects of informativeness of FDI on the sensitivity of FPI to FDI have the expected signs and 
are statistically significant and economically large, which provides supportive evidence for the 
channel highlighted in this paper: The informativeness of FDI reinforces the complementarity 
between FPI and FDI. Specifically, one measure of the informativeness is the degree of industrial 
concentration of the FDI in a particular target country, which measures the coverage of industries 
of cross-border deals given the total transaction values of cross-border M&As. Holding other 
variables fixed, if industrial concentration decreases by one standard deviation (0.28) from its 
sample average, a 1% increase in the proportion of FDI is associated with a 0.34% increase in 
the proportion of FPI.
4
 As detailed in the main text of the paper, the effects of other measures of 
                                                          
3
FDI includes greenfield FDI and cross-border M&As. To ease notation, I refer to cross-border 
M&As as FDI, with full awareness that cross-border M&As are only one important component 
of FDI. 
4
In other words, a one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of FDI is associated with  
4 
 
informativeness on the sensitivity of FPI to FDI are also statistically significant and 
economically large, which provides empirical evidence for the model's predictions. 
I then conduct several robustness tests. First, when I use alternative measures for the 
informativeness of FDI, the empirical findings still provide support for the model's predictions. 
Second, I perform additional tests by including control variables in the regressions, and the 
results provide further evidence that supports the theoretical framework. Third, the results from 
robust regressions, which are less sensitive to outliers than those from the OLS regressions, are 
consistent with the model's predictions, although the economic magnitude is weaker. Fourth, FPI 
is positively correlated with both the averages of FDI and the deviations of FDI from its sample 
average, and the coefficient estimates for the effects of informativeness of FDI on the sensitivity 
of FPI to FDI have the expected signs except for the coefficients on the interaction terms 
between the high-R&D deal ratio and the deviations of FDI. 
 
I also find that the results are robust to different econometric specifications. Specifically, to 
further explore the effects of informativeness of FDI on the sensitivity of FPI to FDI, I estimate 
Panel Vector Autoregression (VAR) models in which no restrictions are imposed on the causal 
relationship between FPI and FDI. I apply two approaches in the estimation. In the first approach, 
I divide the data into two subsamples based on the median of each informativeness measure and 
then estimate two sets of bivariate Panel VARs separately. In the second approach, for each 
informativeness measure, I take the interaction term as an endogenous variable and estimate a 
trivariate Panel VAR. In both approaches, with regard to the informativeness measures 
considered, the orthogonalized impulse responses of FPI to the corresponding shocks provide 
supportive evidence for the model's predictions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
0.61 units of standard-deviation increases in the proportion of FPI. 
 
 
5 
 
Finally, I find that the model's predictions are also robust to an alternative data set, namely an 
annual data set compiled from Treasury International Capital System (TIC) of the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury. I construct correponding variables based on the data characteristics 
of TIC and conduct similar exercises to examine the effects of informativeness of FDI on the 
sensitivity of FPI to FDI. Regarding the proportion of FPI flows as the dependent variable, the 
results are reassuringly similar: In most of the regressions, the effects of informativeness of FDI 
on the sensitivity of FPI to FDI have the expected signs and are statistically significant, although 
I cannot find clear patterns using the Panel VARs. 
 
This paper contributes to two lines of literature. The first is the information-based theoretical and 
empirical work on international investment. Regarding FPI, the observation on information 
asymmetry, theoretically and empirically, has been investigated in many studies and is still under 
debate (see, among others, Brennan and Cao, 1997; Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock, 2004; 
Brennan, Cao, Strong, and Xu, 2005). However, global information access and learning may 
eliminate this information asymmetry. Recently, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) show 
that when investors have a small information advantage in home assets, learning actually 
amplifies information asymmetry. Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider (2009) propose the 
concept of global private information
5
 and show that investors can use the information on their 
own country when they are investing abroad, which can alleviate their information disadvantage 
in foreign markets. 
 
Regarding FDI, existing research shows that FDI overcomes information asymmetry. Goldstein 
and Razin (2006) point out that when investing in FDI the control of investors enables them to 
                                                          
5
This term is defined as the information which is relevant for trading in many foreign countries 
simultaneously; see page 19 in Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider (2009). 
 
 
6 
 
obtain refined information on the foreign subsidiary. Moner-Colonques, Orts, and 
Sempere-Monerris (2007) show that FDI resolves demand uncertainty of the products in the 
foreign country. De Santis and Ehling (2007) find that fitted growth rates of the stock of FDI 
help explain current growth rates of the stock of FPI, and they conclude that investors can learn 
the information about fundamentals in the target country via FDI. Andrade and Chhaochharia 
(2010) find that FDI ten years ago can serve as the original information endowment of investors 
when they invest in FPI. 
 
Based on the research along this line, this paper shows that FDI facilitates information extraction. 
More importantly, using the theory as a guidance, I construct the measures of informativeness of 
FDI and provide robust empirical evidence that supports the model's predictions: The 
informativeness of FDI strengthens the positive correlation between FPI and FDI. Therefore, my 
paper theoretically and empirically pins down the impacts of bilateral exposure of real 
investment on financial investment, and thus identifies a novel role of FDI: information signaling 
in the allocation of FPI and thereby alleviating the information asymmetry about foreign markets. 
Because one of the explanations for the home bias is information asymmetry, this finding 
suggests that FDI can potentially help to reduce the degree of home bias and thereby reduce the 
cost of capital and improve the global risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors. This 
finding also complements the role of FDI as a mode to serve foreign markets versus exports 
when firms face the proximity-concentration trade-off (Horstmann and Markusen, 1992; 
Brainard, 1993; Markusen and Venables, 2000; Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004; Ramondo, 
Rappoport, and Ruhl, 2010; Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman, 2011; Oldenski, 2012). 
 
Second, my paper adds to the studies on the informativeness of signals. A growing literature 
investigates the price informativeness and (non)synchronicity in stock returns (see, among others, 
Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Roll, 1988; Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000; Li, Morck, Yang, and 
7 
 
Yeung, 2004; Veldkamp, 2006; Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007; Goldstein, Ozdenoren, Yuan, 
2011; Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2012). The existing research on these issues examines the 
degree to which the signal reveals the fundamental value of a particular firm. Built upon the 
previous work, my paper measures the informativeness of signals in an international context. 
Specifically, in my paper, the informativeness is referred to as the degree to which FDI reveals 
the market portfolio returns in a particular target country. Using the deal-level data on FDI, I 
construct measures of the informativeness according to investors' behaviors when they make FDI. 
My paper further links the degree of informativeness of FDI to the sensitivity of FPI to FDI. 
Thus, based on the comprehensive data on FPI and FDI, my paper extends the idea of 
informativeness of signals to an open-economy context. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 develops a theoretical model to 
formalize how FDI facilitates information extraction and derives the testable hypothesis. The 
empirical analysis follows in Section 1.3, in which I describe the sample of FPI and FDI, data 
sources, variable construction, and the econometric model. The main results are provided in 
Section 1.4. Robustness tests are explored in Section 1.5, and Section 1.6 concludes the paper. 
 
1.2 Model and Testable Hypothesis 
1.2.1 Model 
There are N  countries in the world. Consider an arbitrary country pair i and j  in the global 
economy, where i  stands for the source country and j  is the target country. The derivations 
apply to any country pair i  and j  in the following discussions. There is a representative 
investor in the source country, who has a chance to invest in a foreign country (host country). 
She can choose to invest via FDI and/or FPI. Following the standard literature, the investor 
invests in the country index when making FPI. In the case of FDI, since the investor has direct 
control over the foreign affiliate, she can observe a signal about the returns of investing in the 
8 
 
target country. 
 
There are two dates: 0 and 1. At date 0, the investor decides whether to make FDI to obtain the 
signal about the returns. At date 1, the investor decides the optimal amount of investment: If she 
chooses to do FDI, then she invests in both FDI and FDI-based FPI; otherwise, she invests in 
portfolios only. At the end of date 1, the investor consumes. Investing in FDI incurs fixed costs 
of ijF , which include the distribution and servicing network costs, as well as the costs of 
building or purchasing a subsidiary in a foreign country and the overhead production costs. ijF   
has a cumulative distribution function in a general form  FG  over the interval  FF, . 
Specifically, the investor first draws a payment of the fixed costs ijF  from the distribution  
 FG . Upon observing this draw, the investor may decide not to make FDI. If she chooses to 
invest in FDI, she obtains a signal about the returns of investing in the target country, which she 
can use to predict the returns of making FPI. The global net risk-free rate is normalized to be 0. 
Let j  be the index returns of the target country in excess of the risk-free rate. j  is normally 
distributed with mean j  and variance /1  and is independent across countries. 
 
Following Brennan and Cao (1997) and Brennan, Cao, Strong, and Xu (2005), I assume that the 
investor is characterized by a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function: We , 
where W  denotes the wealth.
6
 
 
The total payoff per unit of FPI in country j  is  j1 , that is, if the investor invests ijPk , , then 
at the end of date 1 her total wealth 1iW  is 
                                                          
6
To simplify the derivation, I assume that the coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion is 
equal to 1. The results hold for any positive coefficient of constant absolute risk aversion. 
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Without loss of generality, suppose the initial wealth at date 0, 0iW , is 0. Therefore, the budget 
constraint at date 1 degenerates into 
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At date 1, if the investor chooses to make FPI only, her decision is 
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The optimal amount of FPI in target country j  is 
., jijPk 
  
The date-0 indirect utility of doing FPI is  
2
1
5.0
,
j
N
jeU iP
 
 

 , and the certainty equivalent is  
2
1, 5.0 j
N
jiPCE     . 
 
If the investor chooses to make FDI, she first pays the fixed costs ijF . After paying ijF , she 
obtains a signal on the returns of investing in target country j  and receives a cash flow ijDV ,  at 
date 1. The return per unit of direct investment is affected by both the target country index 
returns j  and an idiosyncratic shock ij . 
 
Following Goldstein and Razin (2006), I assume that the cash flow from FDI is in a quadratic 
form 
  ,5.0 2 ,,, ijijDijDijjijD FkkV    
where ijDk ,  stands for the amount of FDI. ij  is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance  
/1 , and ij  is independent of j . At date 1, after observing ijj   , the investor maximizes 
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the cash flow received in country j  as follows: 
 
  .5.0max 2 ,,
,
ijijDijDijj
k
Fkk
ijD
  
The optimal amount of FDI is 
., ijjijDk  
                                         (1.1) 
Therefore, the optimal cash flow from FDI is 
 
.
2
2
, ij
ijj
ijD FV 



                                   (1.2) 
 
Since the representative investor observes the signal ijj    in country j , conditional on this 
signal she is able to extract and learn the information about the index returns j , which 
facilitates her decision on the amount of FPI to do in country j . Therefore, the investor makes 
additional investment in FPI, which I refer to as FDI-based FPI. So, at date 1, conditional on the 
observed signal ijj   , the investor chooses the amount of FDI-based FPI to maximize the 
expected utility 
 
 
 
 
 
Njijj
W
k
i
NjijDP
eE
,...2,1
|max
1
,...2,1,|

 

  
subject to 
 ,,|,
1
1
ijDPjijD
N
j
i kVW 


  
where ijDPk ,|  is the amount of FDI-based FPI in country j . 
As j 's are independent, given the CARA-normal structure, the optimal amount of FDI-based 
FPI is 
 .,| ijjjijDPk                                    (1.3) 
Note that 

ijDV ,  does not affect 

ijDPk ,|  because 

ijDV , , as shown in (1.2), is a constant given the 
information set  
 Njijj ,...2,1
 , and the CARA assumption implies that the portfolio invesment 
is wealth independent. 
Given (1.1) and (1.3), the relationship between the optimal amount of FDI-based FPI and FDI is 
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captured by 
.,,|
  ijDjijDP kk                                    (1.4) 
 
Applying the moment-generating function of non-central Chi-square distributions, I can compute 
the date-0 indirect utility iDU ,  of doing FDI and the corresponding certainty equivalent iDCE , , 
which negatively linearly depends on the fixed costs ijF . Therefore, in equilibrium, there exists a 
threshold value ijF  such that the investor from country i  is indifferent between choosing to do 
FDI to obtain the signal on the returns of investing in target country j  and choosing to invest 
only in FPI in country j . 
 
To summarize, if the representative investor from country i  draws a payment of fixed costs  
ijF  below 

ijF , she makes FDI and FDI-based FPI; otherwise, she only invests in FPI.
7
 
Therefore, at the country level, the relationship between FPI and FDI is captured by Eq. (1.4). 
 
1.2.2 Testable Hypothesis 
Eq. (1.4) is the basis of the empirical analysis. Its empirical implications are twofold. First, Eq. 
(1.4) implies that the optimal amount of FPI is positively correlated with the optimal amount of 
FDI. More importantly, as the sensitivity of FPI to FDI is captured by  , Eq. (1.4) has an 
implication for the informativeness of the signal. Given that /1  is the variance of the noise in 
the signal, a high value of /1  means that the signal is very noisy and that investors cannot 
easily predict the market returns j  based on the signal. Thus,   captures the informativeness 
of FDI, which is defined as the extent to which FDI predicts the returns of making portfolio 
investment in the foreign target country. A higher value of   implies a higher degree of 
                                                          
7
If the investor only makes FPI, then the optimal amount of FDI, 0, 

ijDk . Therefore, there is no 
relationship between FPI and FDI. 
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informativeness. 
 
The model's implications are also intuitive. At a given point in time, if investors try to predict the 
returns in each target country, and thus decide the amount of portfolio investment in each target 
country, they will use all information available to them at that point. This includes both the 
information that investors have themselves and the information that they learn from the direct 
investment. In this scenario, portfolio investment will be more sensitive to direct investment 
when direct investment provides more information that helps investors predict the returns of the 
target country, i.e., when direct investment is more informative. Accordingly, I present the 
following testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.1 If direct investment has a higher degree of informativeness, i.e., a higher value 
of  , portfolio investment is more sensitive to direct investment. 
 
1.3 Empirical Analysis 
1.3.1 Data and Sample 
To empirically test the above hypothesis, I obtain a comprehensive data set on FPI and FDI. I 
obtain the FPI data from two sources: the CPIS of the IMF
8
 and the TIC of the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury.
9
 CPIS records the most comprehensive year-end holdings of bilateral foreign 
portfolio equity securities valued at market prices, and the sample covers the period from 2001 to 
2008. TIC reports the international investment flows of equity securities by U.S. residents, and 
the sample is over the period from 1985 to 2010.
10
 
                                                          
8
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) analyze the data collecting of the CPIS database and conclude 
that (page 541) “[T]hese shortfalls notwithstanding, the CPIS provides a unique perspective on 
cross-country equity positions that warrants a detailed analysis.” 
9
One weakness of the TIC data is that the data are recorded by geographic region and not by the 
security's country of origin. Therefore, the data could be unrepresentative of countries in which 
international financial centers are located (Warnock and Cleaver, 2002). 
10
Although the TIC data start from January 1977, the coverage of the cross-border M&As 
reported by SDC only starts from January 1, 1985. 
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Regarding the country sample, based on the data availability of the CPIS and Datastream, for 
each variable applied, I construct a bilateral data matrix of 42 acquirer countries and 42 target 
countries. For the CPIS sample, over the period from 2001 to 2008, these 42 countries, on 
average, account for 95.79% of the total amount of foreign portfolio holdings worldwide. Over 
the period of 1985 to 2010, the 41 countries, on average, account for 85.81% of the total amount 
of gross purchases of foreign equities by U.S. residents. The countries are listed in Table 1.A.6. 
 
I use the country-level characteristics of cross-border M&As to measure the information 
obtained from FDI. To construct informativeness measures at the country level, I aggregate the 
relevant information of individual cross-border M&A deals that are reported by SDC. Regarding 
the CPIS data, I construct the cross-border M&A sample using the following criteria: (1) both the 
target and acquirer countries are in the country list as shown in Table 1.A.6; (2) the deal is 
announced between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2008, and is completed by the end of the 
sample period; (3) the deal is cross-border; (4) to reduce measurement errors, the deal value must 
be at least 1 million U.S. dollars; (5) following the standard literature, I exclude leveraged 
buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers, repurchases, and 
privatizations from the sample; and (6) I exclude deals in which the target or the acquirer is a 
government agency.
11
 The maximum number of cross-border deals is 46,873. 
 
In order to match with the FPI data from TIC, I use the following criteria to screen the 
cross-border M&A deals: (1) the acquirer country is the U.S., and the target country is in the 
country list as shown in Table 1.A.6 except the U.S.; (2) the deal is announced between January 
1, 1985 and December 31, 2010 and is completed by the end of the sample period; and the above 
                                                          
11
Karolyi and Liao (2010) investigate the cross-border acquisitions led by government-controlled 
acquirers from 1990 to 2008 using the corporate-led acquisitions as a benchmark. 
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criteria (3) to (6) are also applied to this screening process. The maximum number of 
cross-border deals corresponding to the TIC sample is 9,196 .
12
 
 
Based on the model's predictions, I test whether investors hold more portfolio investment in a 
foreign market if they find that cross-border M&As are more informative in predicting the 
returns of that foreign market. Accordingly, for the CPIS data, the dependent variable is 
measured by the proportion of FPI holdings of each source country i  in the total FPI liabilities 
of target country j  in year t . Correspondingly, I use the proportion of transaction values of 
cross-border M&A deals as the measure for FDI, which is defined as the percentage of the 
transaction values of cross-border deals from each acquirer country i  (source country) to target 
country j  in the total values of cross-border deals in target country j  in year t .
13
 For the 
same reason, when examining firm characteristics, such as their R&D expenditures, I focus on 
those of the target firms. 
 
For the TIC data, since the U.S. is the only source country, the dependent variable is measured 
by the proportion of FPI flows by U.S. residents into a specific target country in the total FPI 
flows out of the U.S. in year t . Specifically, the proportion of FPI is the gross purchases of 
country j 's equities by U.S. residents scaled by the total gross purchases of equities in the 41 
                                                          
12
The number of deals used in the computation of each informativeness measure may vary 
depending on the availability of the specific data items. 
13
As FPI is measured by values instead of counts, I use transaction values to measure the 
proportion of cross-border M&As. Moreover, it is appropriate to use the transaction values to 
construct the informativeness measures, such as industrial concentration, value concentration, 
industrial relatedness, and weighted beta. Therefore, I report the regression results using the 
proportion of transaction values of cross-border M&As. As additional tests, I use the proportion 
of counts of cross-border M&As and its interaction terms with informativeness measures as 
regressors and conduct the exercises. The results also provide support to the model's predictions 
and are available upon request. 
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countries by U.S. residents in year t . Correspondingly, the proportion of FDI is the transaction 
values of cross-border deals involving the U.S. as the acquirer and country j  as the target 
scaled by the total transaction values of cross-border M&As from the U.S. to the 41 countries. 
The definitions of all variables and data sources are described in Table 1.A.2. 
 
1.3.2 Variable Construction 
In this subsection, I first present how the informativeness measures are constructed; I then 
outline various control variables, as documented in the existing literature. 
 
1.3.2.1 Informativeness Measures 
The most novel feature of my model is that the degree of informativeness of FDI reinforces the 
sensitivity of FPI to FDI. To test this hypothesis, I require data that quantify the degree of 
informativeness of FDI for each country pair in each year. I rely on guidance from the model to 
construct measures of informativeness of FDI. According to my model, a low variance (low 
/1 ) of the idiosyncratic returns implies that the variation from the idiosyncratic returns is low 
at the aggregate level. Therefore, given the total variation of the total returns, the variation from 
the index (systematic) returns is high, which helps investors to predict the index (systematic) 
returns and thereby stands for a high degree of informativeness of FDI. Based on the economic 
meaning of parameter  , I construct two sets of informativeness measures. As detailed below, 
the first set, which includes the industrial concentration and the deal value concentration, 
measures the informativeness from the perspective of the dispersion of deals. The second set, 
which includes the high-R&D deal ratio and the high-tech deal ratio, measures the 
informativeness from the perspective of the implied idiosyncratic returns of the target firms by 
their production characteristics. 
 
First, I construct the measure industrial concentration. Given the total values of cross-border 
16 
 
M&A deals in a target country, if these deals cover numerous industries, they stand for a low 
degree of industrial concentration, which implies that at the aggregate level the idiosyncratic part 
of each individual FDI firm cancels out and that the variation from the idiosyncratic returns is 
low. Therefore, given the total variation of the total returns, the variation from the index 
(systematic) returns is high, which helps investors to predict the index (systematic) returns. Thus, 
the model predicts that when M&As are more industrially concentrated, an additional percentage 
increase in FDI is associated with a lower increase in FPI. I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
to measure the degree of industrial concentration,
14
 and I include the industrial concentration and 
its interaction with the proportion of FDI in the regression. Given that a high 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index stands for a high degree of industrial concentration, I expect a 
higher interaction term to be associated with a lower proportion of FPI. 
 
As an alternative measure to the industrial concentration, I construct the deal value 
concentration. Given the total values of all cross-border deals in a target country, if there are a 
large number of deals with relatively small values, then these deals represent a low degree of 
value concentration. Deals with a low degree of value concentration can represent the target 
country economy to a greater extent, which implies that the variation from the idiosyncratic 
returns is lower. Therefore, the model predicts that when FDI is less value concentrated, an 
additional percentage increase in FDI is correlated with a higher increase in FPI. I include the 
deal value concentration and its interaction with the proportion of FDI in the regression, and I 
expect a negative coefficient estimate on the interaction term. 
 
Another measure is the high-R&D deal ratio. Firms with high R&D expenditures have earnings 
that depend on the realization of future investment opportunities (Lorek, Stone, and Willinger, 
                                                          
14
Roll (1992) and Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) use similar measures in cross-country studies. 
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1999). Therefore, the variance of idiosyncratic returns of these firms is high. However, if there 
are many deals involving foreign target firms with high R&D expenditures, this implies that in 
this specific target country, the volatility of idiosyncratic returns of these firms is revealed to be 
low ex post (low /1 ), which suggests that the signal on the returns is less noisy and that 
investors can better predict the systematic returns. Therefore, the informativeness of FDI is high. 
 
The high-R&D deal ratio is constructed in the following way. For a specific country pair i  
(acquirer country) and j  (target country) in year t , deals involving a target firm in a high R&D 
industry are defined as high-R&D deals. The high-R&D deal ratio is then defined as the fraction 
of high-R&D deals in the total number of cross-border deals in country j . The ratio is computed 
through the following steps. For each target firm with data on R&D expenditures one year prior 
to the announcement of the M&A deals, I scale its R&D expenditures by its total assets and 
define this ratio as tijdnrd ,,, , where n , d , i , j , and t  are the target firm index, its 4-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) index, the acquirer country index, the target country 
index, and the year of the announcement of the deal, respectively. I then take the average of  
tijdnrd ,,, 's over all the target firms in the same 4-digit SIC industries and define the average,  
drd , as the R&D expenditure ratio of industry d . I rank all the 4-digit SIC industries according 
to drd . If drd  is above the median, then industry d  is defined as a high-R&D industry. If the 
target firm operates in a high-R&D industry, the dummy variable, defined for target firm n ,  
tijdnrdhigh ,,,_ , equals 1; otherwise, 0. Finally, I compute the high-R&D deal ratio, ijtrdhigh _ , 
for each target-acquirer country pair in each year, 
ijt
tijdn
ijtN
n
N
rdhigh
ijtrdhigh
,,,1
_
_
  , where ijtN  is the 
total number of deals involving acquirer country  i  and target country j  in year t . I include 
this ratio and its interaction with the proportion of FDI in the regression, and I expect a positive 
coefficient estimate on the interaction term. 
 
Using the same logic, as an alternative to the high-R&D deal ratio, I construct the high-tech deal 
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ratio. A deal is defined as a high-tech deal if both the acquirer and the target firms are high-tech 
companies; otherwise, it is a non-high-tech deal. For a specific country pair i  (acquirer country) 
and j  (target country) in year t , the high-tech deal ratio is defined as the fraction of the 
high-tech deals involving acquirer firms from country i  in the total number of cross-border 
deals in country j  in year t . The higher the high-tech deal ratio for a specific country pair, the 
less the variation there is from the noise in the return signals, and the more informative FDI is. I 
include the high-tech deal ratio and its interaction with the proportion of FDI in the regression, 
and I expect a positive coefficient estimate on the interaction term. 
 
1.3.2.2 Additional Control Variables 
In addition to the informativeness measures, I also control for various variables that may be 
correlated with FPI and FDI, as documented in the existing literature. 
 
First, I control for the differences in stock returns between the target country and the acquirer 
country. Many studies show that foreign investors are return-chasing (Brennan and Cao, 1997; 
Froot, O'Connel, and Seasholes, 2001; Karolyi, 2002; Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz, 2004; 
Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider, 2007). A higher difference may attract the acquirer country 
investors to invest more in the target country; therefore, I expect a positive association between 
FPI and the differences in stock returns. I compute the differences on an annual basis. 
 
Second, I control for the stock return correlation, measured by the pairwise correlation between 
the monthly Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) market returns of target country j  
and acquirer country i  over the past five years before year t . Investors may use foreign assets 
to hedge against home-country-specific risks, for example, real exchange rate risk and risk from 
non-tradable wealth components such as non-financial income (Adler and Dumas, 1983; Cooper 
and Kaplanis, 1994; Coeurdacier and Gourinchas, 2009). This hedging motive may lead to an 
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increase in FPI. A high stock return correlation reduces the diversification potential between the 
two markets, and therefore I expect the coefficient on the stock return correlation to be negative. 
 
Third, I also include relative stock return volatility of the target country in the regressions, which 
is measured by the differences between the annualized stand deviation of the target country stock 
returns and that of the world market stock returns over the past five years before year t . Van 
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) predict that portfolio investors intend to learn the 
information about the stocks with high uncertainty. This implies that the correlation between 
portfolio investment and stock return uncertainty of a target country should be positive. 
Fourth, the regressions also control for the changes in real exchange rates between the target 
country and the acquirer country. Since the real exchange rate is defined as the value of the 
acquirer country currency in terms of the target country currency, a positive change means the 
depreciation of the target country currency. Existing research finds mixed results regarding the 
correlation between the foreign investment into a target country and the changes in the exchange 
rates of this target country.
15
 
 
I also include the degree of capital account openness in the regressions. Capital controls have 
been shown to affect portfolio investment (Black, 1974; Stulz, 1981). Recent empirical findings 
suggest that restrictions on cross-border capital flows still exist in emerging markets and other 
developing economies (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2009) and that equity market 
segmentation remains significant in emerging markets (Carrieri, Errunza, and Hogan, 2007; 
                                                          
15
Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2004) find that a depreciation of the local currency leads to more 
foreign equity inflows in two of nine countries examined. Karolyi (2002) finds that during the 
Asian crisis the response of foreigners' net purchases of Japanese equity to a depreciation of the 
yen is negative and then quickly dissipates to zero. Under the assumption of incomplete risk 
sharing of foreign exchange risk, Hau and Rey (2006) show that a foreign currency appreciation 
is positively correlated with net equity flows into the foreign market. 
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Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel, 2011). I include the Chinn-Ito index of capital account 
openness of both the target and the source countries in the regressions. 
 
I further control for the institutional quality by including in regressions the country governance, 
which stands for the information and legal environment. If this environment is transparent, 
investors are able to easily obtain information, and the information asymmetry can be alleviated. 
Country governance is computed as the average of the ten economic freedom scores tracked by 
The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation. 
 
In addition, I control for the liquidity and transaction costs of a stock market. As suggested by 
Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005), investors tend to invest in more developed stock markets which 
have higher liquidity and lower transaction costs. Following these authors, I control for the 
market capitalization of listed companies to GDP ratio and turnover ratio of both the source and 
target countries in the regressions. 
 
Finally, language barriers and geographic distances can also be important sources of 
informational cost to cross-border investment, and therefore they become barriers to foreign 
investment (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 1999; Hau, 2001). Thus, I also include an indicator variable 
for common language for the target-acquirer country pair and the geographic distance between 
the target country and the acquirer country. 
 
1.3.3 Econometric Methodology 
The summary statistics are reported in Table 1.A.3. The data show that there are large variations 
in the variables of interest. Although the average number of time series observations is limited 
for some variables, the number of cross-sectional units is large. Tables 1.A.4 and 1.A.5 report the 
pairwise correlations of the variables for the CPIS data and the TIC data, respectively. As 
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pointed out above, I construct two sets of informativeness measures: The industrial concentration 
and the value concentration belong to the first set, and the high-R&D deal ratio and the high-tech 
deal ratio belong to the second. As shown in Table 1.A.4, the industrial concentration and the 
value concentration are highly correlated, with a correlation of 0.95, and the high-R&D deal ratio 
and the high-tech deal ratio are also correlated, with a correlation of 0.47. However, the 
correlations of measures in different sets are very low. The correlations of the informativeness 
measures for the TIC data display similar patterns, which are detailed in Table 1.A.5. These 
observations are consistent with the economic perspective from which these measures are 
constructed, and these two sets of measures are based on the economic meaning of parameter  
  in the theoretical model. Therefore, I include the combination of the industrial concentration 
and the high-R&D deal ratio in my main empirical tests. I also conduct further tests using the 
other three combinations. 
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the role of information on actual portfolio allocations 
instead of on deviations of portfolio allocations from their sample averages. In the panel data 
setting, the errors may be correlated over time periods for a given country pair (the 
cross-sectional unit), and/or they may be correlated across country pairs for a given year. As the 
baseline econometric methodology, I apply the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
in the empirical analysis, which matches the model-implied theoretical relationship between FPI 
and FDI. I include year dummies in the regression and use the clustered standard errors by 
target-acquirer country pairs to deal with correlations between country pairs in the same year. 
The time dummies are designed to remove the correlation between country pairs in the same year, 
and clustering by country pairs is designed to obtain the unbiased estimation of standard errors. 
This methodology is proposed by Petersen (2009) and is used in the existing literature (Bekaert 
and Wang, 2009; Ferreira, Massa, and Matos, 2009; among others).
16
 The proportions of FDI 
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As pointed out by Petersen (2009), clustering by two dimensions produces less biased standard 
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and informativeness measures are lagged by one panel year to mitigate the effect of endogeneity. 
I use the pooled OLS as the baseline econometric methodology, and various robustness tests are 
conducted in Section 1.5. 
 
Based on Eq. (1.4), I estimate the following model in the panel data setting: 
,1,1,1,1, ijttijttijtijtijtijijt ufZXFDIXFDIFPI                (1.5) 
where 1, tijX  is a vector representing the measures for informativeness of FDI, ijtZ  is a vector 
of additional control variables, tf  stands for the year dummies, and ijtu  is the idiosyncratic 
term. Leaving the level terms 1, tijX  out can result in the interaction terms being spuriously 
significant; therefore, I also include the level terms in the regression. 
 
I focus on the estimation of coefficient  , that is, FDI may have a different effect on FPI for 
country pairs that have different informativeness measures 1, tijX . Holding all other variables 
fixed, the partial effect of FDI on FPI is 
FPIijt
FDIij,t1
   X ij,t1 ,
 
which varies with the values of the informativeness measures. I evaluate the partial effect at the 
sample mean of the informativeness measure. Take the informativeness measure industrial 
concentration as an example. If the coefficient estimate on the interaction term between FDI and 
the industrial concentration is less than 0, it implies that an additional percentage increase in FDI 
in the previous year is associated with a lower increase in FPI for a higher degree of industrial 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
errors. However, clustering by cross-sectional units and time does not always yield unbiased 
estimates. As the number of clusters---cross-sectional units or years---declines, the standard 
errors clustered by cross-sectional units and time are biased, although the magnitude of the bias 
is not large. When there are only a few clusters in one dimension, clustering by the more 
frequent cluster yields results that are almost identical to clustering by both cross-sectional units 
and time. In this specific setting, I have around 1,000 country pairs and at most 7 years (varying 
depending on the explanatory variables); therefore, I cluster by country pairs. 
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concentration, i.e., the effect of FDI on FPI is weaker if FDI is less informative in predicting the 
index returns of investing in the target country. 
 
1.4 Results 
In this section, I present the results using the CPIS data. The results based on the TIC data are 
reported in Section 1.5 as a robustness test. 
 
1.4.1 Baseline Regressions 
Table 1.1 reports results of the multivariate regression analysis (1.5) without additional control 
variables. The dependent variable is the proportion of FPI, i.e., the percentage of FPI holdings 
from source country i  in the total FPI liabilities of target country j . In order to raise the level 
of confidence in the results, I consider several variants of the basic specification. Columns (1) to 
(4) present the results from regressions with each of the four informativeness measures and its 
corresponding interaction term with FDI as explanatory variables. As the two sets of measures 
capture different aspects of the informativeness of FDI, and the measures within each set are 
highly correlated, columns (5) to (8) display the results from regressions with a combination of 
two informativeness measures from two different sets. All of the coefficients on the interaction 
term are statistically significant and have the expected signs. 
 
To assess the magnitude of these effects, I set the values of all the informativeness measures in 
the regression to their sample average values and compute the percentage changes in FPI implied 
by a 1% change in FDI. Regarding the informativeness measure industrial concentration, I 
choose column (5) to illustrate the magnitude of its effects, as column (5) is used as a baseline 
regression in the following analysis. The coefficient on the interaction term of industrial 
concentration with FDI is negative and statistically significant. Holding all other variables fixed, 
a 1% increase in FDI is associated with a 0.15% increase in the proportion of FPI. If industrial 
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concentration decreases by one standard deviation (0.28) from its sample average, a 1% increase 
in the FDI proportion is associated with a 0.34% increase in the proportion of FPI. Therefore, 
when measured by industrial concentration, the effects of informativeness of FDI on the 
sensitivity of FPI to FDI is economically large. As shown in columns (1) and (6), the effects of 
industrial concentration have a similar magnitude. As an alternative to industrial concentration, I 
include value concentration as a measure for informativeness in the regression; as shown in 
columns (2), (7), and (8), the effects of value concentration are also statistically significant and 
economically large. 
 
Regarding the economic significance of the high-R&D deal ratio, as shown in column (5), 
evaluated at the sample average of the high-R&D deal ratio, if the FDI proportion increases by  
1%, then the proportion of FPI increases by 0.76%. If the high-R&D deal ratio increases by one 
standard deviation (0.36) from its sample average, a 1% increase in the FDI proportion is 
associated with a 0.85% increase in FPI. As an alternative to the high-R&D deal ratio, I include 
the high-tech deal ratio in the regressions; as reported in columns (4), (6), and (8), the results 
regarding the high-tech deal ratio are also statistically significant and economically large. 
 
I also calculate standardized coefficients, i.e., beta coefficients for the above independent 
variables. They are reported in Table 1.2, along with the sample means and standard deviations 
of the relevant variables. A beta coefficient converts the regression coefficients into units of 
sample standard deviations. It calculates the units of standard-deviation change in FPI implied by 
one unit of standard-deviation change in FDI. Evaluated at the sample average of the industrial 
concentration, a one standard-deviation increases in the FDI proportion is only associated with a  
0.27 standard-deviation increase in the proportion of FPI. If the industrial concentration 
decreases by one standard deviation from its sample average, a one standard-deviation increase 
in the FDI proportion is associated with a 0.61 standard-deviation increase in the proportion of 
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FPI. These beta coefficients suggest that the informativeness measures have an impact 
comparable to that implied by the differences in stock returns between the target and the source 
countries, one of the standard variables in the international portfolio investment literature. Taken 
as a whole, these results provide strong support for the model's predictions. 
 
1.4.2 Regressions with Additional Control Variables 
In this section, I explore the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions that incorporate 
other determinants of FPI which are not captured by Eq. (1.4). Table 1.3 presents the tests 
including additional explanatory variables that are correlated with FPI, as documented in the 
existing literature. I report the results including the industrial concentration and the high-R&D 
deal ratio as informativeness measures. Because the results with other combinations of 
informativeness measures are similar, in order to save space I do not include them in Table 1.3.
17
 
 
Compared with regression (5) in Table 1.1, in regression (1) in Table 1.3 I include two additional 
regressors, namely the differences in stock market returns and the pairwise stock return 
correlation between the target country and the source country. The coefficients on the interaction 
terms of the informativeness measures remain statistically significant and have the expected 
signs, and the economic magnitudes are similar to those in Table 1.1. The coefficient on the 
differences in stock returns is positive and statistically significant. This result is consistent with 
the positive feedback trading by international investors, which is documented in the existing 
literature (among others, see Brennan and Cao, 1997; Froot, O'Connel, and Seasholes, 2001; 
Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz, 2004; Albuquerque, Bauer, and Schneider, 2009). The magnitude of 
this correlation is also large: a one-standard-deviation increase in the stock return differences is 
associated with a 2.12% increase in the proportion of FPI, which corresponds to 25.07% of its 
                                                          
17
The results are available upon request. 
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standard deviation across all country-pair-years. The coefficient on the pairwise stock return 
correlation is statistically insignificant. 
 
Columns (2) to (9) display eight different specifications that extend the regression in column (1) 
with each of the eight sets of additional variables: the relative stock return volatility, changes in 
real exchange rates, capital account openness, country governance, market capitalization to GDP 
ratio, the turnover ratio, the common language dummy, and geographic distance. In all eight 
specifications, the coefficients on the interaction terms of the informativeness measures are 
statistically significant and of a similar magnitude to those in column (1). Among the control 
variables, as shown in columns (2) to (9), the coefficients on the differences in stock returns are 
positive and statistically significant, as before, and the coefficients on the pairwise stock return 
correlation are statistically insignificant. 
 
Of the eight sets of new variables introduced in these additional analyses, the coefficients on the 
relative stock return volatility; changes in real exchange rates; the source country's characteristics, 
including capital account openness, country governance, market capitalization to GDP ratio, and 
the turnover ratio; the common language dummy; and geographic distance are positive and 
statistically significant. The positive correlation between FPI and the relative stock return 
volatility is consistent with the model's prediction in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) 
and with the findings in Andrade and Chhaochharia (2010). The positive correlation between FPI 
and changes in real exchange rates is consistent with the findings in Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz 
(2004). 
 
The coefficient on the target country's turnover ratio is negative and statistically significant; 
coefficients on the other characteristics of the target country, including capital account openness, 
market capitalization to GDP ratio, and country governance, are statistically insignificant. 
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Regarding the magnitude of the coefficient on the target country's turnover ratio, a 
one-standard-deviation increase in turnover ratio is associated with a 1.34% decrease in the 
proportion of FPI, which corresponds to 15.80% of its standard deviation across all 
country-pair-years. Intuitively, foreign investors would have a tendency to invest more in 
countries with higher stock market turnover; however, in a market with short-sales constraints, 
turnover of the stocks, or more generally liquidity, can serve as a sentiment index; thus, high 
turnover is related to overvaluation (Baker and Stein, 2004; Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007). As 
shown in columns (7) and (11), a negative association between FPI and the turnover ratio 
accords with their finding. 
 
In column (10), I include all of the regressors, and the results are reassuringly similar. The 
coefficient on capital account openness of the target country is positive and statistically 
significant, which is consistent with the results in Bekaert and Wang (2009) and in Andrade and 
Chhaochharia (2010). The coefficient on the target country's turnover ratio is statistically 
insignificant. 
 
It is possible that an omitted variable affecting both FDI and FPI creates an endogeneity problem 
in the OLS specifications. To address this endogeneity issue, column (11) reports the result from 
the instrumental variable (IV) estimation using two-stage least squares (2SLS). FDI and those in 
the interaction terms are instrumented by stock return correlation, changes in real exchange rates, 
capital account openness of the target country, country governance of the target country, market 
capitalization to GDP ratio of the target country, and geographic distance. The coefficient on FDI 
is smaller than that in column (10), the coefficient on the interaction term between FDI and 
industrial concentration is around twice of that in column (10), and the coefficient on the 
interaction term between FDI and the high-R&D deal ratio is more than twice of that in column 
(10). All other statistically significant coefficients have a similar magnitude to those in column 
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(10). 
 
To summarize, the effect of the informativeness of FDI on the sensitivity of FPI to FDI is robust 
to different combinations of control variables. The effect is also fairly stable across different 
specifications. Therefore, the empirical findings provide robust support to the model's 
predictions. 
 
1.5 Robustness Tests 
1.5.1 Robust Regressions 
To address the concerns on influences of outliers, I apply the robust regression, which is less 
sensitive to outliers than OLS. To save space, Table 1.4 reports results from regressions with two 
informativeness measures and all of the control variables as regressors. 
 
Column (1) in Table 1.4 includes the same regressors as column (10) in Table 1.3, which is the 
OLS regression. Although the coefficient on the interaction term for the high-R&D deal ratio is 
statistically insignificant in the robust regression, the interaction term for the industrial 
concentration remains statistically significant. Regarding the control variables, the coefficient on 
the pairwise stock return correlation is positive and statistically significant in the robust 
regression, suggesting that investors hold more assets in a target country in which the stock 
returns have a higher correlation with those of their domestic stock markets.
18
 Although this 
finding does not provide support for the risk diversification of international portfolio investment 
in theoretical studies, it accords with some empirical studies in the existing literature: Aviat and 
                                                          
18
As another test, I also use the correlation between the monthly MSCI returns of target country  
j  and the MSCI world returns over the past five years before year t  to measure the stock return 
correlation. The results are similar. 
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Coeurdacier (2007) find a positive association between bilateral banking asset holdings and stock 
return correlation, and Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2008) also document a positive association 
between bilateral portfolio holdings and stock return correlation. The coefficient on the 
geographic distance is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent with the results in 
the previous research on the home bias puzzle (see, among others, Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; 
Chan, Covrig, and Ng, 2005). 
 
In column (2), I include the high-tech deal ratio as an alternative informativeness measure to the 
high-R&D deal ratio, and the coefficient on the interaction term for the high-tech deal ratio is 
statistically insignificant. When I use the deal value concentration as an alternative measure to 
the industrial concentration, the interaction terms for high-R&D deal ratio and high-tech deal 
ratio are statistically significant, as shown in columns (3) and (4), respectively. Regarding the 
coefficient estimates for the control variables in columns (2), (3), and (4), results are similar to 
those in column (1) even if I include different informativeness measures in these regressions. In 
summary, although the economic magnitude of the interaction terms is weaker in the robust 
regressions, the results are still consistent with the model's prediction. 
 
1.5.2 Panel VARs 
In the theoretical model and the above empirical tests, the causal relationship runs from FDI to 
FPI, which may be justified by the observation that investors have control over the overseas 
subsidiaries when making FDI and thus may obtain information about the returns of making 
investment in foreign target countries. To further explore the effects of informativenss of FDI 
and the relationship between FPI and FDI, as an additional robustness test, I present the results 
from the Panel VAR specification (Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen, 1988), in which no 
restrictions are imposed on the causal relationship between FPI and FDI. Because I focus on the 
effects of informativeness of the FDI signals on the sensitivity of FPI to FDI, which are captured 
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by the coefficients on the interaction terms between the informativeness measures and FDI, I 
apply the following two approaches. 
 
In the first approach, following Love and Zicchino (2006) and Powell, Ratha, and Mohapatra 
(2002), I divide the data into two subsamples based on the median of each informativeness 
measure and estimate two sets of Panel VARs separately, in which each informativeness measure 
is below and above the median, respectively. Table 1.5 reports the results for the bivariate Panel 
VAR with two lags of FPI and FDI when the industrial concentration is investigated, and Figure 
1.1 shows the corresponding orthogonalized impulse responses for these two subsamples. When 
the industrial concentration is below the median, the orthogonalized impulse response of FPI to 
the shock of FDI (Figure 1.1, Panel A, bottom left) first rises, then slowly dies away; this implies 
that when FDI has a high degree of informativeness, FDI shock has a subsequently positive 
impact on FPI and that this positive impact slowly disappears as time passes by. In contrast, 
when the industrial concentration is above the median, the orthogonalized impulse response of 
FPI to the shock of FDI (Figure 1.1, Panel B, bottom left) rises upon receiving the shock, quickly 
declines below zero, and then slowly goes back to zero; the magnitude of the impulse response is 
smaller compared to that when the industrial concentration is below the median. These distinct 
patterns imply that when FDI provides less information that helps investors predict the returns of 
FPI in the target country, an increase in FDI leads to a smaller increase in FPI, which provides 
evidence to support the model's prediction. 
 
When investigating the value concentration, the high-R&D deal ratio, and the high-tech deal 
ratio, I also find patterns that are consistent with the model's prediction. Table 1.6 and Figure 1.2 
(Panel A, bottom left; Panel B, bottom left) demontrate the case for the high-R&D deal ratio. In 
order to save space, the results for the value concentration and the high-tech deal ratio are 
omitted in the main text. 
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In the second approach, I take the interaction term as an endogenous variable and estimate 
trivariate Panel VARs. In each Panel VAR, I include two lags of each endogenous variable. 
Regarding the ordering of the variables, I assume that FDI is the most exogenous variable and 
that it is followed by the interaction term. I also assume that FPI responds to the interaction term 
contemporaneously and that if there is any feedback effect from FPI to the interaction term it is 
likely to happen with a lag. When the industrial concentration is examined, the estimation result 
is reported in Panel A of Table 1.7. Corresponding to this estimation, as shown in Figure 1.3 
(bottom middle), the orthogonalized impulse response of FPI to the shock of the interaction term 
between the industrial concentration and FDI first drops below zero, then declines even further, 
and finally slowly converges to zero. This pattern is consistent with the results from the pooled 
OLS regressions, robust regressions, and the first approach. 
 
When the high-R&D deal ratio is examined, Panel B of Table 1.7 and Figure 1.4 present the 
estimation results and the set of impulse responses, respectively. The impulse response of FPI 
shows the opposite pattern to that when the industrial concentration is examined: It first rises 
above zero, then continues to increase, and finally converges to zero (Figure 1.4, bottom middle). 
This pattern implies that for a higher degree of informativeness an increase in FDI in the 
previous year leads to a greater increase in FPI, which is consistent with the model's prediction. I 
conduct further tests using the value concentration and the high-tech deal ratio, and the 
orthogonalized impulse response of FPI to the corresponding shocks provides additional 
evidence to support the model's prediction. 
 
In some cases, the estimation results and the corresponding impulse responses also suggest a 
positive causality running from FPI to FDI. This finding is consistent with the results in Ferreira, 
Massa, and Matos (2009), which suggest that FPI and FDI are complements and that the causal 
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relation is running from FPI to FDI: Portfolio investment builds bridges between firms 
internationally so that FPI actually facilitates cross-border M&As. These findings point to future 
research on the theoretical framework to incorporate them. 
 
1.5.3 TIC Data 
In this section, I use an alternative data set, namely the TIC data, to further test the robustness of 
the model's predictions. I conduct the same exercises as those for the CPIS data using the 
corresponding variables based on the TIC data. In order to save space, I include two 
informativeness measures and all of the control variables as the regressors in each regression. 
For the purpose of comparison, both the results from pooled OLS regressions and those from 
robust regressions are reported in Table 1.8: Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) present those from 
pooled OLS regressions, and columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) display those from robust regressions. 
 
As shown in column (1), the coefficients on the interaction terms between the informativeness 
measures and FDI bear the expected signs and are statistically significant. Column (2) indicates 
that, in the robust regression, the coefficients on the interaction terms are also statistically 
significant, although the economic magnitude is smaller than that in column (1). When I use the 
deal value concentration as an alternative to the industrial concentration to measure 
informativeness, as shown in columns (5) to (8), the coefficients on the interaction terms of the 
deal value concentration are also statistically significant. The coefficients on the interaction 
terms of the high-R&D deal ratio and the high-tech deal ratio are statistically significant in the 
robust regressions. 
 
Regarding the additional control variables in the regressions, similar to the results based on the 
CPIS data, in the robust regressions, FPI is positively associated with the pairwise stock return 
correlation between the target country and the acquirer country. In contrast to the results from the 
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CPIS data, the coefficients on the target country's market capitalization to GDP ratio are positive 
and statistically significant in all the regressions, and in the robust regressions the coefficients on 
the target country's turnover ratio are positive and statistically significant, which may suggest 
that the FPI of U.S. residents, on average, might not be correlated with the sentiment factor in the 
target country. 
 
As an additional test, I estimate Panel VAR models for the TIC data; however, the impulse 
responses of FPI to the relevant shocks do not display clear-cut patterns. One possible reason 
may be that the number of panels is very limited for the TIC data and that Panel VAR models 
require a large number of panels. 
 
1.5.4 Averages vs. Deviations of FDI 
In the previous sections, I show that the total amount of FDI provides information for investors 
to predict returns of the target country. One question follows: Regarding the informativeness of 
FDI, do different components of FDI have differential impacts on investors' portfolio allocations? 
Or, specifically, does FPI have different correlations with the interaction terms between the 
informativeness measures and two components of FDI, namely the average of FDI and the 
deviation of FDI from the corresponding sample average? 
 
In order to answer this question, I regress the proportion of FPI on the average proportion of FDI 
over the available time periods, the deviation of the proportion of FDI from the corresponding 
average, and their corresponding interaction terms with the informativeness measures. Table 1.9 
presents the results for the two data sets: columns (1) and (2) for the CPIS data and columns (3) 
and (4) for the TIC data. For the CPIS data, both the average and the deviation of FDI are 
positively correlated with FPI. As shown in column (1), the coefficients on the interaction terms 
between the informativeness measures and the average FDI have the expected signs and are 
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statistically significant. In column (2), the coefficient on the interaction terms between the 
high-R&D deal ratio and the deviation of FDI is negative. This may suggest that the high-R&D 
deal ratio may help investors to correct the over-adjustment in FPI in the previous year. As 
shown in columns (3) and (4), the TIC data demonstrate similar results to those for the CPIS 
data. 
 
1.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, I develop a model to demonstrate a mechanism that can alleviate investors' 
information asymmetry when they make portfolio investment overseas, that is, investors can 
extract information about the returns of making FPI in foreign countries from FDI. The model 
predicts that FPI and FDI are complements and that, more importantly, the informativeness of 
FDI strengthens the complementarity. I construct measures for the informativeness of FDI and 
provide evidence that supports the model's prediction. The effects of the informativeness of FDI 
are robust to various control variables and to different estimation specifications. 
 
My paper suggests that real investment and financial investment, in the international context, are 
linked through an information channel. These findings have rich policy implications. Since home 
bias continues to exist, the global risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors is still 
insufficient, and a high degree of home bias increases the cost of capital (Lau, Ng, and Zhang, 
2010). To reduce the home bias and thereby the cost of capital, one important policy may be to 
provide incentives for domestic investors to make portfolio investment abroad. In addition, 
another important aspect of the policy might be to promote financial innovation that can facilitate 
domestic firms to make FDI overseas. 
 
The findings also suggest that policy makers may take into account the learning effects when 
evaluating policies. Financial market infrastructures and monetary policies that influence FDI 
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can also affect international portfolio equity flows through the learning mechanism. For example, 
coordination in regulation and supervision of different jurisdictions may have impact on FDI of 
multinational companies. Through the learning mechanism, it may also affect FPI. Thus, when 
addressing issues on international framework for regulation and supervision, policy makers may 
also take into account the impact on international portfolio investment. 
 
The findings of this paper also point to new avenues for future research. First, one interesting 
question is how the volatility of portfolio investment is associated with that of cross-border 
M&As and information flows. The issue is particularly relevant as capital flow volatility can 
increase financial system vulnerabilities and magnify macroeconomic instability. Therefore, it is 
important to study the joint volatility of FPI and FDI, especially how the informativeness of FDI 
affects this relationship over business cycles in general and during extreme periods such as 
global financial crises.
19
 The CPIS data only cover a short time period and have low frequency. 
As these limitations on data availability are alleviated, investigations of the these issues could be 
greatly improved. 
 
Another interesting study could be to investigate the interconnectedness and characteristics of 
target firms and acquirer firms involved in cross-border M&As and their impact on financial 
stability. The existing research suggests that target countries can benefit from cross-border 
M&As: These transactions can improve the corporate governance within target firms, and target 
firms experience abnormal returns when they are acquired by firms operating in an environment 
with better institutional quality (e.g., Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008). However, 
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Forbes and Warnock (2011) find that contagion through bilateral banking claims, based on the 
data from the Bank for International Settlements, is important in determining stop and 
retrenchment episodes of capital flows. 
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the linkages between the headquarters and the overseas subsidiaries can also act as a 
transmission mechanism that spreads the crisis across countries. Therefore, detailed analyses of 
the interconnectedness of headquarters and overseas subsidiaries could provide new insight into 
financial stability and the redesign of the financial supervisory architecture. 
 
Finally, the data show that there are some zero observations in FPI or cross-border M&As or 
both for some country pairs in some years. Intuitively, the factors that may lead to these zero 
observations could represent political risks, investment regulations and restrictions, transaction 
costs, and so on. These factors could act like certain types of fixed costs that are so high for these 
country pairs that they prohibit FPI or cross-border M&As between them. These types of fixed 
costs are of importance to the globally integrated financial markets, and thus it could be 
worthwhile to study the impacts of these types of fixed costs in a framework with both FPI and 
cross-border M&As. 
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Table 1.1 
Pooled OLS regression analysis of FPI and FDI: CPIS data. 
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of FPI on FDI and the informativeness 
measures. The dependent variable is the proportion of FPI holdings computed from the CPIS 
data. All of the independent variables are lagged 1 year. Details on variable construction are 
described in Section 1.3.2. Variable definitions and data sources are as described in Table 1.A.2, 
and summary statistics are reported in Table 1.A.3. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by target-acquirer country pair are reported in parentheses below regression 
coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FDI  0.7948*** 
(0.1070) 
0.7140*** 
(0.0977) 
0.1567*** 
(0.0538) 
0.2003*** 
(0.0424) 
0.6742*** 
(0.1049) 
0.6755*** 
(0.1013) 
0.5744*** 
(0.0873) 
0.5934*** 
(0.0863) 
Industrial Concentration -5.0290*** 
(1.3042) 
   -5.1635*** 
(1.2785) 
-5.2455*** 
(1.2669) 
  
Industrial Concentration×FDI -0.7252*** 
(0.1109) 
   -0.6872*** 
(0.1060) 
-0.6636*** 
(0.1047) 
  
Value Concentration  -4.3166*** 
(1.2244) 
    -4.3898*** 
(1.1942) 
-4.4999*** 
(1.1781) 
Value Concentration×FDI  -0.6686*** 
(0.1032) 
    -0.6379*** 
(0.0948) 
-0.6133*** 
(0.0924) 
High-R&D Deal Ratio   -0.3450 
(0.6797) 
 -0.2804 
(0.5340) 
 -0.5247 
(0.5535) 
 
High-R&D Deal Ratio×FDI   0.3972** 
(0.1633) 
 0.2291* 
(0.1180) 
 0.2933*** 
(0.1118) 
 
High-tech Deal Ratio    0.1535 
(1.1001) 
 0.3215 
(0.9366) 
 0.2348 
(0.9503) 
High-tech Deal Ratio×FDI    0.7628*** 
(0.2436) 
 0.4891*** 
(0.1695) 
 0.5493*** 
(0.1675) 
Observations 3222 3237 3230 3237 3222 3222 3230 3237 
R² 0.2954 0.2745 0.1717 0.1857 0.3016 0.3092 0.2842 0.2916 
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Table 1.2 
“Beta” coefficients. 
This table reports the “beta” coefficients for the relevant explanatory variables in regression (5) in 
Table 1.1 and regression (1) in Table 1.3, along with the sample means and standard deviations of the 
relevant variables. A beta coefficient converts the regression coefficients into units of sample standard 
deviations. 
 
   Regression (5) in Table 1.1   Regression (1) Table 1.3  
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient 
estimate 
“Beta” 
coefficient 
 Coefficient 
estimate 
“Beta” 
coefficient 
FPI: dependent variable 3.0424 8.4717      
FDI 8.2198 15.1701         
Industrial Concentration 0.7643    0.2760         
High-R&D Deal Ratio 0.3913    0.3586      
Differences in Stock Returns 0 0.3041        
Industrial Concentration×FDI   -0.6872 0.2668  -0.6908 0.2325 
Industrial Concentration decreases by 
one standard deviation 
   0.6064   0.5739 
High-R&D Deal Ratio×FDI   0.2291 1.2524.  0.2423 1.3477 
High-R&D Deal Ratio decreases by 
one standard deviation 
   1.4462   1.5033 
Differences in Stock Returns      6.9830 0.2507 
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Table 1.3 
Regression analysis of FPI and FDI: additional control variables. 
This table reports the results from regressions of FPI on FDI, the informativeness measures, and additional control variables. Pooled OLS 
regressions are presented in columns (1) to (10), and the results from the IV estimation using 2SLS are reported in column (11). The 
dependent variable is the proportion of FPI holdings computed from CPIS. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by 
target-acquirer country pair are reported in parentheses below regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
FDI  0.6578*** 
(0.1035) 
0.6543*** 
(0.1041) 
0.6685*** 
(0.1043) 
0.6635*** 
(0.1030) 
0.6467*** 
(0.1035) 
0.6597*** 
(0.1048) 
0.5903*** 
(0.0998) 
0.6516*** 
(0.1024) 
0.6517*** 
(0.1035) 
0.5852*** 
(0.0979) 
0.4314* 
(0.2586) 
Industrial Concentration -5.2962***  
(1.3245) 
-5.5409*** 
(1.3575) 
-5.3679*** 
(1.3459) 
-5.1904*** 
(1.2836) 
-4.3331*** 
(1.2546) 
-5.0359*** 
(1.3466) 
-4.3926*** 
(1.2078) 
-4.4306*** 
(1.3614) 
-5.0062*** 
(1.2933) 
-2.8574** 
(1.2770) 
-0.1898 
(2.8723) 
Industrial Concentration×FDI -0.6908*** 
(0.1050) 
-0.6934*** 
(0.1053) 
-0.6916*** 
(0.1053) 
-0.6960*** 
(0.1047) 
-0.6750*** 
(0.1051) 
-0.6941*** 
(0.1063) 
-0.6463*** 
(0.1022) 
-0.6864*** 
(0.1032) 
-0.6757*** 
(0.1066) 
-0.6277*** 
(0.1010) 
-1.1777*** 
(0.2858) 
High-R&D Deal Ratio -0.2385 
(0.5373) 
-0.1354 
(0.5362) 
-0.1453 
(0.5309) 
0.1216     
(0.5378) 
-0.1039 
(0.5292) 
-0.2604 
(0.5646) 
0.3250 
(0.5547) 
-0.3687 
(0.5458) 
-0.6747 
(0.5516) 
0.3244 
(0.5714) 
-1.8458 
(1.8906) 
High-R&D Deal Ratio×FDI 0.2423** 
(0.1211) 
0.2424** 
(0.1215) 
0.2276* 
(0.1227) 
0.2291* 
(0.1209) 
0.2185* 
(0.1190) 
0.2385* 
(0.1226) 
0.2361* 
(0.1196) 
0.2383* 
(0.1249) 
0.2494** 
(0.1175) 
0.1981* 
(0.1196) 
0.5639* 
(0.3210) 
Differences in Stock Returns 6.9830*** 
(1.2457) 
6.2026***  
(1.1802) 
6.2280*** 
(1.1744) 
5.2356*** 
(1.1905) 
5.0045*** 
(1.1152) 
6.7456*** 
(1.2331) 
4.4817*** 
(1.0160) 
7.3463*** 
(1.2860) 
6.9146*** 
(1.2279) 
2.0490** 
(0.9843) 
3.6449*** 
(1.1459) 
Stock Return Correlation 0.1330     
(2.1105) 
1.1043     
(2.0746) 
0.1485 
(2.1248) 
-1.8577 
(2.2456) 
-0.2333 
(1.9667) 
0.2523 
(2.1102) 
-2.1255 
(2.2066) 
0.0947 
(2.0807) 
2.8637 
(2.0609) 
-2.7535 
(2.1107) 
 
Stock Return volatility   0.0708* 
(0.0441) 
       0.1093** 
(0.0499) 
0.1518*** 
(0.0377) 
Real Exchange Rate    7.4768** 
(2.9269) 
      7.2757** 
(2.9737) 
 
Capital Account Openness: source    2.0326*** 
(0.2437) 
     0.1094 
(0.3003) 
0.1504 
(0.2551) 
Capital Account Openness: target    -0.0848 
(0.4257) 
     0.9277* 
(0.5418) 
 
Country Governance: source     0.2991*** 
(0.0416) 
    0.2551*** 
(0.0471) 
0.2845*** 
(0.0358) 
Country Governance: target     -0.0278 
(0.0456) 
    -0.0693 
(0.0647) 
 
Market Capitalization/GDP: source      0.0167*** 
(0.0040) 
   -0.0062 
(0.0040) 
-0.0008 
(0.0040) 
Market Capitalization/GDP: target      -0.0033 
(0.0082) 
   0.0052 
(0.0089) 
 
Turnover Ratio: source       0.0717*** 
(0.0090) 
  0.0788*** 
(0.0091) 
0.0907*** 
(0.0081) 
Turnover Ratio: target       -0.0138* 
(0.0070) 
  -0.0067 
(0.0071) 
-0.0211*** 
(0.0060) 
Common Language        3.0380** 
(1.2897) 
 3.8881*** 
(1.2820) 
4.4608*** 
(0.7130) 
Geographic Distance         0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0002** 
(0.0001) 
 
Observations 3186 3186 3108 3117 3117 3061 3059 3186 3186 2838 2838 
R² 0.3227 0.3252 0.3281 0.3503 0.3686 0.3307 0.3976 0.3325 0.3342 0.4708 0.2192 
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Table 1.4 
Robust regressions: CPIS data. 
This table reports the results from the robust regression. The dependent variable is the proportion 
of FPI holdings, and the independent variables include FDI, the informativeness measures, and 
additional control variables. Details on variable construction are described in Section 1.3.2. 
Variable definitions and data sources are as described in Table 1.A.2, and summary statistics are 
reported in Table 1.A.3. Standard errors are calculated using the pseudovalues approach 
described in Street, Carroll, and Ruppert (1988). According to Street, Carroll, and Ruppert 
(1988), the saved R-squared and the adjusted R-squared that are leftover from the pseudovalue 
regression are not meaningful and should not be used. Therefore, the R-squareds are computed 
using the program, rregfit, which is written by UCLA Statistical Consulting. ***, **,* indicate 
statistical significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FDI  0.3070*** 
(0.0073) 
0.3040*** 
(0.0066) 
0.1382*** 
(0.0066) 
0.1433*** 
(0.0059) 
Industrial Concentration -0.7260*** 
(0.1631) 
-0.7299*** 
(0.1637) 
  
Industrial Concentration×FDI -0.2814*** 
(0.0076) 
-0.2818*** 
(0.0076) 
  
Value Concentration   -1.0282*** 
(0.1553) 
-1.0329*** 
(0.1552) 
Value Concentration×FDI   -0.1222*** 
(0.0073) 
-0.1269*** 
(0.0074) 
High-R&D Deal Ratio 0.1219 
(0.1250) 
 0.0470 
(0.1265) 
 
High-R&D Deal Ratio×FDI -0.0125 
(0.0084) 
 0.0166** 
(0.0084) 
 
High-tech Deal Ratio  0.0518 
(0.1775) 
 -0.0142 
(0.1791) 
High-tech Deal Ratio×FDI  -0.0030 
(0.0129) 
 0.0309** 
(0.0129) 
Differences in Stock Returns 0.4191**  
(0.1637)  
0.4227***  
(0.1640)  
0.3711**  
(0.1656)  
0.3722**  
(0.1654)  
Stock Return Correlation 1.2687***  
(0.2534)  
1.2708***  
(0.2538)  
1.3377***  
(0.2565)  
1.3511***  
(0.2559)  
Stock Return volatility  -0.0038  
(0.0047)  
-0.0041  
(0.0047)  
-0.0011  
(0.0048)  
-0.0013  
(0.0048)  
Real Exchange Rate  0.4602  
(0.4792)  
0.4685  
(0.4800)  
0.6982  
(0.4848)  
0.6968  
(0.4839)  
Capital Account Openness: source 0.2381***  
(0.0537)  
0.2366***  
(0.0538)  
0.2521***  
(0.0543)  
0.2524***  
(0.0542)  
Capital Account Openness: target 0.1350***  
(0.0499)  
0.1338***  
(0.0501)  
0.1524***  
(0.0506)  
0.1501***  
(0.0505)  
Country Governance: source 0.0461***  
(0.0067)  
0.0462***  
(0.0067)  
0.0460***  
(0.0068)  
0.0456***  
(0.0068)  
Country Governance: target -0.0048  
(0.0067)  
-0.0048  
(0.0067)  
-0.0090  
(0.0068)  
-0.0094  
(0.0068)  
Market Capitalization/GDP: source -0.0026***  
(0.0008)  
-0.0026***  
(0.0008)  
-0.0024***  
(0.0008)  
-0.0024***  
(0.0008)  
Market Capitalization/GDP: target -0.0005  
(0.0008)  
-0.0006  
(0.0008)  
0.0002  
(0.0008)  
0.0003  
(0.0008)  
Turnover Ratio: source 0.0063***  
(0.0008)  
0.0063***  
(0.0008)  
0.0072***  
(0.0008)  
0.0071***  
(0.0008)  
Turnover Ratio: target -0.0002  
(0.0008)  
-0.0002  
(0.0008)  
0.0001  
(0.0008)  
0.0001  
(0.0008)  
Common Language 0.3651***  
(0.0940)  
0.3630***  
(0.0944)  
0.3967***  
(0.0950)  
0.3970***  
(0.0951)  
Geographic Distance -0.0001***  
(0.0000)  
-0.0001***  
(0.0000)  
-0.0001***  
(0.0000)  
-0.0001***  
(0.0000)  
Observations 2838 2838 2843 2850 
R² 0.1226 0.1225 0.1190 0.1190 
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Table 1.5 
Bivariate Panel VAR model of FDI and FPI: industrial concentration. 
This table reports the results from a bivariate Panel VAR model, which is estimated by GMM 
with country-pair-year and fixed effects removed prior to estimation. Observations are divided 
into two subsamples based on the median value of industrial concentration. Panel A and Panel B 
are results for the subsamples with industrial concentration below and above the median, 
respectively. The coefficients of regressing the row variables on the column variables are 
reported.  Variable definitions and data sources are as described in Table 1.A.2, and summary 
statistics are reported in Table 1.A.3. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in 
parentheses below regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Response of 
Response to 
FDI (t-1) FDI (t-2) FPI (t-1) FPI (t-2) 
Panel A: Industrial Concentration below the Median 
FDI (t) 
0.1961 
(0.1459) 
0.1655 
(0.1221) 
2.5162** 
(0.9798) 
-0.2908 
(0.4447) 
FPI (t) 
0.0134 
(0.0143) 
0.01796 
(0.0130) 
0.6032*** 
(0.1729) 
-0.0128 
(0.0626) 
Observations 204 
Panel B: Industrial Concentration above the Median 
FDI (t) 
0.1319 
(0.1033) 
0.1043 
(0.0676) 
0.5485 
(0.8066) 
1.5756* 
(0.8799) 
FPI (t) 
-0.0081  
(0.0076) 
-0.0102* 
(0.0061) 
0.3929 
(0.0969) 
0.1667* 
(0.0885) 
Observations 316 
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Table 1.6 
Bivariate Panel VAR model of FDI and FPI: high-R&D deal ratio. 
This table reports the results from a bivariate Panel VAR model, which is estimated by GMM 
with country-pair-year and fixed effects removed prior to estimation. Observations are divided 
into two subsamples based on the median value of high-R&D deal ratio. Panel A and Panel B are 
results for the subsamples with high-R&D deal ratio below and above the median, respectively. 
The coefficients of regressing the row variables on the column variables are reported. Variable 
definitions and data sources are as described in Table 1.A.2, and summary statistics are reported 
in Table 1.A.3. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses below 
regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Response of 
Response to 
FDI (t-1) FDI (t-2) FPI (t-1) FPI (t-2) 
Panel A: High-R&D Deal Ratio below the Median 
FDI (t) 
0.4321  
(0.5455) 
0.3218  
(0.3827) 
2.5103 
(2.3136) 
3.3939 
(3.1258) 
FPI (t) 
-0.0337   
(0.0507) 
-0.0078 
(0.0384) 
-0.1758 
(0.2280) 
-0.0073 
(0.3391) 
Observations 122 
Panel B: High-R&D Deal Ratio above the Median 
FDI (t) 
0.1369  
(0.1192) 
0.1256    
(0.0773) 
1.0283  
(0.7943) 
0.4295 
(0.4856) 
FPI (t) 
0.0070  
(0.0132) 
0.0092 
 (0.0089) 
0.5120*** 
(0.1648) 
0.0357 
(0.1085) 
Observations 233 
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Table 1.7 
Trivariate Panel VAR model: FDI, FDI×Informativeness, and FPI. 
This table reports the results from a trivariate Panel VAR model, which is estimated by GMM with country-pair-year and fixed effects 
removed prior to estimation. The interaction term between the informativeness proxy and FDI are included in the estimation as an 
endogenous variable. Panels A and B are results for the informativeness measures industrial concentration and high-R&D deal ratio 
respectively. The coefficients of regressing the row variables on the column variables are reported. Variable definitions and data 
sources are as described in Table 1.A.2, and summary statistics are reported in Table 1.A.3. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard 
errors are reported in parentheses below regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Response of 
Response to 
FDI (t-1) FDI (t-2) 
FDI (t-1)× 
Informativeness (t-1) 
FDI (t-2)× 
Informativeness (t-2) 
FPI (t-1) FPI (t-2) 
 Panel A: Industrial Concentration 
FDI (t) 
0.2547* 
(0.1328) 
0.2031*  
(0.1043) 
-0.1773 
(0.1542) 
-0.1472 
(0.1128) 
1.3776** 
(0.5683) 
0.6062**  
(0.2612) 
FDI (t)×Industrial Concentration (t) 
0.0334 
(0.0757) 
0.0515 
(0.0629) 
0.0465 
(0.0997) 
0.0050 
(0.0750) 
0.6913* 
(0.3608) 
0.2752* 
(0.1590) 
FPI (t) 
-0.0009 
(0.0137) 
0.0215  
(0.0142) 
-0.0131 
(0.0154) 
-0.0312 ** 
(0.0146) 
0.5066*** 
(0.1532) 
0.1886**   
(0.0785) 
Observations 1160 
 Panel B: High-R&D Deal Ratio 
FDI (t) 
0.2723** 
(0.1076) 
0.1329* 
(0.0680) 
-0.3648* 
(0.2101) 
-0.0707 
(0.1233) 
1.2984*** 
(0.4862) 
0.6459** 
(0.2692) 
FDI (t)× High-R&D Deal Ratio (t) 
0.1349** 
(0.0524) 
0.0543* 
(0.0322) 
-0.1190 
(0.1184) 
0.0280 
(0.0730) 
0.6105** 
(0.2663) 
0.2978** 
(0.1456) 
FPI (t) 
-0.0263** 
(0.0132) 
-0.0084 
(0.0130) 
0.0394 
(0.0268) 
0.0126 
(0.0216) 
0.4901*** 
(0.1317) 
0.1925** 
(0.0748) 
Observations 1165 
57 
 
Table 1.8 
Pooled OLS regressions and robust regressions: TIC data. 
This table reports results for the TIC data: Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) are those from pooled 
OLS regressions and columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) are from robust regressions. Variable 
definitions and data sources are as described in Table 1.A.2, and summary statistics are reported 
in Table 1.A.3. For the TIC data, as the U.S. is the only source country and the value of capital 
account openness does not vary over the sample period, the explanatory variable capital account 
openness is omitted in the regressions. Regarding the robust regressions, standard errors are 
calculated using the pseudovalues approach described in Street, Carroll, and Ruppert (1988). 
According to Street, Carroll, and Ruppert (1988), the saved R-squared and the adjusted R-
squared that are leftover from the pseudovalue regression are not meaningful and should not be 
used. Therefore, the R-squareds are computed using the program, rregfit, which is written by 
UCLA Statistical Consulting. Regarding the pooled OLS regressions, standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by target country are reported in parentheses below regression 
coefficients. ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FDI  0.7304*** 
(0.1523) 
0.2181*** 
(0.0150) 
0.9281*** 
(0.0819) 
0.2319*** 
(0.0112) 
0.7015*** 
(0.1532) 
0.2052*** 
(0.0149) 
0.8978*** 
(0.0835) 
0.2212*** 
(0.0111) 
Industrial Concentration -0.1207 
(1.9814) 
-0.2733** 
(0.1295) 
-0.1235 
(1.9326) 
-0.3033** 
(0.1270) 
    
Industrial Concentration×FDI -1.3303*** 
(0.2274) 
-0.3351*** 
(0.0263) 
-1.4553*** 
(0.3106) 
-0.3170*** 
(0.0260) 
    
Value Concentration     -0.2377 
(2.0285) 
-0.3248** 
(0.1301) 
-0.2187 
(1.9820) 
-0.3374*** 
(0.1274) 
Value Concentration×FDI     -1.2900*** 
(0.2796) 
-0.3108*** 
(0.0273) 
-1.4055*** 
(0.3561) 
-0.3035*** 
(0.0268) 
High-R&D Deal Ratio -0.8003 
(1.2996) 
-0.1771 
(0.1217) 
  -0.7724 
(1.2572) 
-0.1638 
(0.1213) 
  
High-R&D Deal Ratio×FDI 1.4239* 
(0.8577) 
0.3202*** 
(0.0353) 
  1.3689 
(0.8671) 
0.2900*** 
(0.0352) 
  
High-tech Deal Ratio   -0.2642 
(1.4403) 
-0.2471* 
(0.1374) 
  -0.2357 
(1.4106) 
-0.2492* 
(0.1366) 
High-tech Deal Ratio×FDI   1.5701 
(1.3199) 
0.3573*** 
(0.0399) 
  1.4615 
(1.3122) 
0.3270*** 
(0.0395) 
Differences in Stock Returns -0.5514 
(0.7485) 
-0.0097 
(0.1175) 
-0.5314 
(0.6997) 
0.0004 
(0.1154) 
-0.5752 
(0.7469) 
-0.0031 
(0.1171) 
-0.5646 
(0.7012) 
0.0043 
(0.1146) 
Stock Return Correlation -7.4363 
(4.7915) 
0.6597*** 
(0.2565) 
-7.7052 
(4.8959) 
0.6677** 
(0.2505) 
-7.6974 
(4.8617) 
0.6367** 
(0.2571) 
-7.9522 
(4.9541) 
0.6338** 
(0.2502) 
Stock Return volatility  -0.0110 
(0.0230) 
0.0018 
(0.0033) 
-0.0102 
(0.0223) 
0.0018 
(0.0032) 
-0.0101 
(0.0232) 
0.0018 
(0.0033) 
-0.0096 
(0.0226) 
0.0019 
(0.0032) 
Real Exchange Rate  0.4055 
(1.2504) 
0.2046 
(0.4076) 
0.3886 
(1.3561) 
0.1363 
(0.3996) 
0.7400 
(1.2098) 
0.2483 
(0.4063) 
0.7481 
(1.2852) 
0.2022 
(0.3971) 
Capital Account Openness: source         
Capital Account Openness: target 0.4627 
(0.4205) 
0.0499* 
(0.0299) 
0.4349 
(0.4165) 
0.0496* 
(0.0294) 
0.4779 
(0.4221) 
0.0534* 
(0.0298) 
0.4519 
(0.4178) 
0.0550* 
(0.0293) 
Market Capitalization/GDP: source -0.0105 
(0.0075) 
-0.0023 
(0.0018) 
-0.0119 
(0.0072) 
-0.0021 
(0.0017) 
-0.0121* 
(0.0072) 
-0.0025 
(0.0018) 
-0.0135* 
(0.0072) 
-0.0024 
(0.0017) 
Market Capitalization/GDP: target 0.0170** 
(0.0075) 
0.0045*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0171** 
(0.0074) 
0.0043*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0175** 
(0.0076) 
0.0046*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0177** 
(0.0075) 
0.0045*** 
(0.0006) 
Turnover Ratio: source -0.0023 
(0.0064) 
-0.0021* 
(0.0013) 
-0.0015 
(0.0070) 
-0.0017 
(0.0012) 
-0.0032 
(0.0062) 
-0.0022* 
(0.0013) 
-0.0024 
(0.0067) 
-0.0018 
(0.0012) 
Turnover Ratio: target 0.0032 
(0.0066) 
0.0017** 
(0.0008) 
0.0026 
(0.0052) 
0.0019** 
(0.0007) 
0.0030 
(0.0068) 
0.0016** 
(0.0008) 
0.0026 
(0.0054) 
0.0018** 
(0.0007) 
Common Language -0.5126 
(2.0995) 
0.2587*** 
(0.0868) 
-0.7185 
(2.0720) 
0.2439*** 
(0.0846) 
-0.4642 
(2.0801) 
0.2485*** 
(0.0865) 
-0.6544 
(2.0528) 
0.2350*** 
(0.0840) 
Geographic Distance 0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.00004*** 
(0.00001) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.00003*** 
(0.00001) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.00004*** 
(0.00001) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.00004*** 
(0.00001) 
Observations 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 
R² 0.6702 0.3229 0.6687 0.3181 0.6654 0.3207 0.6630 0.3168 
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Table 1.9 
Average vs. Deviation of FDI: CPIS and TIC data. 
This table examines the different correlations of FPI with the average and deviation of FDI and 
the corresponding interaction terms between the informativeness measures and FDI. It reports 
the results from pooled OLS regressions. Columns (1) and (2) are results for the CPIS data, and 
columns (3) and (4) are those for the TIC data. Variable definitions and data sources are as 
described in Table 1.A.2, and summary statistics are reported in Table 1.A.3. Standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by target-acquirer country pair (CPIS) or by the target 
country (TIC) are reported in parentheses below regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate 
statistical significance at the1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average FDI  0.8827*** 
(0.1662) 
0.5561*** 
(0.0858) 
0.8991** 
(0.3550) 
1.2801*** 
(0.3079) 
Deviation FDI 0.0302** 
(0.0149) 
0.2440*** 
(0.0716) 
0.1108** 
(0.0435) 
0.4525* 
(0.2539) 
Industrial Concentration -0.8167 
(1.7775) 
-9.3081*** 
(1.3961) 
1.4446 
(1.7892) 
1.1548 
(1.6892) 
Industrial Concentration×Average FDI -0.8658*** 
(0.1629) 
 -0.8316*** 
(0.2009) 
 
Industrial Concentration×Deviation FDI  -0.2242*** 
(0.0748) 
 -0.2324 
(0.2608) 
High-R&D Deal Ratio -1.2660 
(0.8088) 
1.7253*** 
(0.6590) 
-0.8587 
(0.5196) 
1.0983 
(0.7265) 
High-R&D Deal Ratio×Average FDI 0.4731*** 
(0.1714) 
 1.2993*** 
(0.3372) 
 
High-R&D Deal Ratio× Deviation FDI  -0.1538** 
(0.0778) 
 -0.8551* 
(0.4566) 
Difference in Stock Returns 5.6755*** 
(1.0637) 
4.9871*** 
(1.1681) 
-0.6731 
(0.6864) 
-0.7012 
(0.6970) 
Stock Return correlation 0.4678 
(2.0586) 
0.6079 
(2.2067) 
-8.7511* 
(4.7969) 
-9.7572** 
(4.7037) 
Stock Return Volatility  0.0454 
(0.0439) 
0.0196 
(0.0467) 
-0.0192 
(0.0255) 
-0.0105 
(0.0255) 
Observations 3186 3186 690 690 
R² 0.4094 0.3451 0.7469 0.7339 
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Table 1.A.1 
Home bias levels. 
This table reports the home bias levels for 27 countries. Columns (1) and (2) show the values of 
two measures of home bias for each country. Each measure is averaged over the six survey years 
(1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005). Source: Bekaert and Wang (2009), page 37. 
 
 Country (1) Country (2) 
Least  United States 0.386 Netherlands 0.468 
home  Netherlands 0.457 Norway 0.567 
biased Norway 0.565 Austria  0.574 
 Austria  0.573 Denmark  0.630 
 United Kingdom 0.626 Sweden 0.639 
 Denmark  0.627 Belgium  0.664 
 Sweden  0.633 New Zealand 0.687 
 Belgium  0.659 Canada  0.689 
 Canada  0.669 United Kingdom 0.689 
 New Zealand  0.686 Argentina  0.720 
 Singapore  0.717 Singapore  0.721 
 Argentina 0.719 United States 0.727 
 France  0.724 Finland  0.740 
 Finland  0.736 France  0.757 
 Italy  0.755 Italy  0.773 
 Japan  0.792 Iceland  0.822 
 Australia  0.814 Australia  0.829 
 Iceland 0.821 Spain  0.852 
 Spain  0.838 Portugal  0.876 
 Portugal  0.874 Japan  0.896 
 Israel  0.921 Israel 0.923 
 Chile  0.957 Chile  0.960 
 Venezuela  0.974 Venezuela  0.975 
 South Korea  0.976 South Korea  0.985 
Most Malaysia  0.982 Malaysia  0.987 
home Thailand 0.989 Thailand  0.991 
biased Indonesia 0.997 Indonesia 0.998 
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Table 1.A.2 
Definitions of variables. 
This table describes the definitions and data sources of all the variables used in the regressions. 
 
Variable Definition 
 Panel A: CPIS Data 
FPI The percentage of FPI holdings from country   in the total FPI liabilities of country   in year  . (Source: CPIS) 
FDI: Transaction Values Percentage of transaction values of deals, defined as the transaction values of deals involving target firms from country   and acquirer 
firms from country   as a percentage of the total transaction values of cross-border deals with target firms from country   in year  , where 
   . (Source: SDC) 
FDI: Counts Percentage of counts of deals, defined as the number of deals involving target firms from country   and acquirer firms from country   as a 
percentage of the total number of cross-border deals with target firms from country   in year  , where    . (Source: SDC) 
Average of FDI Average of the proportion of values of deals over the years available. (Source: SDC) 
Deviation of FDI Deviation of the proportion of values of deals in year   from the sample average. (Source: SDC) 
Industrial Concentration The sum of the squared transaction value shares of all target firms with the same four-digit SIC Codes, that is,               
  
   , where 
       is the share of transaction values in industry   with acquirer firms from country   and target firms from country   in year  , and   is 
the total number of different industries based on target firms’ four-digit SIC Codes. (Source: SDC) 
Deal Value Concentration The sum of the squared transaction value share of each deal with target firm from country  . The transaction value share is defined as the 
transaction values of each deal as a percentage of the total transaction values of target country  . (Source: SDC) 
High-R&D Deal Ratio The proportion of deals where the target firm is in one of the high-R&D industries. The high-R&D industry is defined as the industry in 
which the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets one year prior to the announcement of the M&As is above the median. (Source: SDC) 
High-tech Deal Ratio The proportion of high-tech deals in the total number of deals from acquirer country   targeting country  . A deal is defined as a high-tech 
deal if both the acquirer and the target are high-tech companies. (Source: SDC) 
 Panel B: TIC Data 
FPI The percentage of FPI flows from the U.S. to country   in the total FPI flows to the 41 countries in year  . (Source: TIC) 
FDI: Transaction Values The transaction values of deals involving target firms from country   and acquirer firms from the U.S. as a percentage of the total 
transaction values of cross-border deals to the 41 target countries with acquirer firms from the U.S. in year  . (Source: SDC) 
Average of FDI Average of the proportion of values of deals over the years available. (Source: SDC) 
Deviation of FDI Deviation of the proportion of values of deals in year   from the sample average. (Source: SDC) 
Industrial Concentration The sum of the squared transaction value shares of all target firms with the same four-digit SIC Codes, that is,                
  
   , 
where        is the share of transaction values in industry   with acquirer firms from the U.S. and target firms from country   in year  , 
and   is the total number of different industries based on target firms’ four-digit SIC codes. (Source: SDC) 
Deal Value Concentration The sum of the squared transaction-value share of each deal with target firms from country   in year  . The transaction-value share is 
defined as the transaction values of each deal as a percentage of the total transaction values of target country   with the U.S. (Source: 
SDC) 
High-R&D Deal Ratio The proportion of deals where the target firm is in one of the high- R&D industries. The high-contracting-cost industry is defined as the 
industry in which the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets one year prior to the announcement of the M&As is above the median. 
(Source: SDC) 
High-tech Deal Ratio The proportion of high-tech deals in the total number of deals from the U.S. targeting country  . A deal is defined as a high-tech deal if 
both the acquirer and the target firms are high-tech companies. (Source: SDC) 
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Table 1.A.2 (continued) 
Definitions of variables. 
 
Variable Definition 
 Panel C: Additional Control Variables 
Differences in Stock Returns between 
the Target Country and the Source 
Country 
Annual returns of the target country minus those of the source country. The returns are calculated from the annual MSRI index 
denominated in U.S. dollars. (Source: Datastream) 
Stock Return Correlation  Correlation between the monthly market returns of target country j and the MSCI world returns over the past five years before year t. 
(Source: Datastream) 
Pairwise Stock Return Correlation Pairwise correlation between returns of the target and acquirer countries over the past five years before year t. The returns are calculated 
from the annual MSRI index denominated in U.S. dollars. (Source: Datastream) 
Relative Stock Return Volatility Differences between the annualized stand deviation of the target country stock returns and that of the world market stock returns. The 
standard deviation of the stock returns of the target country is calculated using the monthly MSCI Return Index over the previous 5 years. 
The standard deviation of the stock returns of the world market is calculated using the monthly MSCI World Return Index over the 
previous 5 years. (Source: Datastream) 
Real Exchange Rate Annual changes in the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate is defined as the value of the acquirer country currency in terms of the 
target country currency. (Source: Penn World Tables 7.0)  
Capital Account Openness  Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness. (Source: http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm.) 
Market Capitalization to GDP Ratio The market capitalization of listed companies as a percentage of GDP. (Source: World Bank) 
Turnover Ratio The total value of shares traded during each year divided by the average market capitalization for the period. Average market 
capitalization is calculated as the average of the end-of-period values for the current period and the previous period. (Source: World Bank) 
Country Governance The average of the ten economic freedom scores measuring ten components of freedom. The ten components of economic freedom are: 
Business Freedom, Trade Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary Freedom, Investment Freedom, Financial Freedom, 
Property rights, Freedom from Corruption, and Labor Freedom. Tracked by The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation, the 
Index starts from 1995 and covers 183 countries. (Source: http://www.heritage.org/index/Explore.aspx?view=by-region-country-year) 
Common Language Common Language is defined by a dummy variable, which is equal to 1, if the target country and the source country share a common 
language, 0 otherwise. (Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html) 
Geographic Distance The variable “dist” from CEPII. (Source: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm) 
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Table 1.A.3 
Summary statistics. 
This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the regressions. Variable 
definitions are described in Table A.2. 
 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max Observations 
 Panel A: CPIS Data 
FPI 3.0424 8.4717 -7.2189    92.9567 11044 
FDI: Transaction Values 8.2198 15.1701    0.0006    99.1838 3972 
FDI: Counts 5.8343 8.3512    0.0656    77.7778 5657 
Industrial Concentration 0.7643    0.2760    0.0499       1 3952 
Deal Value Concentration 0.7376    0.2895    0.0275       1 3972 
High-R&D Deal Ratio 0.3913    0.3586 0 1 5642 
High-tech Deal Ratio 0.1487    0.2595           0 1 5657 
 Panel B: TIC Data 
FPI  2.4390    7.1204 0 52.2298 1066 
FDI: Transaction Values  3.2541    6.9989    0.0014    76.0032 799 
Industrial Concentration 0.5438    0.3078           0 1 799 
Deal Value Concentration 0.5290    0.3113    0.0320           1 799 
High-R&D Deal Ratio 0.3451    0.3056           0 1 799 
High-tech Deal Ratio 0.2166    0.2554           0 1 799 
 Panel C: Additional Control Variables for CPIS Data 
Differences in Stock Returns 0 0.3041   -1.3387    1.3387 14112 
Pairwise Stock Return Correlation  0.4565 0.1941   -0.2032 1 13780 
Relative Stock Return Volatility 13.4143 12.2496 -2.4873 69.2718 13944 
Real Exchange Rate 0.0071 0.1322    -0.6784 2.1092 14112 
Capital Account Openness 1.4530 1.2961 -1.8081 2.5408 13776 
Market Capitalization to GDP Ratio 86.6418     78.9683     9.8379    617.6384 14112 
Turnover Ratio 81.4317     58.7013    0.1870    359.4998 14112 
Country Governance 68.1184 9.4569 48.7291 89.9678 13776 
Common Language 0.1542 0.3611 0 1 14112 
Geographic Distance 7425.464 5186.487    9.5598    19772.34 14112 
 Panel D: Additional Control Variables for TIC Data 
Differences in Stock Returns 0.0895     0.4905    -1.1372    7.4390 936     
Pairwise Stock Return Correlation  0.4887     0.2041   -0.1973    0.9105 816     
Relative Stock Return Volatility 13.3456     11.9666    -2.4873    75.3351 816     
Real Exchange Rate 0.02597     0.1245   -0.8853    1.4294 974     
Capital Account Openness: U.S. 2.4776 0 2.4776 2.4776 1025 
Capital Account Openness: target 1.0357     1.5410   -1.8438    2.4776 965     
Market Capitalization to GDP Ratio: U.S. 109.3073     36.3112    53.1730     178.853 902     
Market Capitalization to GDP Ratio: target 72.1270     78.8635    0.0041    1088.282 879     
Turnover Ratio: U.S. 137.6385      73.6708     48.5235    348.5814 902     
Turnover Ratio: target 65.2729     51.8658    0.1697    376.5525 875     
Common Language 0.2683     0.4433 0 1 1066     
Geographic Distance 8443.921      3762.37    548.3946    16180.32 1066     
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Table 1.A.4 
Correlation matrix: CPIS data. 
This table reports the pairwise correlations of the variables for the CPIS data. * indicates significance at the 5% level. “s” stands for 
the source country, and “g” represents the target country. 
  
 
FPI FDI 
Industrial 
Concentr
ation 
Value 
Concentr
ation 
High-
R&D 
Deal 
Ratio 
High-
tech Deal 
Ratio 
Differenc
es in 
Stock 
Returns 
Stock 
Return 
Correlati
on 
Stock 
Return 
volatility 
Real 
Exchang
e Rate 
Capital 
Account 
Opennes
s: source 
Capital 
Account 
Opennes
s: target 
Country 
Governa
nce: 
source 
Country 
Governa
nce: 
target 
Market 
Capitaliz
ation/GD
P: source 
Market 
Capitaliz
ation/GD
P: target 
Turnover 
Ratio: 
source 
Turnover 
Ratio: 
target 
Common 
Languag
e 
Geograp
hic 
Distance 
FPI 1.0000                    
FDI  0.3716* 1.0000                   
Industrial Con -0.3267* -0.1633*   1.0000                  
Value Con -0.3095*  -0.1847*   0.9458*   1.0000                 
High-R&D Ratio 0.0382*    -0.0139 -0.0631* -0.0590*   1.0000                
High-tech Ratio 0.0565*    -0.0049 -0.0705* -0.0667*   0.4663*   1.0000               
Diff Stock Returns 0.1250* 0.0956* -0.0015 -0.0029   -0.0139   -0.0221    1.0000              
Return Correlation 0.1702*    0.0586* -0.3025* -0.2931*   0.0205    0.0416*   0.0000 1.0000             
Return volatility 0.0229*    0.1199*   0.1546*   0.1276* -0.0450* -0.0594*   0.2127* -0.2153* 1.0000            
Real Exchange Rate  0.0172      0.0203   -0.0256 -0.0261   -0.0298* -0.0056   -0.0076 -0.0300*   0.0961* 1.0000           
Capital Openness: s 0.2171*    0.1466* -0.1325* -0.1311* -0.0594* -0.0417*   0.1862* 0.2121*   0.0033   -0.0083 1.0000          
Capital Openness: g -0.0219*  -0.0714* -0.0986* -0.0734*   0.0330*   0.0685* -0.1862* 0.2121*     -0.6036* -0.0292* 0.0054 1.0000         
Governance: s 0.2728*     0.1490* -0.1979* -0.1874* -0.0224   -0.0259    0.1801* 0.2121*    -0.0046 0.0509*   0.6174* -0.0030 1.0000        
Governance: g 0.2728*    0.1490* -0.1979* -0.1874* -0.0224   -0.0259    0.1801* 0.2121* -0.5315*  -0.0908* -0.0030    0.6174*   0.0029 1.0000       
Market Cap/GDP: s 0.1136*   0.0411* -0.1010* -0.0910* 0.0193   -0.0233    0.1077* 0.1069*    -0.0384* 0.0814*   0.1776*   0.0004    0.5303* -0.0017 1.0000      
Market Cap/GDP: g -0.0157    -0.0815* -0.0484* -0.0419*   0.0725*   0.0260   -0.1077* 0.1069*     -0.2776* -0.1012* 0.0004    0.1776* -0.0017   0.5303* 0.0562* 1.0000     
Turnover Ratio: s 0.2604*    0.1698* -0.2132* -0.1912*   0.0206    0.0347*   0.0462* 0.1714*     -0.0434* -0.0382* 0.1482* -0.0082    0.1572*   0.0071 0.0310*   0.0196* 1.0000    
Turnover Ratio: g -0.0196*  -0.1380* -0.1758* -0.1678*   0.0465*   0.0511* -0.0462* 0.1714*    -0.0542* -0.0025   -0.0082   0.1482*   0.0071    0.1572* 0.0196*   0.0310*   0.0367* 1.0000   
Common Language 0.2078*    0.0816* -0.2031* -0.1921*   0.0403*   0.0608* -0.0001 0.2875*    -0.1275* -0.0070   0.0288*   0.0264*   0.1833*   0.1837* 0.1240*    0.1269* -0.0136 -0.0132 1.0000  
Geographic Distance -0.0598* -0.0841*   0.0442*   0.0444*   0.0625*   0.0070    0.0000 -0.3241* 0.0460*   0.0272* -0.1374* -0.1374*   0.0611*   0.0611* 0.0323*    0.0323* -0.1467* -0.1467* -0.0816* 1.0000 
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Table 1.A.5 
Correlation matrix: TIC data. 
This table reports the pairwise correlations of the variables for the TIC data. * indicates significance at the 5% level. “g” represents the 
target country. Because the value of capital account openness of the United States (the source country) does not vary over the sample 
period, it is omitted in the calculations. 
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e 
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FPI 1.0000                 
FDI  0.6899* 1.0000                
Industrial Con -0.3003*  -0.3102* 1.0000               
Value Con -0.3030*  -0.3207*   0.9629* 1.0000              
High-R&D Ratio 0.0647     0.0083   -0.0812* -0.1024* 1.0000             
High-tech Ratio 0.0334     -0.0084 -0.1125* -0.1340*   0.6435* 1.0000            
Diff Stock Returns -0.0462   -0.0391    0.0601    0.0627   -0.0420   -0.0075 1.0000           
Return Correlation 0.1455*   0.2571* -0.2081* -0.2093*   0.1033*   0.2077*   0.0387 1.0000          
Return volatility -0.2313*  -0.2225*   0.1486*   0.1448* -0.2332* -0.2021*   0.1295* -0.3302* 1.0000         
Real Exchange Rate  -0.0048    0.0107    0.0400    0.0508   -0.0777* -0.0385   -0.0049 0.0289   -0.0386 1.0000        
Capital Openness: g 0.2738*   0.2504* -0.1931* -0.2021*   0.2493*   0.2788* -0.1249* 0.3655*   -0.5482* -0.0440 1.0000       
Market Cap/GDP: U.S. 0.0000   -0.0840* -0.2150* -0.2342*   0.0870*   0.1427*   0.0031 0.0802*   0.0835* -0.1658*   0.1579* 1.0000      
Market Cap/GDP: g 0.2102*   0.0738* -0.0775* -0.0680    0.0818*   0.0719    0.0294 0.2477*   -0.2190* -0.0783*   0.2448*   0.2197* 1.0000     
Turnover Ratio: U.S. 0.0000     -0.0413 -0.0299   -0.0185    0.0768*   0.1434*   0.0732* 0.4488*   -0.0106 -0.0877*   0.1693*   0.3862*   0.1865* 1.0000    
Turnover Ratio: g 0.1047*   0.1027* -0.2143* -0.2158*   0.1319*   0.1170*   0.0636 0.1813*   0.0509    0.0376    0.1244*   0.1815*   0.0370    0.2558* 1.0000   
Common Language 0.2585*   0.2785* -0.1689* -0.1709*   0.0837*   0.0406   -0.0714* 0.1649*   -0.1921* -0.0505    0.0744* -0.0000    0.2980*   0.0000 -0.0847* 1.0000  
Geographic Distance -0.1164*  -0.2888*   0.1534*   0.1594* -0.0878* -0.1150* -0.0019 -0.2226*   0.2200* -0.0462   -0.0775*   0.0000    0.2085* -0.0000 -0.0294    0.3568* 1.0000 
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Table 1.A.6 
Target and acquirer country list. 
This table presents the target and source country names. 
 
Argentina France South Korea Singapore 
Australia Germany Luxembourg South Africa 
Austria Greece Malaysia Spain 
Belgium Hong Kong Mexico Sweden 
Brazil Hungary Netherlands Switzerland 
Canada India New Zealand Thailand 
Chile Indonesia Norway Turkey 
Colombia Ireland Philippines United Kingdom 
Czech Republic Israel Poland United States 
Denmark Italy Portugal  
Finland Japan Russia  
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CHAPTER 2 
OUTBIDDING COMPETITORS WORLDWIDE: IMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKETS, 
EXCHANGE RATES, AND ASSET SALES 
   
 
2.1 Introduction 
Cross-border asset sales have experienced dramatic growth in the past decades.
1
 During the 
period from 1986 to 1990, the average annual count and transaction values are 134 and 28.13 
billion dollars, respectively. During the period from 2006 to 2010, the average count and 
transaction values have more than doubled, increasing to 289 and  63.46 billion dollars, 
respectively. In contrast, domestic asset sales did not significantly change during these two 
periods: 378 deals in counts and 48.97 billion dollars in transaction values over the first period 
and 685 deals and 77.90 billion over the second period.
2
 As a result, cross-border asset sales 
have been playing an increasingly important role in reallocating resources around the world. 
 
Despite the dramatic worldwide increases in cross-border asset sales, almost all of the studies on 
asset sales to date only focus on exclusively domestic asset sales or the cross-border ones 
involving a specific country (usually the U.S. as either the only acquirer country or the only 
target country).
3
 In addition, limited studies have explored how cross-border asset sales are 
                                                          
1
Several key features distinguish asset sales from mergers. Hege, Lovo, Slovin, and Sushka 
(2009) summarize the following (page 682). First, an asset sale is governed by contract law and 
the business judgment rule. Second, mergers are generally buyer-initiated, while asset sales are 
generally seller-initiated. Third, sellers of assets foster competitive and coetaneous bidding via 
an auction like process, followed by private negotiations between a seller and a selected buyer. 
2
Our calculations are based on data from Securities Data Corporation Platinum (SDC). To 
mitigate the influence of business cycles, we report the averages for two five-year periods: 
1986-1990 and 2006-2010. Although only after 1992 does SDC cover deals of any value, our 
calculations may not be affected by the coverage of SDC as we impose certain restrictions to 
identify the asset sales. Table 2.A.3 details the searching criteria, and Table 2.4 reports the 
information on cross-border and domestic asset sales by year. 
3
For domestic asset sales, see, among others, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001, 2002); Jovanovic 
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affected by informational imperfections on the capital market (or financial development of a 
country). This issue is particularly important and relevant in a multi-country context, because (1) 
resource-constrained firms may suffer credit rationing caused by information asymmetry when 
raising external finance on the capital market (Jaffee and Russell, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, 
1983; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Tang, 2009; Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller, 2011), 
and (2) there exists substantial cross-country heterogeneity in the level of financial development 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2000; Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2009). Our purpose in the 
present study is to conduct a full investigation of cross-border asset sales with a focus on the 
roles of financial development and of its interaction with the exchange rate. 
 
We first propose a model to analyze how imperfect capital markets and exchange rates influence 
firms' cross-border asset transactions. We build on the source of information asymmetry (costly 
state verification) in Froot and Stein (1991), and expand their model by incorporating the type of 
credit constraint as demonstrated in Antràs and Caballero (2009) as a second source of 
information asymmetry, namely, the levels of the country-specific financial development of the 
target country and the acquirer country. Our model shows that when the credit-constrained 
entrepreneur bids for corporate assets worldwide with finance raised externally in the imperfect 
capital market, the degree of credit constraint of a country affects asset sales through two 
channels: First, it influences the maximum amount of loans that the entrepreneur can obtain from 
the creditor; second, it affects the cut-off amount of wealth below which the entrepreneur is 
credit-rationed. As a result, the degrees of informational imperfections on the capital markets of 
the target country and the acquirer country influence the entrepreneur's reservation bidding price, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Rousseau (2002); Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2004); Yang (2008); 
Warusawitharana (2008); Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang (2010); Levine (2011). For 
cross-border asset sales, see Froot and Stein (1991); Borisova, John, and Salotti (2011). 
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and thus the odds that she wins the bid and the cross-border asset sales between this country pair. 
 
The above two channels lead to two sets of predictions concerning the asset transactions 
worldwide. First, regarding the asset sales that occur in a given target country, if the financial 
system of this target country improves, then the domestic entrepreneurs have higher odds to win 
the bid, which implies that a larger proportion of the domestic entrepreneurs win the bids when 
we aggregate the domestic entrepreneurs' odds to the country level. As a result, the proportion of 
domestic deals (as the complement to the proportion of cross-border deals) in the total deals that 
occur in this target country increases. The second set of predictions concerns the asset 
transactions for a specific target-acquirer country pair. Specifically, all else being equal, if the 
financial system of the target country improves, on the asset transaction market of the target 
country, a lower proportion of foreign entrepreneurs from a specific acquirer country win the 
bids. But if the financial system of the acquirer country improves, then a higher proportion of 
foreign entrepreneurs from this acquirer country win the bids in the target country. Moreover, the 
sensitivity of the proportion of cross-border deals to the real exchange rates is reduced by the 
improvement of the financial system of the target country. The reason is as follows. The 
improvement of the financial system of the target country may reduce the wealth effects caused 
by the depreciation of the target country currency as the low degree of information asymmetry of 
the target country increases the ability of the entrepreneurs in the target country to obtain loans 
from the bank through the two previously-mentioned channels. As a result, the entrepreneurs in 
the target country can bid a higher price for the assets in the target country.
4
 
 
To formally test the model's predictions, we design two experimental settings, namely, the target 
                                                          
4
The financial system of the acquirer country may also have impact on the sensitivity of the 
proportion of cross-border asset sales to the exchange rate. However, given the complexity of the 
general equilibrium, this effect is not easily disentangled and we leave it for future research. 
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country experiment and the target-acquirer country pair experiment, to evaluate the above 
hypotheses. As the first step, based on the data available at Securities Data Corporation Platinum 
(SDC), we construct a sample of annual asset sales with transaction values greater than 1 million 
U.S. dollars over the period of 1985 to 2010 for 43 countries, and document some stylized facts 
about cross-border asset sales. In the second step, we propose three empirical tests to evaluate 
our hypotheses. The first is a panel test based on regressions of the annual domestic asset sales in 
each target country on country characteristics that measure the degree of financial development 
and currency depreciation (Test 1). The second is a panel test based on regressions of the annual 
data for each target-acquirer country pair to link our measures of country-pair cross-border asset 
sales to measures for the degrees of financial development of the target country and the acquirer 
country and the bilateral exchange rates (Test 2). The third test is also based on cross-border 
asset sales for each target-acquirer country pair, but it specifically evaluates the hypothesis 
regarding the effect of the target country financial development on the sensitivity of the 
country-pair cross-border deals to the real exchange rates (Test 3). 
 
Our tests provide empirical evidence consistent with the theoretical framework. Regarding Test 1, 
the domestic deal ratio, measured as the proportion of domestic deals in the total transaction 
values of the deals that occurred in this target country, is positvely correlated with the degree of 
financial development of this target country, measured as the credit to the private sectors to the 
GDP ratio. The domestic deal ratio is negatively associated with the real exchange rate, 
measured by the changes in the value of the target country currency against the U.S. dollar.
5
 
Regarding Test 2, the cross-border pair ratio, measured by the proportion of deals from a specific 
                                                          
5
In this test, we use the value of the U.S. dollar as a benchmark. Specifically, if one unit of the 
U.S. dollar can be converted into more units of the target country currency in the next period, 
then the target country currency depreciates against the U.S. dollar. 
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acquirer country in the total transaction values of the deals that occurred in a target country, is 
negatively correlated with the degree of financial development of the target country, but 
positively correlated with the degree of financial development of the acquirer country. The 
magnitudes are also economically large: If the domestic credit to private sector to GDP ratio of 
the target country (acquirer country) increases by one standard deviation, the proportion of asset 
sales from the acquirer country to the target country decreases (increases) by 0.27 (0.14) units of 
standard-deviation. The result also demonstrates that the cross-border pair ratio is positively 
associated with the depreciation of the target country's real exchange rate, which accords well 
with Froot and Stein (1991).
6
 
 
Regarding Test 3, the effect of the target country financial development on the sensitivity of the 
country-pair cross-border deals to the real exchange rates is captured by the interaction term 
between the target country financial development and the bilateral exchange rate. We find that 
the cross-border pair ratio is negatively correlated with this interaction term, which implies that 
the sensitivity of the cross-border pair ratio to changes in the bilateral exchange rates is reduced 
by the improvement of the target country financial system. 
 
We conduct a battery of robustness tests. First, we control for variations in institutional factors 
and economic development across countries, such as capital account openness, the logarithm 
(Log) of GDP per capita, and the GDP growth rate, which might otherwise obscure the analysis. 
In Tests 2 and 3, we also consider the common language and geographic distances for the 
target-acquirer country pair, which may measure the degree of information asymmetry between 
                                                          
6
If one unit of the acquirer country currency can be converted into more units of the target 
country currency in the next period, then the target country currency depreciates against the 
acquirer country currency. 
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the target and the acquirer countries. Our results show that all the above associations of interest 
regarding the domestic deal ratio and the cross-border pair ratio are robust to these additional 
control variables. In addition, we examine the transactions that occurred between the member 
countries of the Euro Area as these countries have the same currency. The results show that the 
dummy variable Euro  is statistically insignificant, which provides supportive evidence to the 
model's predictions as the effect of the real exchange rate would not emerge if the target country 
and the acquirer country use the same currency for transactions.
7
 
 
As a second robustness test, we use the counts of asset sales to construct the domestic deal ratio 
and the cross-border pair ratio. The results are still consistent with the model's predictions. 
Finally, we use the credit by the banking sector to GDP ratio as an alternative measure for the 
degree of financial market development. The results are similar. 
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in four aspects. First, we advance the 
understanding of the effects of imperfect capital markets on corporate investment across 
countries in an international context. The existing research concerning the impact of information 
asymmetry on the credit market on firms' investment mainly focuses on firms' domestic 
investment. Some studies find that a firm's inability to access to bank credit has negative impact 
on firms' investment and growth (e.g., Stein, 2003; Campello, Graham, and Harvey, 2010; 
Rahaman, 2011). In a cross-country comparison framework, studies suggest that credit 
constraints influence the domestic investment across different industries and that financial 
                                                          
7
The corporate tax rate may be an important factor influencing the firms' investment decisions. 
However, for the data available from University of Michigan tax database, there is no time 
variation in the data on the average total tax rate, and the top tax rate is only available for the 
year 2002. Therefore, we cannot investigate the impact of the corporate tax rate on firms' 
cross-border investment. 
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development can improve capital allocation efficiency (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Wurgler, 2000; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 
2008; Morck, Yavuz, and Yeung, 2011). 
 
Despite the importance of cross-border asset sales in corporate investment, limited research has 
been devoted to how imperfect capital markets affect firms' cross-border asset sales and thus 
bilateral asset sales at the country level. Froot and Stein (1991) show that when entrepreneurs use 
external finance from the capital market with informational imperfections to bid for assets, the 
wealth effects caused by the depreciation of the target country currency enable foreign 
entrepreneurs to bid a higher price for the target country assets, and thereby acquire more assets 
in the target country. This paper introduces country-specific credit constraints on a firm’s 
maximum amount of borrowing, as a second source of capital market imperfection. This new 
theoretical framework enables us to conduct cross-country comparisons regarding the impact of 
financial development and exchange rates on cross-border asset sales. We document robust 
empirical findings that are consistent with the model's predictions. Therefore, this paper 
contributes to the literature by identifying the roles of financial development and its interaction 
with the exchange rate. Moreover, this paper emphasizes the influences of financial development 
on the supply of external finance by creditors, which is of particular interest in light of the 
subprime crisis and complements the existing research from the demand side of the credit market 
(borrowing firms). 
 
Second, this paper provides unique evidence regarding the impact of financial development on 
the sensitivity of cross-border asset sales to exchange rates. The result shows that an additional 
unit of depreciation in the target country currency is associated with a lower increase in the 
cross-border pair ratio for a higher level of financial development in the target country. This 
result is of particular importance to macroeconomic policy as it suggests that the deep capital 
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market of a country (as the target country) can partly mitigate the risks of large capital inflows 
associated with a sizeable depreciation of the real exchange rates. 
 
Third, we collect comprehensive bilateral data on asset sales, and focus on the cross-country 
comparison on cross-border investment. A large body of literature investigates the reasons for 
firms' participation in domestic asset transactions and the factors affecting firms' participation.
8
 
Regarding the credit constraint, in particular, Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang (2010) find that 
when making asset transaction decisions, public firms with intermediate access to credit markets 
(public firms with BBB ratings and below based on S&P long-term debt ratings) are most 
affected by changes in market liquidity. In an international context, a few studies explore 
cross-country comparisons on cross-border investment. Froot and Stein (1991) examine the 
wealth effects due to the depreciation of the target country currency when entrepreneurs use 
external finance from the credit market with informational imperfections to bid for assets. 
Borisova, John, and Salotti (2011) study why asset sales to foreign buyers yield higher abnormal 
returns to the seller as compared with domestic sales. These two papers examine the scenario in 
which the U.S. is the only target country (the seller). In contrast, Antràs, Desai, and Foley (2009) 
focus on the U.S. firms' investment overseas and investigate how the quality of investor 
protections and the depth of capital markets influence the cross-border operational, financing, 
and investment decisions of firms. As a result, most of the empirical studies on asset sales only 
investigate domestic asset sales; or, cross-border asset sales with a specific country (usually the 
U.S.) as either the only acquirer country or the only target country. 
                                                          
8
The reasons and factors can be demand shocks, cross-sectional differences in productivity, 
liquidity of the markets for corporate assets, changes in productivity, profitability and firm size, 
and the production costs of the target firm (e.g., Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001, 2002; Jovanovic 
and Rousseau, 2002; Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2004; Yang, 2008; Warusawitharana, 
2008; Levine, 2011). 
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In this paper, we first conduct an overview on domestic and cross-border asset sales regarding 
the cumulative counts and transaction values by country pair, by year, and by the industries. 
Corresponding to the model's predictions, we then investigate the effects of imperfect capital 
markets and the exchange rates on cross-border asset sales. Therefore, this paper extends the 
existing literature that exclusively focuses on just domestic asset sales or cross-border asset sales 
with a specific country (usually the U.S.) as either the only acquirer or target country. In addition, 
by including both the target country and the acquirer country characteristics in the regressions, 
we distinguish between two correlations: that of cross-border asset sales with the target-country 
characteristics; and that of cross-border asset sales with the acquirer-country characteristics. This 
approach complements the econometric specification that includes the differences between the 
target country variable and the acquirer country variable in the regression, which imposes the 
restriction that the target country variable and the acquirer country variable bear the coefficients 
with the same magnitude but with opposite signs (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Erel, Liao, and 
Weisbach, 2011). 
 
Finally, as cross-border asset sales are components of foreign direct investment (FDI), in a 
broader sense, this paper is also related to the relevant studies on FDI. Klein, Peek, and 
Rosengren (2002) find that financial difficulties at banks reduce the number of Japanese-initiated 
FDI projects into the U.S. Generally speaking, our results are consistent with their findings; in 
addition, we use a comprehensive country sample and obtain richer findings on the effects of the 
interaction of financial development and exchange rates. Walsh and Yu (2010) find that net FDI 
flows in the secondary sector are drawn into countries with depreciated real exchange rates and 
that greater financial depth of the host country only leads to more FDI in manufacturing sectors. 
Blonigen and Piger (2011) explicitly exclude the exchange rates in their analysis and their 
Bayesian statistical techniques provide little support to high inclusion probabilities of 
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host-country infrastructure (including credit markets) and host-country institutions. The above 
two studies analyze the aggregate FDI flows into a target country, while we focus on the flows 
between each country pair. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops a theoretical model on 
asset sales, exchange rates, and imperfect capital markets, and derives the propositions as well as 
a series of testable hypotheses. The empirical analysis follows in Section 2.3, in which we 
describe the sample of asset sales, data sources, and variable construction. Section 2.4 presents 
the econometric models, the empirical tests, and main results corresponding to each testable 
hypothesis; robustness tests are also examined in this section. Section 2.5 concludes the paper. 
All the proofs are collected in the Appendix. 
 
2.2 The Model and Testable Hypotheses 
Consider an extension of the model in Froot and Stein (1991) with credit constraints. Specifically, 
we maintain all the assumptions in Froot and Stein (1991) and then expand their model by 
incorporating the type of credit constraint as demonstrated in Antràs and Caballero (2009). The 
credit constraint is country-specific and related to the country's financial development. The 
friction behind the credit constraint could be related to an ex-post moral hazard problem, to 
limited commitment, or to adverse selection.
9
 
 
2.2.1 The Model 
There are 1N  countries in the world. Consider a generic domestic country d  and N  foreign 
countries: Nn ,...,2,1 . In each country, a continuum  1,0  of projects are initially held by 
                                                          
9
Antràs and Caballero (2009) develop a microfoundation for the financial constraint in a model 
with limited commitment on the part of entrepreneurs in Appendix A.1 of their paper. 
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domestic entrepreneurs. In order to operate the project, entrepreneurs need to purchase it initially, 
that is, a cash-in-advance constraint is imposed, which, combined with information asymmetry, 
is the source of the wealth effects emphasized in our model. A large number of domestic and 
foreign entrepreneurs are bidding for a specific asset. The one with the highest reservation price 
wins the bid. Figure 2.1 illustrates this model economy for an arbitrary country pair. 
 
Entrepreneurs use the project as collateral to obtain loans from creditors. Entrepreneurs can only 
be financed by the local banking sector (intermediaries) in their home countries. However, local 
banks can source money worldwide. Entrepreneurs use their own wealth and loans to finance the 
purchases of the asset and then start to manage the asset, which generates payoffs for the 
entrepreneur. The optimal financing contract between the entrepreneur and the creditor involves 
the amount of loan L  and the required debt repayment D . We follow Froot and Stein (1991) in 
adopting the assumption of costly state verification: External creditors must pay cost c  if they 
want to observe the profit generated from the asset. When the profit from the asset falls below 
D , the creditor pays the monitoring cost c , discovers the profit, and keeps all of it. 
 
2.2.1.1 Investment Opportunities 
There are two periods of time: 1t  and 2 . All agents are risk neutral and they can allocate 
their wealth in period 1 across three types of investments. 
 
There are two riskless bonds available to all agents. They can invest in bonds and obtain the 
risk-free rate. The domestic interest rate, r , denominated in the domestic currency, is in the 
interval  1,0 , and the foreign interest rate  1,0r , is denominated in the foreign currency. 
The uncovered interest parity is 
        ,111
1
21
1
2
1
e
eE
r
e
e
rEr  





                       (2.1) 
where 1e  and 2e  measure how many units of domestic currency one unit of foreign currency is 
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worth in period 1 and period 2, respectively. 
 
To simplify the notation, we assume that   121 eE  and that 0
r . Let ee 1 , then equation 
(2.1) delivers 
1  r  1e .  
 
The third asset is a risky direct investment asset held by the domestic entrepreneur. There are a 
large number of risky assets, indexed by i , available to the entrepreneur. The i th asset can be 
managed either by a single domestic entrepreneur, who realizes a random profit of dix  in the 
domestic currency, or by a single foreign entrepreneur, whose profit in the domestic currency is  
f
ix .  
d
ix  and  
f
ix  are uniformly distributed over the intervals  diX,0  and  fiX,0 , 
respectively. The population-wide distributions of abilities of domestic and foreign entrepreneurs 
are  did XG  and  fif XG , respectively, where  dG  and  fG  stand for certain general 
forms of distributions.
10
 For tractability, we assume that realizations of diX  and 
f
iX  are 
independent. 
 
2.2.1.2 Creditor's Supply of Loan 
Consider a generic asset in the domestic country. For simplicity, we further assume that dix  and 
f
ix  are uniformly distributed over the interval  X,0 , that is, we assume that the domestic and 
foreign entrepreneurs have identical expected gross profits. Recall that the optimal financing 
contract is defined by a loan amount L , and a required debt repayment D . If the payoff of the 
asset is greater than D , that is, if Dx  , the creditor receives D ; if Dx  , the creditor pays 
monitoring cost c  and keeps cx . Therefore, for a given contracted D , the expected return to 
                                                          
10
For tractability, in the proofs of the propositions, as detailed in the Appendix, we assume that  
d
iX  and  
f
iX  are uniformly distributed over the interval  XX , . 
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the creditor is 
                     (2.2) 
 
Given the expected payoff for the creditor LDR  and the cost of the loan, the credit market 
equilibrium implies that the creditor’s loan supply function is 
 
 
 .,0for  ,
12
22
cXD
rX
DcXD
L 


                        (2.3) 
 
Without any further frictions on the capital market, the maximum amount of loan that the 
creditor lends to the entrepreneur is 
 
    
 
 
 
.
1212
2
22
max
rX
cX
rX
cXcXcX
L





                    (2.4) 
 
Following Antràs and Caballero (2009), we introduce the second source of capital market 
imperfection: the credit constraint, which is related to the financial development of a country. To 
be specific, the creditor can only lend a fraction   of the maximum amount of loan, i.e., the 
creditor's maximum amount of loan is 
 
 
.10  where,
12
2
maxmax 


 
rX
cX
LL                        (2.5) 
 
Notice that in addition to monitoring cost c , parameter   captures the credit constraint. 
Given that the entrepreneur uses the asset as collateral, in the case where 0c  and 1 , the 
creditor can lend the maximum amount of loan 
 
 rX
cX
L



12max
2
 to the entrepreneur, as shown in 
(2.4), and requires debt repayment cXD   from the entrepreneur. However, if 0c  and  
10  , the credit constraint, characterized by  , further decreases the maximum amount of 
loan that the creditor would like to lend to the entrepreneur to   rX
cXL 
 12max
2
 . Ideally, if the 
capital market is perfect in this economy, i.e., if 0c  and 1 , the maximum loan amount is  
 r
X
12
, which is the expected value of the asset. However, for 0c  and 10  , the 
.
2
2
X
cD
X
D
DRLD 
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entrepreneur cannot entirely finance the expected value of the asset with external loans. 
 
Let maxD  denote the amount of debt repayment corresponding to the maximum loan 

maxL . 
Given the monotonicity of the loan supply function over the interval  cX ,0 , the loan supply 
function (2.3), together with the constrained maximum amount of loan (2.5), determines maxD : 
  .11max   cXD                                 (2.6) 
 
Three features of equation (2.6) are worth noting. First, if 1 , then  cXD max , which is 
the case in Froot and Stein (1991). Second, maxD  is increasing in   for  1,0 . This implies 
that as the information asymmetry becomes less severe in the capital market, the maximum 
amount of loans that the creditor would like to lend to the entrepreneur becomes greater, and the 
creditor requires a higher amount of debt repayment corresponding to the maximum loan maxL . 
Third, if 0 , then 0max 
D , which implies that the information asymmetry on the capital 
market is so severe that no contract is reached between the creditor and the entrepreneur. 
 
2.2.1.3 Entrepreneur's Reservation Price 
Given the debt repayment D  and the distribution of the profit X , the entrepreneur's expected 
returns from the management of the asset is 
.
22
2 X
D
X
D
RED                                    (2.7) 
 
Now we characterize the equilibrium in the credit market. Due to the deadweight losses caused 
by monitoring cost c , the implicit interest rate for the entrepreneur to use loans is higher than  
r . Therefore, if the entrepreneur's initial wealth is sufficiently large, she will use it to fully 
finance the purchase of the asset instead of obtaining loans from the creditor. However, if the 
entrepreneur's initial wealth is not sufficiently large, she will partially finance the entire expected 
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value of the asset using external loans.
11
 Thus, if 0c  and 10  , depending the amount of 
the entrepreneur's initial wealth, three possible cases can occur in the equilibrium. 
 
(i) Case 1: the entrepreneur's initial wealth is not sufficiently large so that she uses external funds 
to partially finance the purchase of the asset and she is credit-rationed. In the following analysis 
and Proposition 2.1, we also denote this case as Region 1 in terms of the amount of the 
entrepreneur's initial wealth. 
 
(ii) Case 2: the entrepreneur's initial wealth is not sufficiently large so that she uses external 
funds to partially finance the purchase of the asset but she is not credit-rationed. Correpondingly, 
we denote this case as Region 2. 
 
(iii) Case 3: the entrepreneur's initial wealth is sufficiently large so that she completely uses her 
initial wealth to finance the purchase of the asset. We denote this case as Region 3. 
 
In what follows, we focus on the discussion of Case 2 as it is the general scenario. We 
summarize the main results in the main text and collect all the derivations in the Appendix. 
 
Case 2 
In this case, the entrepreneur uses the loan L  and the initial wealth w  to finance the payment. 
Given the perfect competition on the asset market, the entrepreneurs compete for a specific asset 
so that they bid up to the reservation price of the asset LwP  , and each entrepreneur's 
                                                          
11
The cut-off point of the wealth that determines whether the entrepreneur can fully cover the 
purchase of the asset only using her initial wealth is  r
Xw


12
, which is exactly the present value 
of the asset. This is determined by the equilibria in the credit market and in the asset market, 
which are detailed below. 
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expected returns from the asset also equal the returns of her initial wealth from the alternative 
investment opportunities, i.e., the returns obtained in period 2  from investing her wealth in the 
riskless bonds in period 1:  wr1 .12 Therefore, the bidding rule of the entrepreneur is 
characterized by  wrRED  1 , and the maximum amount of the loan that the entrepreneur is 
willing to borrow is also determined by this condition.
13
 Given the perfect competition on the 
credit market, the creditor's expected returns on the loan need to equal the returns on investing 
the amount of loan L  in riskless bonds; therefore, the lending rule for the creditor is 
 LrDR
X
cD
X
DL
D  12
2
. 
 
To summarize, in this case, the equilibria in the asset market and the credit market are 
characterized by the following conditions: 
 
  ,1
22
2
wr
X
D
X
D
RED                           (2.8) 
 
  .1
2
2
Lr
X
cD
X
D
DRLD                           (2.9) 
 
.LwP                                     (2.10) 
Using equations (2.8), (2.9), and (2.10), we fully characterize the reservation price using all the 
exogenous parameters: 
                                                          
12
For each asset, there are 1N  types of entrepreneurs: the domestic entrepreneurs and N  
types of foreign entrepreneurs. And there are a large number of entrepreneurs within the same 
type. 
13
Note that  2
2
1
22
2
DXDR
X
X
X
DE
D   is decreasing in D  and is one-to-one. So 
controlling D  is equivalent to controlling EDR . Also recall that the amount of loan is 
 
 rX
DcXDL 
 12
22  , which is increasing in D  over the interval  cX ,0 . So controlling L  is 
equivalent to controlling D . That is, a high EDR  means a low D , and a low amount of loan  L , 
thereby leading to a low amount of maximum controllable money for bidding: wL  . 
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   ./121
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1








 Xrwc
X
r
P                    (2.11) 
 
Case 3 
In this case, the entrepreneur's initial wealth is sufficiently large so that she uses it to completely 
finance the purchase of the asset and bid at the expected present value of the asset. Thus, the 
reservation price is determined by the expected present value of the asset:  r
XP


12
; and the 
cut-off level of the wealth separating Case 2 from Case 3 is  r
Xw


12
, which is exactly the 
expected present value of the asset. 
 
Case 1 
In this case, the entrepreneur's initial wealth is very low and she is credit-rationed. The 
reservation price is determined by the sum of the maximum amount of loan obtained from the 
creditor and her initial wealth:    wP rX
cX  

12
2
 . The cut-off level of wealth separating Case 1 
from Case 2, i.e., the entrepreneur's initial wealth below which she is credit-rationed is 
  
 
.
12
1
2
rX
cXc
w




                           (2.12) 
 
Three features of equation (2.12) are worth noting. First, if 1 , then it is simplified to  
 rX
cw  12
2
, which is the original cut-off point for Regions 1 and 2 in Froot and Stein (1991). 
Second, the expression 
  
 rX
cXc


12
1
2

 is decreasing in  . As   decreases, i.e., the degree of 
capital market imperfection increases, the cut-off point moves to the right thereby leading the 
credit-rationed region (Region 1) to expand and the non-rationed region (Region 2) to shrink. 
Third, if 0 , then  r
Xw


12
, which is essentially the cut-off point between Regions 2 and 3, 
in other words, in this extreme case, since the entrepreneur cannot obtain external finance at all, 
Region 2 completely disappears. 
 
Overall, the entrepreneur's reservation bid price is summarized in the following proposition: 
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Proposition 2.1 An entrepreneur with initial wealth w  and ability X  from a country with a 
degree of financial development   has the following reservation bid price: 
 
 
 
 
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
  
 
 
Proposition 2.1 shows how the amount of the entrepreneur's initial wealth affects her reservation 
price. When her wealth is low (Region 1), the entrepreneur would like to bid up to the sum of the 
maximum amount of loan obtained from the creditor and her initial wealth:    wrX
cX 

12
2
 , and in 
this scenario, her marginal return is greater than r1  and she is credit-rationed. Only when her 
wealth increases and reaches Region 2, the entrepreneur would like to bid up to 
   XrwcX
r
/121
21
1  . When the entrepreneur's initial wealth is sufficiently large (Region 
3), the entrepreneur only uses her own initial wealth to pay for the asset and would like to bid the 
expected present value of the asset. 
 
Proposition 2.1 also demonstrates how the credit constraint   influences the comparative statics 
of the reservation price. Suppose that 0 , i.e., the entrepreneur cannot obtain any loans from 
the creditor. This implies that the entrepreneur uses her initial wealth to completely finance the 
purchase of the asset. As shown by Proposition 2.1, in this scenario, Region 2 disappears, and 
only Regions 1 and 3 are left. In Region 1, the entrepreneur's wealth is very limited; therefore, 
the reservation price is simply w ; while in Region 3 where her wealth is sufficiently large and is 
greater than the expected present value of the asset, the reservation price is exactly the present 
value of the asset. If 1 , that is, there is no credit constraint in this economy, the pricing 
function  rcwXP ,,,,  is the case in Froot and Stein (1991). 
 
Suppose that 10  , which is the general scenario. In Region 1,   0,,,, 


 rcwXP ; as the 
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pricing function  rcwXP ,,,,  is continuous in w  over the whole domain of w ,  
  0,,,, 


 rcwXP  over the whole domain of w . Also the cut-off wealth which distinguishes 
Region 1 from Region 2 moves continuously to the left as   increases. These two properties 
imply that values of  rcwXP ,,,,  in Region 2 are greater than those in Region 1; in other 
words, entrepreneurs with greater initial wealth can bid a higher price. 
 
To intuitively illustrate how the credit constraint affects the entrepreneur's reservation price, in 
Figure 2.2, we plot the reservation price  rcwXP ,,,,  against wealth w  for two economies:  
low -economy (solid blue line) and high -economy (dashed red line) which represent a 
severely-credit-constrained economy and a modestly-credit-constrained economy, respectively.
14
 
The intersections of these two lines with the vertical axis represent the maximum amount of 
loans that the creditor can lend to the entrepreneur in these two economies: lowL

max  and 
highL

max . 
Clearly, highL

max  is greater than 
lowL

max . In the  high -economy, as the dashed red line shows, when 
the entrepreneur is credit-rationed, she borrows the maximum amount of loan, and her 
reservation price increases one-for-one with her initial wealth. The same scenario occurs in the  
low -economy. 
 
In the  high -economy, the entrepreneur's wealth first reaches the cut-off amount above which 
she is not credit-rationed, which shows that Region 1 is smaller in the high -economy compared 
with that in the low -economy. In both economies, when the entrepreneur's wealth is beyond the 
corresponding credit-rationed cut-off level, the reservation price is still increasing in her wealth, 
but at a slower rate. Finally, when the entrepreneur's wealth is sufficiently large, she will only 
                                                          
14
The parameter values are set as follows: 10X ; 1c ; 10.0r ; 20.0low ;  80.0high ; 
and w  is in the interval   rX12 2.1,0 . These parameter values are chosen for the purpose to illustrate 
the intuition and are surely debatable. 
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use her wealth to pay for the price of the asset which is the expected present value of the asset; as 
a result, although the entrepreneur's wealth continues to increase, her reservation price remains 
unchanged. Because the cut-off level of wealth separating Region 2 from Region 3 does not 
depend on the degree of credit constraint, they are the same in these two economies. 
 
The effect of the exchange rate on cross-border asset sales is as follows. Suppose that the 
domestic currency depreciates ( e  rises). This implies that the wealth of foreign entrepreneurs 
rises relative to that of domestic entrepreneurs. As the bidding price is an increasing function of 
the wealth, the wealth effect due to the depreciation of the domestic currency enables foreign 
entrepreneurs to bid a higher price so that they have higher odds to win the bid and acquire more 
domestic assets. 
 
To summarize, our model shows that when the credit-constrained entrepreneur bids the corporate 
assets worldwide with finance raised externally on the imperfect capital market, the degree of 
credit constraint of a country affects the entrepreneur's odds to win the bid through two channels: 
(1) the maximum amount of loans that the entrepreneur can obtain from the creditor; and (2) the 
cut-off amount of wealth below which the entrepreneur is credit rationed. Therefore, the degrees 
of the capital market imperfection of the target country and the acquirer country influence the 
entrepreneur's reservation bidding price and thereby the odds that the entrepreneur wins the bid. 
 
2.2.2 Testable Hypotheses 
In this section, we derive additional propositions and develop the corresponding hypotheses for 
our empirical tests. All the proofs are given in the Appendix. 
 
Assume that all countries have the same monitoring cost c  and the same distribution of  X , 
but the degree of credit constraint   is different across countries. For tractability, without loss 
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of generality, we further assume that X  is uniformly distributed over the interval  XX , , that 
is, the probability density function (pdf) of X  is  
XX
Xg

 1 . We consider a generic asset a  
on the asset sales market in country d . 
 
First, we investigate the asset sales in each target country. Let adom  denote the proportion of 
domestic deals in the total number of deals that occur in country d  , and d  denote the degree 
of credit constraint in country d . We thus have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2.2 The proportion of domestic deals in the total number of deals that occur in 
country d  is increasing in the degree of credit constraint in country d , that is, 0


d
adom

. 
 
The mechanism behind this proposition is that the credit constraint of the target country affects 
the proportion of domestic entrepreneurs winning the bid and thus the proportion of domestic 
deals in the total number of deals that occur in this target country. So we have the following 
hypothesis concerning the proportion of domestic deals in a target country, which is the 
complement of the proportion of the cross-border deals. In Section 2.4, we use Test 1 to examine 
this hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2.1 If the financial system in the target country improves, a larger proportion of 
domestic entrepreneurs win the bid, and the proportion of domestic deals in the total deals that 
occur in this target country increases. 
 
Next, we analyze how the degrees of the credit constraint of the target country and the acquirer 
country affect the bilateral deals for a target-acquirer country pair, i.e., the proportion of 
cross-border deals from a specific acquirer country in the total deals that occur in the target 
country. Let nanum  denote the proportion of deals with acquirer country n  in the total number 
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of deals that occur in target country d  , and n  denote the degree of credit constraint in 
country n . We have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2.3 The proportion of deals with acquirer country n  in the total number of deals 
that occur in target country d  is decreasing in the degree of credit constraint in country d , but 
increasing in the degree of credit constraint in country n . That is, 0


d
n
anum

; 0


n
n
anum

. 
 
Accordingly, we present the following Hypothesis 2.2, and in Section 2.4, we design Test 2 to 
investigate it. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2 On the asset transaction market in country d , all else being equal, if the 
financial system of target country d  improves, a lower proportion of foreign entrepreneurs 
from country n  win the bid. In contrast, if the financial system of country n  improves, a higher 
proportion of foreign entrepreneurs from country n  win the bid in country d . 
 
Finally, we explore the impact of the exchange rates and its interaction with financial 
development. ne  denotes the exchange rate between the target country and the acquirer country, 
specifically, ne  is defined as the value of the acquirer country currency measured in units of the 
target country currency. The effect of the exchange rate on the asset sales for a target-acquirer 
country pair and the effect of the target country's financial development on the association 
between the asset sales and the exchange rate are summarized in Proposition 2.4 below.
15
 
 
                                                          
15
The financial system of the acquirer country also has impact on the sensitivity of the proportion 
of cross-border deals to the real exchange rates. However, given the complex nature of the 
equilibrium, this effect cannot be solved explicitly. As numerical analysis is needed, we leave it 
for future research. 
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Proposition 2.4 The proportion of deals with acquirer country n  in the total number of deals 
that occur in target country d  is increasing in ne , that is, 0


n
n
a
e
num
; however, this derivative is 
decreasing in the degree of financial development of the target country d , that is, 0
2



dn
n
a
e
num

. 
 
Correspondingly, Hypothesis 2.3 follows. In Section 2.4, we design Test 3 to test this hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2.3 On the asset transaction market of country d , all else being equal, if the target 
country currency depreciates against the acquirer country, the proportion of deals from acquirer 
country n  in the total number of deals that occur in country d  increases. In addition, the 
degree of the financial development of target country d  reduces the association between the 
proportion of deals from acquirer country n  and the exchange rate. 
 
The depreciation of the target country currency has wealth effects; in other words, the 
entrepreneurs in the acquirer country can bid for a higher price due to their increased wealth. 
This channel is similar to that in Froot and Stein (1991). In addition, the different degrees of 
credit constraint in the target and acquirer countries, which are unique in our paper, interact with 
the impact of the exchange rate. Specifically, a better financial system in the target country 
partially offsets the impact of the depreciation of the target country currency. 
 
2.3 Data and Variables 
In this section, we describe our data sources, the screening procedures, and the variables that we 
construct to test our hypotheses. 
 
2.3.1 Data and Sample 
Regarding the country sample, we construct a bilateral data matrix of 43 source countries and 43 
target countries. These countries are listed in Table 2.A.4. 
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Regarding the data screening criteria, we try to balance the accuracy and the maximum 
availability of asset sales deals. We impose certain searching criteria on the mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) database recorded by SDC to identify cross-border asset sales. Borisova, 
John, and Salotti (2011) use Thomson ONE Banker's Deals Analysis module to identify 
cross-border asset sales, which has the same data coverage as SDC.
16
 Warusawitharana (2008) 
also uses SDC to collect the data on asset sales when studying the domestic deals. We highlight 
some searching criteria here and the complete set of criteria is detailed in Table 2.A.3. Consistent 
with Borisova, John, and Salotti (2011), we only include acquisition of assets and acquisition of 
certain assets as the Form of the Deal, and the deal attitude is friendly. Regarding the 
“Consideration Sought Category”, we only include “Assets”. Regarding the “Acquisition 
Techniques”, we only include “Divestiture” as classified by SDC. As to the cross-border asset 
sales, after the deal is identified by the cross-border deal flag of SDC, we further impose the 
restriction that the deal involves the acquirer and the target firms which are not located in the 
same nation. In addition, deals in which the target or the acquirer is a government agency are 
excluded from the sample.
17
 We also exclude asset sales due to bankruptcy as reasons for the 
asset sales in this scenario are different from those of firms in good standing (Ofek, 1993). We 
further exclude deals involving financial industries (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes 6000-6799) or utilities industries (SIC codes 4900-4999). The total number of asset sales 
over the period from 1985 to 2010 is 23,936 , and the count of cross-border deals is 6,491, while 
the domestic sample includes 17,445 deals. 
 
As a first step, we present overviews of the counts and transaction values of the asset sales 
                                                          
16
SDC and Thomson ONE Banker both belong to Thomson Financials Corporation. 
17
Karolyi and Liao (2010) investigate the cross-border acquisitions led by government-controlled 
acquirers from 1990 to 2008 using the corporate-led acquisitions as a benchmark. 
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aumulated over the whole sample period from 1985 to 2010 for each target-acquirer country pair. 
They are shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. In Table 2.1, each row represents an acquirer country (the 
buyer) while each column represents a target country (the seller). Therefore, the diagonal entries 
of the matrix are the cumulative counts of domestic asset sales for a particular country and the 
off-diagonal entries are those of cross-border asset sales involving firms from a particular pair of 
countries. There are a large number of country pairs without any asset sales. Intuitively, the 
reason for this may be that the fixed transaction cost, such as political risks and government 
regulations, is so high for this country pair that it prohibits any transactions between them. The 
country with the largest counts of deals is the U.S. Similar patterns emerge when we examine the 
cumulated transaction values, as shown in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.3 reports the counts and transaction values by year for both the cross-border asset sales 
and domestic ones. Although the counts and transaction values fluctuate from year to year due to 
the influence of business cycles, the counts and transaction values of cross-border asset sales 
have increased over the past two decades. We also break down total asset sales into two-digit 
SIC macro-industries. Table 2.4 presents the distribution of counts by industries. As the table 
shows, regarding the cross-border deals, the target and acquirer firms display similar distribution 
of industries, and there is substantial cross-sectional variation across industries. Moreover, the 
data display a clear-cut concentration of transactions in manufacturing and service industries. As 
to the domestic deals, the same characteristics of the industry distribution emerge, although the 
fraction of manufacturing is much lower while those of the service and transportation industries 
are higher. 
 
2.3.2 Variable Construction 
In this section, we outline the variables that we use to evaluate the testable hypotheses developed 
in Section 2.2. The definitions and data sources of the variables are detailed in Table 2.A.1. 
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Regarding Hypothesis 2.1, we use the domestic asset sales ratio as the dependent variable, which 
is defined as the proportion of domestic deals in the total counts (or transaction values) of the 
deals that occurred in target country d  (the seller). Regarding Hypotheses 2 and 3, we use the 
cross-border pair ratio as the dependent variable, which is measured as the proportion of 
cross-border asset sales involving target country d  (the seller) and acquirer country n  (the 
buyer) in the total counts (or transaction values) of deals that occurred in target country d . 
 
The degree of the capital market development of a country is one of the key explanatory 
variables of interest. We use the domestic credit to private sector to GDP ratio as the primary 
measure. As an alternative measure, we also use the domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector to GDP ratio in the analysis.
18
 Both of them are obtained from the World Development 
Indicators database (WDI) of the World Bank. 
 
Another key explanatory variable is the exchange rate between the target country and the 
acquirer country, which is denoted by ne  in the model. We use the value of the acquirer country 
currency measured in units of the target country currency to measure it. If ne  goes up, then the 
target country currency depreciates against the acquirer country currency. In the regressions, we 
use the changes in the exchange rates. 
 
We control for several measures of economic and institutional development that might otherwise 
obscure our analysis, as the above measures of the capital market development are correlated 
with these factors and these factors may have independent impact on asset sales. Specifically, to 
capture the degree of the capital account openness, we include the Chinn-Ito Index. We also 
                                                          
18
These two measures objectively capture the lenders' willingness to supply loans and closely 
correspond to the degree of credit constraint in the theoretical model. 
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include the Log of GDP per capita, which is Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted in constant 
2005 international dollars, and the GDP per capita annual growth rate. We also include the 
freedom scores of both the target country and the acquirer country in the regressions to control 
for the impact of institutional quality. In addition, we consider the language and geographic 
distances between the target-acquirer country pair, which are measures for the information 
asymmetry at the country level. 
 
We also use a dummy variable, Euro , which is equal to 1 if both the target country and the 
acquirer country are in the Euro Area in year t  and 0 otherwise, to control for the impact of 
adopting the euro on asset sales. The introduction of the euro may facilitate the movement of 
capital by boosting financial integration in the Euro Area. However, the common currency 
among the Euro Area countries eliminates the wealth effects of the exchange rates on 
cross-border asset sales. Therefore, the expected sign for the coefficient on Euro  is ambiguous. 
 
2.4 Empirical Results 
In this section, we map the theoretical results into empirical strategies and test the model's 
predictions. 
 
The model's predictions motivate us to include both the target country and the acquirer country 
characteristics in the regressions. The target country variables control for characteristics that 
explain why some countries are more attractive than others to all acquirer countries; in contrast, 
the acquirer country variables control for features that explain why some countries are more 
likely to facilitate their entrepreneurs to win the bids than other countries. The variables that vary 
across country pairs can help explain why the same target country attracts different levels of 
asset sales from different acquirer countries. We include year dummies in the regression and use 
the clustered standard errors by target-acquirer country pairs. The year fixed effects, which help 
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control for the influence of specific events that are likely to be specific to particular country pairs 
at particular points in time, such as a currency crisis, a banking crisis, and a country's 
liberalization of its financial system. Clustering by country pairs is designed to obtain the 
unbiased estimation of standard errors.
19
 The changes in exchange rates are lagged by one panel 
year to mitigate the effect of endogeneity. To mitigate the effects of outliers, we winsorize the 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
2.4.1 Domestic Deal Ratio: Test 1 
In order to investigate the effects of financial development on the domestic deal ratio, as 
illustrated in Hypothesis 2.1, we design Test 1 as the following regression: 
,1,
d
jttjt
d
jt
d
tj
ddd
jt ufZFRERY                       (2.13) 
where djtY  is the domestic deal ratio, 1, tjRER  is the changes in real exchanges rates in period  
1t ,  jtF  is the financial development of target country j , jtZ  is a vector of additional 
control variables that may be correlated with the cross-border asset sales, tf  stands for the year 
fixed effects, and djtu  is the idiosyncratic term. The model predicts 
d  to be positive. 
 
The results are reported in Table 2.5 in which the domestic deal ratio is calculated in terms of 
transaction values of asset sales. As shown in column (1), the coefficient on the financial 
development of the target country is positive and statistically significant. Regarding the 
economic magnitude, if the domestic credit to private sector to GDP ratio of the target country 
increases by one standard deviation, the domestic deal ratio of the target country increases by  
                                                          
19
This methodology is proposed by Petersen (2009). Clustering by two dimensions produces less 
biased standard errors. However, clustering by cross-sectional units and time does not always 
yield unbiased estimates. As the number of clusters---cross-sectional units or years---declines, 
the standard errors clustered by cross-sectional units and time are biased, although the magnitude 
of the bias is not large. When there are only a few clusters in one dimension, clustering by the 
more frequent cluster yields results that are almost identical to clustering by both cross-sectional 
units and time. In this specific setting, I have around 1000 country pairs and at most 26 years 
(varying depending on the explanatory variables); therefore, I cluster by country pairs. 
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0.23 units of standard-deviation.
20
 The coefficient on the capital account openness is negative 
and statistically significant, which suggests that if the target country is more open, more 
cross-border deals occur in the target country, thereby leading to a lower proportion of domestic 
deals. After we control for Log GDP per capita and GDP per capita growth rate in column (2), 
the magnitude of the financial development of the target country only slightly changes. In 
column (3), we include an additional control variable: the institutional quality, the result is 
reassuringly similar. 
 
2.4.2 Cross-border Pair Ratio: Test 2 
In order to investigate Hypothesis 2.2 concerning the effects of financial development and the 
changes in real exchange rates on the cross-border pair ratio, we design Test 2; specifically, we 
estimate the following regression model: 
,211, ijttijtjtittijijt ufZFFRERY                       (2.14) 
where ijtY  is the cross-border pair ratio, 1, tijRER  is the changes in real exchange rates in period  
1t , itF  and jtF  are the degrees of financial development of the acquirer country and the 
target country, ijtZ  is a vector of additional control variables that may be correlated with the 
cross-border asset sales, tf  stands for the year fixed effects, and ijtu  is the idiosyncratic term. 
We expect   and 1  to be positive, and, in contrast, 2  to be negative. 
 
Table 2.6 reports the results regarding the cross-border pair ratio. The coefficient estimates 
provide strong support for the model's predictions. All the coefficients on the changes in the real 
exchange rates have the expected signs, although corresponding coefficients in columns (4) and 
                                                          
20
The standard deviations of the domestic credit to private sector to GDP ratio of the target 
country and the domestic deal ratio of the target country are 48.9682 and 35.7921, respectively. 
Therefore, the effect of jtF  on 
d
jtY  is 2257.07921.35/9682.481650.0  . 
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(5) are statistically insignificant. All the coefficients on the domestic credit to private sector to 
GDP ratios of the target country and the acquirer country have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant. 
To assess the magnitude of these effects, we compute the units of standard-deviation changes in 
the cross-border pair ratio associated with a one-standard-deviation change in the explanatory 
variables of interest. Regarding the changes in the real exchange rates, as shown in column (1), if 
the currency of the target country depreciates by one standard deviation, the proportion of asset 
sales between the acquirer country and the target country increases by 0.13 units of standard 
deviation.
21
 Regarding the domestic credit to private sector to GDP ratio of the acquirer country, 
a one-standard-deviation increase in this variable is associated with 0.14 units of 
standard-deviation increases in the proportion of asset sales between the acquirer country and the 
target country.
22
 In contrast, if the domestic credit to private sector to GDP ratio of the target 
country increases by one standard deviation, the proportion of asset sales decreases by0.27  
units of standard deviation.
23
 Therefore, the effect of the target country's financial development 
is around twice that of the acquirer country's in absolute values. The coefficient on the common 
language dummy is statistically insignificant, while the coefficient on the geographic distance is 
negative and statistically significant. 
 
In column (2), we include the Log GDP per capita and the GDP per capita growth rate for the 
acquirer country and the target country separately. Although the magnitudes of coefficients on 
the changes in the real exchange rates and the financial development of the acquirer and the 
                                                          
21
The standard deviations of the changes in the real exchange rates and the cross-border pair ratio 
in transaction values are 2970.0  and 3115.27 , respectively. Therefore, the effect of 1, tijRER  
on ijtY  is 1324.03115.27/2970.01795.12  . 
22
The standard deviation of the domestic credit to private sector to GDP ratio of the acquirer 
country is 9452.48 . Therefore, the effect of itF  on ijtY  is 1389.03115.27/9452.480775.0  . 
23
The effect of jtF  on ijtY  is 2711.03115.27/9452.481513.0  . 
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target countries become weaker, they still bear the predicted signs and are statistically significant. 
The coefficient on the Log GDP per capita of the target country is negative and statistically 
significant, which suggests that the economic development of the target country may increase the 
likelihood that the domestic entrepreneurs win the bids, thereby reducing the odds of their 
foreign competitors. 
 
As shown in column (3), two additional control variables are included in the regression, namely, 
the capital account openness of the acquirer country and the target country. The coefficients on 
these two variables are statistically insignificant. In column (4), we include the dummy variable, 
Euro . The coefficient on Euro  is statistically insignificant.
24
 In column (5), we control for the 
institutional quality of the target and the acquirer countries. The coefficients on these two 
variables are statistically insignificant, which is consistent with the results in Daude and 
Fratzcher (2008).
25
 Although the coefficient on the changes of real exchange rates is statistically 
insignificant and the magnitude is also reduced, the statistical significance and the magnitudes of 
the financial development of the target and the acquirer countries barely change. 
 
2.4.3 Interaction of Financial Development and Real Exchange Rates: Test 3 
In order to investigate the effects of financial development on the sensitivity of the cross-border 
                                                          
24
Dvorak (2006) finds that the introduction of the Euro is associated with an increase in the 
growth rate of physical investment. Our result is not inconsistent with his because we focus on 
the bilateral cross-border investment flows while he examines the total investment of a country. 
25
Using FDI stocks in a cross-sectional analysis, Daude and Fratzcher (2008) find that the size of 
FDI that a country receives is insensitive to institutional factors, such as transparency, investor 
protection, the degree of corruption, and expropriation risk in host countries. Some studies on 
cross-border M&As, in particular, on announcement returns, suggest that corporate governance 
can be a motive for cross-border acquisitions, see, among others, Rossi and Volpin (2004); Bris 
and Cabolis (2008); Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2010); Ellis, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 
(2011). 
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pair to changes in real exchange rates, as suggested in Hypothesis 2.3, we design Test 3 and 
estimate the following regression: 
,1,1,1, ijttijtjtdjttijditnittijntijijt ufZFFRERFFRERRERY      (2.15) 
where ijtY  is the cross-border pair ratio, 1, tijRER  is the changes in real exchange rates in period  
1t ,  itF  and  jtF  are the financial development of the acquirer country and the target country,  
ijtZ  is a vector of additional control variables that may be correlated with the cross-border asset 
sales,  tf  stands for the year fixed effects, and ijtu  is the idiosyncratic term. Leaving the level 
terms itF  and jtF  out can result in the interaction terms being spuriously significant, so we also 
include the level terms in the regression. 
 
We focus on the effect of target country financial development on the sensitivity of the 
cross-border pair ratio to changes in exchange rates, which is captured by the coefficient d . In 
other words, the changes in real exchange rates may have different effects on the cross-border 
pair ratio for target countries with different levels of financial development jtF . We are 
interested in the partial effect of changes in real exchange rates on the cross-border pair ratio, 
holding all other variables fixed: 
.
1,
jtditn
tij
ijt
FF
RER
Y
 



 
As suggested by Hypothesis 2.3, 0d , which implies that an additional unit of depreciation of 
the target country currency is associated with a lower increase in the cross-border pair ratio for a 
higher level of financial development in the target country. We evaluate this partial effect at the 
sample average of the financial development. 
 
Table 2.7 reports the results regarding the effects of the financial development on the sensitivity 
of the cross-border pair ratio to the changes in real exchange rates. Similar to Table 2.6, the 
dependent variable is the cross-border pair ratio. Compared with column (1) in Table 2.6, 
column (1) in Table 2.7 includes two additional explanatory variables, i.e., the interaction term 
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between the changes in real exchange rates and the acquirer country financial development and 
that between the changes in real exchange rates and the target country financial development. 
The coefficient on the latter interaction term has the expected sign and is statistically significant. 
Moreover, other variables of interest bear the predicted signs and are statistically significant. 
 
To gauge the magnitude of the effect of depreciation of the real exchange rate of the target 
country currency on the cross-border pair ratio, we compute the units of standard-deviation 
changes in the cross-border asset sales ratio implied by a one-standard-deviation change in the 
changes in real exchange rates. Column (1) shows that, evaluated at the sample average of 
financial development of the acquirer country and the target country, if the currency of the target 
country depreciates by one standard deviation, the proportion of asset sales from the acquirer 
country to the target country increases by 0.32 units of standard deviation.
26
 If the financial 
development of the target country increases by one standard deviation, and if the currency of the 
target country depreciates by one standard deviation, the proportion of asset sales from the 
acquirer country to the target country only increases by 0.11 units of standard deviation.
27
 
Therefore, the improvement in the financial system of the target country can partially offset the 
effects of the depreciation of its currency on the cross-border capital flows, and the magnitude is 
economically large. 
 
When we include other control variables in the regressions, as shown in columns (2) and (3), the 
                                                          
26
The sample average of the acquirer country (or the target country) credit to private sectors to 
GDP ratio is 0818.82 . Therefore, the partial effect of changes in real exchange rates on the 
cross-border pair ratio is 
3229.03115.27/2970.0]0818.82)4011.0(0818.82)3083.0(9210.87[  . 
27
The standard deviation of the target country credit to private sectors to GDP ratio is 9452.48 . 
Therefore, the partial effect of changes in real exchange rates on the cross-border pair ratio is  
  1094.03115.27/2970.0]9452.480818.82)4011.0(0818.82)3083.0(9210.87[  . 
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magnitudes of the coefficients barely change. As shown in column (4), the coefficient on the 
dummy variable Euro  is statistically insignificant. In column (5), we include the institutional 
quality of the target and the acquirer countries. Although the coefficient on the changes of real 
exchange rates is reduced, it is still statistically significant. The magnitudes of the coefficients on 
the variables of interest: the financial development of the target and the acquirer countries, and 
the interaction term between the changes in real exchange rates and the target country financial 
development, only slightly change. 
 
2.4.4 Additional Robustness Tests 
In order to investigate the robustness of the results, we conduct a series of additional tests. We 
use the counts of asset sales to construct the domestic deal ratio and the cross-border pair ratio, 
and conduct the same exercises as in Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7. 
 
Table 2.8 reports the results regarding the domestic deal ratio of the target country, i.e., Test 1. 
The dependent variable is the proportion of the counts of domestic asset sales in the total counts 
of deals that occurred in target country d . The results are still consistent with the model's 
predictions. Compared with the results in Table 2.5, Table 2.8 shows that the 2R s increase 
slightly if we use the counts of asset sales to construct the dependent variable. 
 
Table 2.9 reports the results from Test 2: the cross-border pair ratio. The results provide support 
for Hypothesis 2.2. Table 2.10 presents the results from Test 3: the effects of the financial 
development on the sensitivity of the cross-border pair ratio to the changes in real exchange rates. 
The results are reassuringly similar to those in Table 2.7. We also notice that  2R s increase 
compared with those in the corresponding regressions in which transaction values are used to 
construct the dependent variables. 
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As another robustness test, we use the credit by the banking sector to GDP ratio as a measure for 
the financial development. In these regressions, we perform the tests using the dependent 
variables constructed from both counts and transaction values of asset sales. In order to save 
space, we only report the results when using the full set of explanatory variables in the 
regressions.
28
 As shown in Tables 2.11, 2.12, and 2.13, all these empirical findings are 
consistent with the model's predictions. We also use the market capitalization to GDP ratio to 
measure the financial market development, and the coefficient estimates on the financial market 
development are statistically insignificant. The reason may be that the market capitalization to 
GDP ratio cannot fully capture the informational imperfections on the credit market. Another 
possible reason may be the high volatility of the equity markets.
29
 
 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
We present a model to show how informational imperfections on the capital markets impact the 
asset sales worldwide. Specifically, the monitoring cost together with the country-specific credit 
constraint affects the maximum amount of loans that the entrepreneur obtains and the cutoff 
amount of wealth below which the entrepreneur is credit-rationed. We construct a 
comprehensive data set on cross-border asset sales, design relevant tests, and document robust 
empirical findings that are consistent with the model's predictions. Specifically, we find that the 
proportion of asset sales involving a specific acquirer country in the total cross-border asset sales 
that occurred in the target country is negatively correlated with the level of financial 
development of the target country, while it is positively associated with that of the acquirer 
country. We also present one unique empirical finding: The improvement of the target country's 
                                                          
28
The rest of the results are available upon request. 
29
di Giovanni (2005) investigates the cross-border M&As over the period from 1990 to 1999. He 
finds that the size of the acquirer country's financial market, as measured by the stock market 
capitalization to GDP ratio, is positively associated with its firms' cross-border M&A activities. 
 
 
 101 
 
financial system can reduce the impact of changes in real exchange rates on cross-border asset 
sales. 
 
Our theoretical model and empirical findings advance the understanding of the cross-border asset 
sales for cross-country comparision, thereby complementing the current literature on domestic or 
cross-border asset sales to a single target country or by a single acquirer country. Our findings 
have rich policy implications. They highlight the important role and impact of capital markets on 
cross-border corporate investment. They also suggest that deep financial markets can partly 
mitigate one of the main risks associated with a sizeable depreciation of the real exchange rate: 
the large capital inflows due to a sizeable depreciation of the real exchange rate and the 
destabilization of the macroeconomy. 
 
The findings of this paper point to new avenues for future research. First, as noticed above, there 
are substantial zero observations in cross-border asset sales for country pairs. Intuitively, the 
factors that might lead to these zero observations could be political risks, investment regulations 
and restrictions, transaction cost, and so on. These factors could act like certain types of fixed 
costs that are so high that they completely prevent entrepreneurs from participating in the foreign 
asset transaction markets. As the focus of this paper is the credit constraint and exchange rates, 
only conditional on the deal happens, can we examine their impact on cross-border deals. 
However, these types of fixed costs are of importance to the globally integrated corporate asset 
markets; thus, it could be worthwhile to study the impact of these types of fixed costs. 
 
Second, as the credit constraint and exchange rates have impact on the odds that entrepreneurs 
win the bids, it could be worthwhile to incorporate these features into the model built by Hege, 
Lovo, Slovin, and Sushka (2009), and study whether and how the credit constraint and exchange 
rates affect the means of payment in cross-border asset sales. This exercise could also make rich 
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predictions regarding the gains to both buyers and sellers generated in cross-border asset sales by 
different means of payments, and thus empirical work along this line could also add new findings 
to the existing research. 
 
Third, given the rich features of data on asset sales, it could be interesting to explore the 
cross-border asset sales at the industry level. As different industries have different degrees of 
dependence on external finance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998), one hypothesis could be that the 
association of the cross-border pair ratio with the degree of financial development is higher in 
industries that have a higher dependence on external finance. The challenge to this test is to 
construct appropriate measures for the industry-specific credit constraint. The findings regarding 
industry-specific credit constraint may help to explain the differences in industry distributions in 
cross-border and domestic asset sales, and it could also generate policy implications on the 
improvement of the financial system. 
 
Finally, it could be interesting to study the abnormal returns of both the sellers and the buyers at 
the firm level upon the announcement of the asset sales for our comprehensive data set. Some 
interesting facts could emerge as there are large variations in country and firm characteristics 
across countries; therefore, the new findings could complement the results in Borisova, John, and 
Salotti (2011). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.1 
Case 2 
As shown in the main text, in this case, the equilibria in the asset market and the credit market 
are characterized by equations (2.8), (2.9), and (2.10). Equations (2.8) and (2.9) deliver 
  .1
2
Lwr
X
cDX
RR LD
E
D   
Therefore, by equation (2.10), the reservation price is 
 
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LwP                             (2.16) 
Using equation (2.8), we can solve for the repayment  D   
  ./121 XrwXD                                (2.17) 
Substituting (2.17) into (2.18), we fully characterize the reservation price using all the exogenous 
parameters: 
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P                       (2.18) 
 
Case 3 The term   Xrwc /121   in equation (2.11) captures the deadweight loss associated 
with monitoring cost c , and it is decreasing in w , which implies that the more initial wealth the 
entrepreneur has, the more benefit she preserves. Thus, in order to avoid the deadweight loss, the 
entrepreneur has an incentive to use his initial wealth when bidding for the asset. Therefore, in 
the case in which the entrepreneur's initial wealth is sufficiently large, she will completely use it 
to finance the purchase of the asset and bid at the expected present value of the asset, and the 
reservation price is determined by the expected present value of the asset: 
 
.
12 r
X
P

                                      (2.19) 
The above analysis shows that the cut-off point of the wealth that determines whether the 
entrepreneur use external funds to finance the bidding for the asset is determined by the 
condition    0/121  Xrw . Therefore, the cutoff point of the wealth separating Case 2 
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from Case 3 is  r
Xw


12
, which is exactly the expected present value of the asset. 
 
Case 1 Recall that under the two types of frictions of the imperfect capital market in this 
economy, i.e., the monitoring cost c  and the credit constraint  , as shown by equations (2.4) 
and (2.5), the maximum amount of loans that the creditor can lend to the entrepreneur is  
 
 rX
cX


12
2
 . Therefore, if the entrepreneur's initial wealth is sufficiently low, although her ability 
X  may be high enough and she wants to obtain an amount of loan   rX
cXL 

12
2
 , the creditor is 
not able to lend the money to him. In this scenario, the entrepreneur is credit-rationed, and the 
expected returns generated from the management of the asset is greater than the returns of her 
initial wealth from its alternative investment opportunities, i.e.,   wrD X
X
D  1
22
2
. The 
reservation price is determined by the sum of the maximum amount of loan obtained from the 
creditor and her initial wealth: 
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Next, we derive the cut-off point of wealth separating Case 1 from Case 2. Recall that when the 
repayment D  is less than the amount of repayment corresponding to the maximum loan maxL , 
i.e., when maxDD  , the entrepreneur is not credit-rationed. Therefore, using equations (2.6) and 
(2.17), we can determine the cut-off point of wealth separating Case 1 from Case 2, i.e., the 
entrepreneur's initial wealth below which she is credit-rationed: 
  
 
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12
1
2
rX
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                              (2.21) 
 
Proofs of Propositions 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 are available upon request. 
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Figure 2.1 
Model economy for an arbitrary country pair. 
This figure illustrates the model economy for an arbitrary country pair. Country D and Country F stand for the domestic and the 
foreign country, respectively. 
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Figure 2.2 
Effects of credit constraint:      vs.      . 
This figure illustrates how the credit constraint affects the entrepreneur's reservation price. It plots the reservation price P(θ,X,w,c,r) 
against wealth w for two economies:     -economy (solid blue line) and      -economy (dashed red line) which represent a severely-
credit-constrained economy and a modestly-credit-constrained economy, respectively. The price function P(θ,X,w,c,r) is shown in 
Proposition 1, and the parameter values are set as follows:     ; c=1; r=0.10;      =0.20;      =0.80; and w is in the interval [0, 
    
      
]. These parameter values are chosen for the purpose to illustrate the intuition and are surely debatable. 
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Table 2.1 
Cumulated counts by country pairs. 
This table presents the cumulative counts of asset sales for each target-acquirer country pair over the sample period from 1985 to 2010. 
Each row represents an acquirer country (buyer) while each column represents a target country (seller). Therefore, the diagonal entries 
of the matrix are the counts of domestic asset sales for a particular country and the off-diagonal entries are those of cross-border asset 
sales involving firms from a particular pair of countries. The country names are listed in Table 2.A.4. 
 AR AS AU BE BR CA CE CH CO CC DN FN FR WG GR HK HU ID IN IR IS IT JP SK LX MA MX NT NZ NO PH PL PO RU SG SA SP SW SZ TH TK UK US 
AR 21    3 1 1                                     
AS 2 900  1 3 14 2 3 1  1 3 4 7    1 5 1 1 4    1  4 36 1 1    6 6 2 3 1 1  20 71 
AU 1  12  1 1    1 1 1 1 10      1  6     1 2    1     1 4 3   3 3 
BE 1 2  21  2     2 2 9 11    1  1  2   1   7        1 2 3 2   20 22 
BR 4    75 2   2    1 1        1     1 1  2       1     2 9 
CA 9 20 1 2 15 860 2 4 5 2 2 2 4 6     1 1  3  2   28 5 4  1  1   3 4 3 2  1 49 340 
CE 2    6  9  2                   1               1 
CH  5  1  5 1 141 1    1   4   2     2     1 1     1 1      1 9 
CO       1  6                                  2 
CC          5                      1      1      
DN  2    2     37 2 4 6    1  1  2      8  5  1  1 1 1 1 11 4   18 14 
FN  1 1 2 1 2     3 68 7 8  1  1    2     1 5  9  1  1    14 1   11 22 
FR 1 5 1 5 9 5 1 1 1  5 1 217 23  1 1 5  1 1 11  4 1   15 1 5  4 1  1 3 13 9 8 1  81 89 
WG  5 3 5 4 4 1 2  3 11 5 20 117    3 1  1 6  3 1 1  11  5  4   2 1 5 13 8  2 60 93 
GR               18 1   1   1 2       2    1  1 1 1    1 3 
HK  6   1 2  11   1  1 2  48      1    2 2  2  1    6   1  1  14 25 
HU              1   4               1          1  
ID  6   2 2    2   4 6    99  1  1      1    1     1     12 32 
IN      2          1   14                1        1 
IR 1 4 2 1  3     2 2 3 3      60 1 1     1 5  1       1 2    63 38 
IS  1  1  1       5 2       28 2  1        1      1 3   3 41 
IT 1 3 3 4 3 1 1 2  3 1  20 12 2   1    160      3  1   1   1 9 3 4  1 22 30 
JP  7 2 3 2 4  3   1 3 3 6  3   1   4 432    1 6 1 1    2 3 2 2 2 2 1  27 131 
SK  1    1  2      2    1     1 91 1 1   1      1       2 16 
LX    1       1  2    1 1   1      1 1  2   1   1 1 2 1   4 3 
MA  5      1      1  1  1        46  2 2      2 1    2  1 5 
MX     7  1  1                 1 35   2       1      17 
NT  6 2 14 2 6  2 1 1 5 6 27 14 1 1 1 1 1   6   1  1 62 1 4  2  1 1  8 10 3   50 46 
NZ  23    2                1     1 1 62             4 4 
NO  1 1 2 1 2     9 2 2 4              4  92  1 1  2  2 26    17 18 
PH                       1    1   1 11         1  1 1 
PL          1       1               22          1  
PO     3        1 2                1   24    5    1 1 1 
RU    1  1      1  2        1 1       1    25  1  1 1  1 1 2 
SG  14  2 2 1  2   1  2 6  4     1 1  1  3 1 1 4  1    39 1  1 2 3  6 14 
SA  13         1 1 1 2        1              136      11 5 
SP 5    4 1 3 2 4 2  2 14 4   1     8 1  1  4 1    1 2    159 3 2   9 13 
SW 1 5 2 6  7  1  1 26 19 18 19   2 1    6  2   1 9 1 20    2   3 106 3   49 45 
SZ 1 10 3 3 2 6   3 1 2 2 13 13  1  1  1  7  1 1   6 1 2    1  3 3 5 23   14 53 
TH  1              1          1   1      1    1 15  4 3 
TK             1   1 1           1      1       13  1 
UK 2 71 3 15 9 40 2 3  6 12 6 99 103  9 1 5 2 32 4 31 4 1 1 2 6 65 7 27 1 7 4 5 4 27 29 37 19 2 1 3080 583 
US 21 100 7 17 34 304 9 23 3 1 17 17 102 156 1 9 3 22 4 16 25 25 18 19 1 5 43 68 6 30 4 4 1 7 10 9 24 39 27 1  501 9951 
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Table 2.2 
Cumulated transaction values by country pairs. 
This table presents the cumulative transaction values of asset sales for each target-acquirer country pair from 1985 to 2010. Each row 
and each column represent an acquirer country (buyer) and a target country (seller), respectively. The transaction values are adjusted 
by the GDP deflator of the U.S., available at the U.S. Bureau of the Economic Analysis (BEA). GDP deflator is equal to 1 in the year 
of 2005. The transaction values are in millions of U.S. dollars. The country names are listed in Table 2.A.4. 
 AR AS AU BE BR CA CE CH CO CC DN FN FR WG GR HK HU ID IN IR IS IT 
AR 1266.26    393.41 9.92 1.87                
AS 45.12 39737.10  46.83 211.83 2001.22 25.66 28.28 6.89  1.75 130.15 1907.47 1988.71    6.52 439.33 8.11 2.95 1388.21 
AU 5.52  543.16  79.49 583.86    12.35 62.44 120.03 65.01 1254.39      114.86  123.65 
BE 6.88 352.67  886.81  524.91     76.27 19.83 233.94 997.18    24.46  2.36  93.17 
BR 1442.61    7682.00 932.15   519.99    3.40 868.81        135.50 
CA 159.90 727.32 2.63 46.64 908.21 62035.23 32.61 136.74 106.23 591.05 71.53 106.08 257.37 639.53     46.78 209.83  599.25 
CE 233.87    2128.49  1153.54  144.61              
CH  1880.33  480.92  148.86 16.27 13767.71 823.19    12.50   153.54   926.95    
CO       197.56  829.71              
CC          50.13             
DN  112.40    823.07     1803.77 174.29 481.05 6022.03    6.16  64.32  12.39 
FN  10.71 78.77 302.68 401.91 8.33     90.65 2340.16 1355.36 701.90  29.46  9.56    85.09 
FR 37.99 101.00 136.01 818.63 999.90 678.81 747.31 152.81 460  1822.05 44.11 27173.78 9829.39  135.37 9.00 1247.12  81.33 4.70 839.11 
WG  854.83 275.13 557.60 1586.93 2491.24 356.68 325.15  149.74 5081.43 460.17 4810.96 23958.96    173.42 10.86  27.62 365.60 
GR               729.57 1.91   40.93   32.33 
HK  307.43   9.65 46.66  38826.43   78.54  31.50 19.97  5940.06      175.67 
HU              302.08   21.94      
ID  166.05   109.21 103.17    36.77   563.10 892.27    4032.46  493.41  99.41 
IN      42.99          32.78   1500.60    
IR 20.85 86.24 59.94 19.86  65.51     49.01 555.32 309.29 295.31      3814.69 6.05 32.90 
IS  10.37  34.29  16.42       669.40 4462.96       741.05 101.95 
IT 21.05 78.05 63.42 946.97 164.83 162.47 180.74 69.23  30.36 749.58  1367.16 3482.13 4421.75   46.75    17758.37 
JP  1665.32 254.90 357.50 24.74 131.74  680.46   20.10 343.45 272.18 220.74  1627.21   13.83   632.24 
SK  6.36    302.94  38.88      73.10    42.12     
LX    22.59       204.37  520.99    18.44 8.42   155.09  
MA  194.14      48.08      67.73  35.06  9.63     
MX     859.99  505.08  20.78              
NT  401.81 99.95 4441.94 209.05 1170.68  15.69 735.27 236.53 111.54 963.83 4395.51 2794.10 138.50 183.45 6.35 2.64 49.60   601.50 
NZ  3201.85    300.83                95.21 
NO  5.34 453.93 58.74 4471.63 1467.42     675.30 23.26 49.85 3032.57         
PH                       
PL          252.62       32.98      
PO     400.16        136.79 192.79         
RU    16.69  3705.61      395.13  131.21        1931.46 
SG  520.44  6.47 66.44 749.20  51.92   16.51  75.79 365.68  400.47     22.56 51.75 
SA  2791.36         100.86 995.94 35.59 2813.90        50.11 
SP 1618.36    556.07 40.07 1384.27 48.27 1364.48 61.98  43.44 2470.32 2686.97   1.80     1589.61 
SW 14.46 481.29 309.47 430.80  1250.53  45.18  18.87 2555.69 2140.98 2786.73 1419.83   4.84 15.16    442.04 
SZ 1.47 4531.89 1299.06 527.52 261.51 171.16   2532.35 7.03 580.43 98.02 1505.31 5970.89  35.58  6.91  3.51  3026.05 
TH  3.42              85.15       
TK             10.51   4.61 50.19      
UK 542.46 7553.61 594.74 902.52 786.38 6767.70 1583.00 157.79  162.97 3576.71 837.12 12386.95 10161.08  632.15 1.00 218.03 110.74 3063.47 89.42 3547.04 
US 2136.59 11691.34 1142.36 3048.62 4906.45 30143.84 148.40 2813.09 299.23 401.87 2833.72 2279.04 27785.79 41558.43 326.57 772.24 38.34 4343.22 87.11 820.80 1471.72 4744.48 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Cumulated transaction values by country pairs. 
 
 JP SK LX MA MX NT NZ NO PH PL PO RU SG SA SP SW SZ TH TK UK US 
AR                      
AS    21.77  945.61 4051.26 690.03 2.81    252.69 371.42 81.90 403.80 32.97 10.33  5733.85 13379.88 
AU     55.26 133.09    137.42     7.06 1324.05 731.23   297.47 350.18 
BE   300.26   218.94        9.80 51.93 179.40 390.77   6919.31 2187.35 
BR     3.25 40.24  25.13       97.57     114.96 2103.46 
CA  29.74   766.69 644.34 1430.06  13.70  581.62   21.43 100.04 121.43 3337.14  72.05 7984.76 40395.25 
CE      69.73               642.69 
CH  573.99     8.32 112.90     1.60 6.12      6.46 747.10 
CO                     428.45 
CC          9.13      2.74      
DN      450.14  117.98  8.90  45.18 1.40 409.20 74.40 883.21 595.06   528.95 4965.23 
FN     34.10 1927.36  873.99  27.61  9.53    903.20 90.92   750.83 3367.91 
FR  401.30 123.20   4606.69 23.20 384.17  652.21 31.78  1.09 483.23 2642.26 823.54 692.55 28.94  19426.12 43131.23 
WG  1147.18 70.63 29.33  3638.77  425.26  295.26   98.38 30.77 747.75 1917.86 5429.39  128.35 8688.69 46278.70 
GR 60.58       59.26    220.63  8.46 5.93 15.68    15.63 948.46 
HK    120.68 20.66  333.50  6.62    441.41   647.51  5.57  1354.01 4289.20 
HU          13.73          112.23  
ID      282.60    35.54     18.59     874.67 1219.98 
IN             30.54        16.42 
IR     146.71 1451.54  6.28       12.60 100.68    3693.99 5774.01 
IS  175.42        21.71      27.99 128.57   137.86 2397.28 
IT      90.27  1170.23   55.67   9.03 301.26 465.14 235.74  133.81 1884.26 11646.69 
JP 18819.34    281.70 10215.33 709.01 180.74    33.13 69.95 110.83 134.60 97.58 551.98 3.67  4658.16 30594.60 
SK 15.26 9977.21 406.04 9.68   40.00      122.65       136.89 5269.17 
LX     1394.58 18.75  41.01   40.57   1825.54 104.31 55.18 34.86   1216.98 1085.45 
MA    1506.95  289.74 195.48      18.54 17.33    76.56  6.26 302.00 
MX    2.35 5550.81   1061.95       12.29      5063.11 
NT   1.22  6.27 8621.09 15.93 676.27  645.07  32.93 1402.56  528.21 2556.51 2325.23   6500.25 21225.19 
NZ     30.75 141.79 2330.32             713.31 551.14 
NO      1167.53  4891.95  13.94 48.37  391.22  759.50 1277.07    715.47 5350.44 
PH 4.51    3.36   14.72 311.83         105.72  62.21 1.35 
PL          698.16          103.20  
PO        5.64   6960.67    318.98    681.59 53.57 102.86 
RU 250.28       110.31    17965.80  469.00  88.02 24.07  20.82 110.31 784.27 
SG  263.35  19.99 130.17 23.07 109.89  4.84    1819.15 3.53  120.35 350.09 101.36  280.25 1062.79 
SA              5569.26      1062.62 650.59 
SP 7.33  76.23  1936.69 394.73    15.61 144.66    12569.11 228.07 904.55   814.13 1677.14 
SW  57.13   112.96 304.14 676.95 2309.08    118.65   185.73 8620.09 334.45   9231.81 10387.47 
SZ  167.00 7.13   3611.70 10.85 214.86    446.25  1194.515 381.74 288.94 6074.89   7180.77 19297.09 
TH    4.81   37.14      77.95    139.50 413.17  903.00 397.57 
TK      19.00      256.64       502.78  799.65 
UK 223.21 80.67 7.96 20.97 223.91 16243.59 301.98 2053.80 14.59 655.13 354.02 758.85 427.72 1769.98 2369.31 1030.21 1616.72 115.29 4.65 169305.60 105814.80 
US 2428.20 3720.44 38.43 206.49 5264.73 32769.08 183.44 4274.28 171.76 525.99 72.45 430.49 260.14 751.71 2800.08 11309.23 5294.77 5.16  88034.31 1349383.0
0  
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Table 2.3 
Counts and transaction values by year. 
This table reports the raw counts and transaction values for each year. The transaction values are 
adjusted by the GDP deflator of the U.S., available at the U.S. Bureau of the Economic Analysis 
(BEA). GDP deflator is equal to 1 in the year of 2005. The transaction values are in millions of 
U.S. dollars. 
 
Year Cross-border  Domestic 
 Counts Transaction Values  Counts Transaction Values 
1985 25 7250.67  131 40953.99 
1986 51 19801.41  219 49123.56 
1987 88 29626.16  267 41849.35 
1988 140 34280.19  393 65890.35 
1989 171 32314.52  507 46133.42 
1990 224 24617.01  507 41849.14 
1991 181 14992.44  471 31731.33 
1992 146 10402.07  520 34818.81 
1993 174 15562.87  674 43353.77 
1994 212 30309.94  685 47332.01 
1995 219 25767.16  762 51380.21 
1996 254 35358.24  909 77810.81 
1997 346 48172.88  1070 111414.66 
1998 361 64317.22  1065 102249.00 
1999 396 95675.98  987 126902.08 
2000 482 94898.28  901 152343.33 
2001 389 69123.46  832 163977.14 
2002 294 57193.66  734 65603.79 
2003 295 30189.80  746 52307.79 
2004 288 49454.87  803 70736.81 
2005 309 57702.00  837 91136.59 
2006 355 62089.69  795 111296.52 
2007 378 112091.33  822 104588.32 
2008 267 41139.06  689 56915.40 
2009 203 36278.40  555 47343.11 
2010 243 65690.46  564 69378.15 
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Table 2.4 
Counts and percent by industry. 
This table reports the raw counts and percent (%) for each two-digit SIC macro-industry. 
 
 Cross-border  Domestic 
Two-digit SIC Industry Target  Acquirer  Target  Acquirer 
Counts Percent  Counts Percent  Counts Percent  Counts Percent 
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 44 0.68  36 0.55  158 0.91  134 0.77 
10-14 Mining 484 7.46  483 7.44  1815 10.41  1848 10.59 
15-17 Construction 69 1.06  65 1.00  225 1.29  269 1.54 
20-39 Manufacturing 3739 57.60  3961 61.02  6481 37.15  6816 39.07 
40-49 Transportation, excluding Public Utilities 366 5.64  397 6.12  2401 13.76  2366 13.56 
50-51 Wholesale Trade 372 5.73  258 3.97  893 5.12  802 4.60 
52-59 Retail Trade 191 2.94  150 2.31  1307 7.49  1220 6.99 
60-67 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
70-89 Services 1211 18.66  1130 17.41  4121 23.62  3957 22.68 
91-99 Public Administration 15 0.23  11 0.17  44 0.25  33 0.19 
Total 6491 100  6491 100  17445 100  17445 100 
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Table 2.5 
Pooled OLS regressions: domestic deal ratio (transaction values). 
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of cross-border ratio on real exchange 
rates, financial development, and other control variables. The dependent variable is the 
proportion of the transaction values of domestic asset sales in the total transaction values of deals 
in target country  . Variable definitions and data sources are as described in Table 2.A.1, and 
summary statistics are reported in Table 2.A.2. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by target country are reported in parentheses below regression coefficients, and ***, 
**,* indicate statistical significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Real Exchange Rate -33.1828 
(22.4802) 
-31.5473 
(22.9123) 
-16.5540 
(27.2878) 
Credit Private: Target Country 0.1650*** 
(0.0607) 
0.1904*** 
(0.0559) 
0.1864*** 
(0.0548) 
Capital Account Openness: Target Country -5.0295***   
(1.5106) 
-2.6022 
(2.0135) 
-4.5190* 
(2.2777) 
Freedom: Target Country   0.2126 
(0.2523) 
Log GDP per capita: Target Country  -0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Target Country  0.5154 
(0.5778) 
0.8487 
(0.5809) 
Observations 507 507 396 
R² 0.0983 0.1073 0.1116 
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Table 2.6 
Pooled OLS regressions: cross-border pair ratio (transaction values). 
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of cross-border pair ratio on real 
exchange rates, financial development, and other control variables. The dependent variable is the 
proportion of the transaction values of cross-border asset sales by acquirer country   in the total 
transaction values of deals in target country  . Variable definitions and data sources are as 
described in Table 2.A.1, and summary statistics are reported in Table 2.A.2. Standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by target-acquirer country pair are reported in 
parentheses below regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Real Exchange Rate 12.1795* 
(6.7799) 
11.8627* 
(6.7205) 
10.3216 
(6.8064) 
10.2019 
(6.8072) 
2.6301 
(6.6819) 
Credit Private : Acquirer Country 0.0775*** 
(0.0162) 
0.0737*** 
(0.0179) 
0.0827*** 
(0.0175) 
0.0815*** 
(0.0175) 
0.0775*** 
(0.0185) 
Credit Private: Target Country -0.1513*** 
(0.0165) 
-0.1016*** 
(0.0183) 
-0.1030*** 
(0.0174) 
-0.1040*** 
(0.0176) 
-0.1061*** 
(0.0171) 
Capital Account Openness: Acquirer Country   -1.8794*  
(1.0287) 
-1.8214* 
(1.0211) 
-3.3842** 
(1.3933) 
Capital Account Openness: Target Country   -1.2711 
(1.0698) 
-1.2190 
(1.0885) 
-0.1087 
(1.3427) 
Freedom: Acquirer Country     0.0374 
(0.1070) 
Freedom: Target Country     0.0821 
(0.1240) 
Log GDP per capita: Acquirer Country  1.6455 
(1.2752) 
3.9358** 
(1.9240) 
3.9028** 
(1.9182) 
5.6210** 
(2.4539) 
Log GDP per capita: Target Country  -6.5132*** 
(1.3588) 
-5.4466*** 
(2.2309) 
-5.4609** 
(2.2373) 
-5.3588* 
(2.9742) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Acquirer Country  0.5556** 
(0.2461) 
0.4734* 
(0.2437) 
0.4612* 
(0.2439) 
0.4954* 
(0.2635) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Target Country  0.3643 
(0.3022) 
0.1886 
(0.3050) 
0.1766 
(0.3062) 
-0.0064 
(0.3011) 
Common Language 0.9320 
(1.9695) 
0.7467 
(1.9561) 
0.9953 
(1.9486) 
0.9983 
(1.9505) 
1.2740 
(1.9696) 
Geographic Distance -0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003* 
(0.00015) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
Euro    -1.5863 
(2.1565) 
-1.9739 
(2.1990) 
Observations 2628 2628 2566 2566 2026 
R² 0.1046 0.1227 0.1403 0.1405 0.1259 
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Table 2.7 
Pooled OLS regressions with interaction terms: cross-border pair ratio (transaction values). 
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of cross-border pair ratio on real 
exchange rates, financial development, and other control variables. The dependent variable is the 
proportion of the transaction values of cross-border asset sales by acquirer country   in the total 
transaction values of deals in target country  . Variable definitions and data sources are as 
described in Table 2.A.1, and summary statistics are reported in Table 2.A.2. Standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by target-acquirer country pair are reported in 
parentheses below regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Real Exchange Rate 87.9210*** 
(27.3968) 
85.4999*** 
(27.1362) 
89.1517***   
(26.3510) 
89.0506*** 
(26.3199) 
69.3722** 
(28.3056) 
Real Exchange Rate× Credit Private Acquirer Country  -0.3083* 
(0.1665) 
-0.2776* 
(0.1642) 
-0.3519** 
(0.1645) 
-0.3538** 
(0.1645) 
-0.2512 
(0.1744) 
Credit Private: Acquirer Country 0.0848*** 
(0.0162) 
0.0820*** 
(0.0179) 
0.0912*** 
(0.0175) 
0.0903*** 
(0.0175) 
0.0850*** 
(0.0189) 
Real Exchange Rate× Credit Private Target Country  -0.4011** 
(0.1748) 
-0.4143** 
(0.1712) 
-0.3821** 
(0.1675) 
-0.3801** 
(0.1675) 
-0.3705** 
(0.1610) 
Credit Private: Target Country -0.1489*** 
(0.0169) 
-0.1029*** 
(0.0188) 
-0.1060*** 
(0.0177) 
-0.1068*** 
(0.0179) 
-0.1094*** 
(0.0176) 
Capital Account Openness: Acquirer Country   -1.9286* 
(1.0239) 
-1.8825* 
(1.0163) 
-3.2406** 
(1.3966) 
Capital Account Openness: Target Country   -0.9003 
(1.1074) 
-0.8576 
(1.1265) 
0.2620 
(1.3674) 
Freedom: Acquirer Country     0.0187 
(0.1071) 
Freedom: Target Country     0.0684 
(0.1234) 
Log GDP per capita: Acquirer Country  1.3285 
(1.2395) 
3.6850* 
(1.9256) 
3.6566* 
(1.9206) 
5.2018** 
(2.4334) 
Log GDP per capita: Target Country  -5.9572*** 
(1.3566) 
-5.3783** 
(2.2898) 
-5.3884** 
(2.2955) 
-5.1734* 
(2.9950) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Acquirer Country  0.4957* 
(0.2589) 
0.4214* 
(0.2555) 
0.4113 
(0.2559) 
0.4304 
(0.2787) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Target Country  0.3513 
(0.2855) 
0.1998 
(0.2891) 
0.1906 
(0.2903) 
-0.0260 
(0.2840) 
Common Language 0.8538   
(1.9529) 
0.7008 
(1.9491) 
0.9144 
(1.9336) 
0.9171 
(1.9356) 
1.2695 
(1.9518) 
Geographic Distance -0.00019 
(0.00015) 
-0.00030** 
(0.00015) 
-0.00033** 
(0.00015) 
-0.00034** 
(0.00015) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
Euro    -1.2998 
(2.1780) 
-1.8106 
(2.2260) 
Observations 2557 2557 2496 2496 1960 
R² 0.1145 0.1297 0.1482 0.1483 0.1328 
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Table 2.8 
Pooled OLS regressions: domestic deal ratio (counts). 
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of domestic deal ratio, real exchange 
rates, financial development, and other control variables. The dependent variable is the 
proportion of the counts of domestic asset sales in the total counts of deals in target country  . 
Variable definitions and data sources are as described in Table 2.A.1, and summary statistics are 
reported in Table 2.A.2. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by target 
country are reported in parentheses below regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate 
statistical significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Real Exchange Rate -15.1843 
(13.1902) 
-13.4607 
(13.4785) 
-1.5634 
(13.4470) 
Credit Private: Target Country 0.1438** 
(0.0536) 
0.1590*** 
(0.0513) 
0.1525*** 
(0.0486) 
Capital Account Openness: Target Country -3.3083*** 
(1.2790) 
-1.9431 
(2.0061) 
-3.6924 
(2.3062) 
Freedom: Target Country   0.3102 
(0.2320) 
Log GDP per capita: Target Country  -0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Target Country  0.6632 
(0.4308) 
0.9912** 
(0.4792) 
Observations 507 507 396 
R² 0.1152 0.1255 0.1703 
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Table 2.9 
Pooled OLS regressions: cross-border pair ratio (counts). 
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of cross-border pair ratio on real 
exchange rates, financial development, and other control variables. The dependent variable is the 
proportion of the counts of cross-border asset sales by acquirer country   in the total counts of 
deals in target country  . Variable definitions and data sources are as described in Table 2.A.1, 
and summary statistics are reported in Table 2.A.2. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by target-acquirer country pair are reported in parentheses below regression 
coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Real Exchange Rate 9.7358** 
(4.7806) 
9.1379** 
(4.5765) 
7.8217* 
(4.6420) 
7.6339* 
(4.6443) 
-0.8860 
(4.1998) 
Credit Private : Acquirer Country 0.0635***  
(0.0137) 
0.0575*** 
(0.0153) 
0.0629*** 
(0.0148) 
0.0611*** 
(0.0147) 
0.0517*** 
(0.0144) 
Credit Private: Target Country -0.1441*** 
(0.0144) 
-0.0877*** 
(0.0156) 
-0.0907*** 
(0.0140) 
-0.0922*** 
(0.0141) 
-0.0966*** 
(0.0129) 
Capital Account Openness: Acquirer Country   -0.9285 
(0.8374) 
-0.8380 
(0.8360) 
-2.7063*** 
(1.0316) 
Capital Account Openness: Target Country   -1.4204  
(0.9468) 
-1.3432 
(0.9609) 
-0.1557 
(1.0218) 
Freedom: Acquirer Country     0.1396 
(0.0864) 
Freedom: Target Country     0.1124 
(0.0941) 
Log GDP per capita : Acquirer Country  1.5201 
(1.0471) 
2.5419   
(1.5914) 
2.4901 
(1.5873) 
4.1122** 
(1.8914) 
Log GDP per capita: Target Country  -7.8591*** 
(1.2269) 
-6.4661*** 
(2.0891) 
-6.4877*** 
(2.0956) 
-6.4083*** 
(2.2559) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Acquirer Country  0.3725* 
(0.2140) 
0.2867 
(0.2090) 
0.2699 
(0.2087) 
0.2521 
(0.2185) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Target Country  0.1665 
(0.2444) 
0.0287 
(0.2442) 
0.0105 
(0.2440) 
-0.1965 
(0.2103) 
Common Language 0.7052   
(1.7577) 
0.6369 
(1.7190) 
0.7741 
(1.6814) 
0.7771 
(1.6826) 
0.6474 
(1.5505) 
Geographic Distance -0.0003** 
(0.00014) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
Euro    -2.3643 
(1.5769) 
-2.3265 
(1.5666) 
Observations 2619 2619 2557 2557 2015 
R² 0.1622 0.2008 0.2354 0.2363 0.2435 
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Table 2.10  
Pooled OLS regressions with interaction terms: cross-border pair ratio (counts). 
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of cross-border pair ratio on real 
exchange rates, financial development, and other control variables. The dependent variable is the 
proportion of the counts of cross-border asset sales by acquirer country   in the total counts of 
deals in target country  . Variable definitions and data sources are as described in Table 2.A.1, 
and summary statistics are reported in Table 2.A.2. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by target-acquirer country pair are reported in parentheses below regression 
coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Real Exchange Rate 49.5963*** 
(17.8414) 
45.7181*** 
(16.8432) 
45.1906***   
(16.7368) 
44.9816*** 
(16.8035) 
15.5859 
(12.8157) 
Real Exchange Rate× Credit Private Acquirer Country  -0.1350  
(0.1109) 
-0.0942 
(0.1069) 
-0.1229 
(0.1078) 
-0.1269 
(0.1077) 
0.0207 
(0.0915) 
Credit Private: Acquirer Country 0.0661*** 
(0.0138) 
0.0615*** 
(0.0153) 
0.0666*** 
(0.0148) 
0.0648*** 
(0.0147) 
0.0531*** 
(0.0141) 
Real Exchange Rate× Credit Private Target Country  -0.2256** 
(0.1050) 
-0.2357** 
(0.0988) 
-0.2120** 
(0.0989) 
-0.2079** 
(0.0989) 
-0.1822** 
(0.0785) 
Credit Private: Target Country -0.1455*** 
(0.0140) 
-0.0914*** 
(0.0153) 
-0.0954*** 
(0.0133) 
-0.0971*** 
(0.0134) 
-0.1030*** 
(0.0119) 
Capital Account Openness: Acquirer Country   -0.8610 
(0.8141) 
-0.7658 
(0.8120) 
-2.2843** 
(1.0106) 
Capital Account Openness: Target Country   -1.2545* 
(0.9669) 
-1.1661 
(0.9824) 
0.0209 
(1.0469) 
Freedom: Acquirer Country     0.1279 
(0.0824) 
Freedom: Target Country     0.1162 
(0.0940) 
Log GDP per capita: Acquirer Country  1.3772 
(1.0170) 
2.3102   
(1.5747) 
2.2515 
(1.5713) 
3.5377* 
(1.8440) 
Log GDP per capita: Target Country  -7.3092*** 
(1.2174) 
-6.1115*** 
(2.0987) 
-6.1326*** 
(2.1055) 
-6.0181*** 
(2.2854) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Acquirer Country  0.3760* 
(0.2126) 
0.2957 
(0.2060) 
0.2749 
(0.2064) 
0.2598 
(0.2092) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Target Country  0.1780 
(0.2303) 
0.0669 
(0.2307) 
0.0479 
(0.2306) 
-0.2010 
(0.1922) 
Common Language 0.9748  
(1.7554) 
0.9059 
(1.7232) 
1.0375 
(1.6808) 
1.0430 
(1.6822) 
1.0938 
(1.5398) 
Geographic Distance -0.00029** 
(0.00014) 
-0.00036*** 
(0.00014) 
-0.00042*** 
(0.00013) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
Euro    -2.6849 
(1.5512) 
-2.7590* 
(1.5399) 
Observations 2557 2557 2496 2496 1960 
R² 0.1739 0.2080 0.2440 0.2451 0.2550 
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Table 2.11 
Robustness tests: domestic deal ratio. 
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of cross-border ratio on real exchange 
rates, financial development, and other control variables. The financial development is calculated 
as the credit by the banking sector to GDP ratio. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is 
the proportion of the transaction values of domestic asset sales in the total transaction values of 
deals in target country  . In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the proportion of the 
counts of domestic asset sales in the total counts of deals in target country  . Details on variable 
construction are described in Section 2.3.3. Variable definitions and data sources are as described 
in Table 2.A.1, and summary statistics are reported in Table 2.A.2. Standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by target country are reported in parentheses below regression 
coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Transaction Values  Counts 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Real Exchange Rate -38.3259 
(23.7919) 
-25.6386 
(29.2430) 
 -20.9844 
(14.0037) 
-11.7771 
(15.0828) 
Credit Banking: Target Country 0.1627*** 
(0.0554) 
0.1539*** 
(0.0532) 
 0.1355** 
(0.0518) 
0.1246** 
(0.0490) 
Capital Account Openness: Target Country -2.8264 
(2.0078) 
-4.8862** 
(2.2379) 
 -2.1176 
(2.0642) 
-3.9723* 
(2.3604) 
Freedom: Target Country  0.2339 
(0.2594) 
  0.3235 
(0.2401) 
Log GDP per capita: Target Country -0.0004 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
 -0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Target Country 0.6225 
(0.5816) 
0.9740 
(0.5953) 
 0.7873* 
(0.4421) 
1.1382** 
(0.4971) 
Observations 508 397  508 397 
R² 0.1037 0.1078  0.1059 0.1498 
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Table 2.12 
Robustness tests: cross-border pair ratio (without interaction terms). 
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of cross-border pair ratio on real 
exchange rates, financial development, and other control variables. The financial development is 
calculated as the credit by the banking sector to GDP ratio. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent 
variable is the proportion of the transaction values of cross-border asset sales by acquirer country 
  in the total transaction values of deals in target country  . In columns (3) and (4), the 
dependent variable is the proportion of the counts of cross-border asset sales by acquirer country 
  in the total counts of deals in target country  . Details on variable construction are described in 
Section 2.3.3. Variable definitions and data sources are as described in Table 2.A.1, and 
summary statistics are reported in Table 2.A.2. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by target-acquirer country pair are reported in parentheses below regression 
coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Transaction Values  Counts 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Real Exchange Rate 8.7690 
(6.8757) 
1.2176 
(6.7107) 
 6.2988 
(4.6950) 
-2.2522 
(4.2389) 
Credit Banking: Acquirer Country 0.0657*** 
(0.0164) 
0.0627*** 
(0.0156) 
 0.0460*** 
(0.0131) 
0.0401*** 
(0.0119) 
Credit Banking: Target Country -0.0983*** 
(0.0182) 
-0.1045*** 
(0.0160) 
 -0.0891*** 
(0.0137) 
-0.0966*** 
(0.0116) 
Capital Account Openness: Acquirer Country -1.7804* 
(1.0232) 
-3.3163** 
(1.3732) 
 -0.7643 
(0.8435) 
-2.5990** 
(1.0135) 
Capital Account Openness: Target Country -1.2966 
(1.0900) 
-0.1308 
(1.3267) 
 -1.4081 
(0.9597) 
-0.1772 
(1.0039) 
Freedom: Acquirer Country 
 
0.0824 
(0.1015) 
 
 
0.1719** 
(0.0822) 
Freedom: Target Country 
 
0.0617 
(0.1196) 
 
 
0.0945 
(0.0913) 
Log GDP per capita: Acquirer Country 4.4592** 
(1.9011) 
5.7111** 
(2.4076) 
 3.0029* 
(1.5736) 
4.1491** 
(1.8659) 
Log GDP per capita: Target Country -5.9025*** 
(2.2210) 
-5.6526* 
(2.9397) 
 -6.8278*** 
(2.0506) 
-6.6462*** 
(2.2050) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Acquirer Country 0.5258** 
(0.2459) 
0.5519** 
(0.2620) 
 0.3250 
(0.2105) 
0.3061 
(0.2169) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Target Country 0.0651 
(0.3037) 
-0.1325 
(0.3002) 
 -0.0965 
(0.2387) 
-0.3212 
(0.2071) 
Common Language 1.0461 
(1.9049) 
1.2246 
(1.9314) 
 0.7464 
(1.6409) 
0.5382 
(1.5114) 
Geographic Distance -0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
 -0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
Euro -1.4271 
(2.1754) 
-1.7568 
(2.2010) 
 -2.2349 
(1.5692) 
-2.1089 
(1.5451) 
Observations 2566 2026  2557 2015 
R² 0.1446 0.1352  0.2411 0.2584 
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Table 2.13 
Robustness tests: cross-border pair ratio (with interaction terms). 
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of the cross-border pair ratio on real 
exchange rates, financial development, and other control variables. The financial development is 
calculated as the credit by the banking sector to GDP ratio. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent 
variable is the proportion of the transaction values of cross-border asset sales by acquirer country 
  in the total transaction values of deals in target country  . In columns (3) and (4), the 
dependent variable is the proportion of the counts of cross-border asset sales by acquirer country 
  in the total counts of deals in target country  . Details on variable construction are described in 
Section 2.3.3. Variable definitions and data sources are as described in Table 2.A.1, and 
summary statistics are reported in Table 2.A.2. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by target-acquirer country pair are reported in parentheses below regression 
coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Transaction Values  Counts 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Real Exchange Rate 64.7263** 
(28.5375) 
56.2736** 
(28.2059) 
 28.7056 
(18.4975) 
10.9807 
(12.9544) 
Real Exchange Rate× Credit Banking Acquirer Country  -0.2414* 
(0.1430) 
-0.1890 
(0.1431) 
 -0.0686 
(0.0962) 
0.0068 
(0.0819) 
Credit Banking: Acquirer Country 0.0800*** 
(0.0162) 
0.0788*** 
(0.0164) 
 0.0537*** 
(0.0135) 
0.0456*** 
(0.0127) 
Real Exchange Rate× Credit Banking Target Country  -0.2179 
(0.1626) 
-0.2644* 
(0.1465) 
 -0.1126 
(0.1031) 
-0.1236* 
(0.0763) 
Credit Banking: Target Country -0.1034*** 
(0.0173) 
-0.1112*** 
(0.0155) 
 -0.0912*** 
(0.0130) 
-0.1010*** 
(0.0110) 
Capital Account Openness: Acquirer Country -1.7175* 
(1.0238) 
-3.0452** 
(1.3896) 
 -0.6875 
(0.8238) 
-2.2797** 
(0.9998) 
Capital Account Openness: Target Country -1.1785 
(1.1208) 
-0.0108 
(1.3342) 
 -1.3832 
(0.9764) 
-0.1646 
(1.0175) 
Freedom: Acquirer Country  0.0218 
(0.1007) 
  0.1446* 
(0.0790) 
Freedom: Target Country  0.0527 
(0.1201) 
  0.0993 
(0.0918) 
Log GDP per capita: Acquirer Country 3.7190** 
(1.8883) 
5.0821** 
(2.3912) 
 2.4997* 
(1.5522) 
3.6227** 
(1.8228) 
Log GDP per capita: Target Country -5.4590** 
(2.2861) 
-5.0013* 
(2.9452) 
 -6.3351*** 
(2.0746) 
-5.9941*** 
(2.2223) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Acquirer Country 0.5110** 
(0.2463) 
0.5646** 
(0.2637) 
 0.2912 
(0.1997) 
0.2923 
(0.1969) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate: Target Country 0.1000 
(0.2834) 
-0.0795 
(0.2720) 
 -0.0652 
(0.2261) 
-0.2921 
(0.1853) 
Common Language 0.8440 
(1.8875) 
1.2700 
(1.8973) 
 0.7406 
(1.6416) 
0.7882 
(1.4863) 
Geographic Distance -0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
 -0.0005 
(0.0001) 
-0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
Euro -1.4085 
(2.1934) 
-1.9428 
(2.2134) 
 -2.3126 
(1.5757) 
-2.3279 
(1.5469) 
Observations 2505 1972  2505 1972 
R² 0.1540 0.1446  0.2477 0.2660 
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Table 2.A.1 
Definitions of variables. 
This table describes the definitions and data sources of all the variables used in the regressions. 
 
Variable Definition  
Cross-border Pair Ratio: Counts Proportion of the counts of cross-border asset sales involving acquirer 
country   in the total counts of asset sales in target country  . (Source: 
SDC) 
Cross-border Pair Ratio: Transaction Values Proportion of the transaction values of cross-border asset sales 
involving acquirer country   in the total transaction values of asset 
sales in target country  . (Source: SDC) 
Domestic Deal Ratio: Counts Proportion of the counts of domestic asset sales in the total counts of 
asset sales in target country  . (Source: SDC) 
Domestic Deal Ratio: Transaction Values Proportion of the transaction values of domestic asset sales in the total 
transaction values of asset sales in target country  . (Source: SDC) 
Changes in Real Exchange Rates Annual changes in the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate is 
defined as the value of the acquirer country currency in terms of the 
target country currency. (Source: Penn World Tables 7.0) 
Changes in Real Exchange Rates: Target Country Annual changes in the real exchange rate of the target country from 
year t-1 to year t. The real exchange rate is defined as the value of the 
U.S. Dollars in terms of the target country currency. (Source: Penn 
World Tables 7.0) 
Credit Private Domestic credit to the private sector to GDP ratio. (Source: World 
Bank) 
Credit Banking Domestic credit provided by the banking sector to GDP ratio. (Source: 
World Bank) 
Capital Account Openness Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness. (Source: 
http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm.) 
Log GDP per capita Logarithm of the GDP per capita, PPP in constant 2005 international 
dollars. (Source: World Bank) 
GDP per capita Growth Rate GDP per capita annual growth rate in percentage. (Source: World 
Bank) 
Freedom Index The average of the ten economic freedom scores measuring ten 
components of freedom. The ten components of economic freedom 
are: Business Freedom, Trade Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Government 
Spending, Monetary Freedom, Investment Freedom, Financial 
Freedom, Property rights, Freedom from Corruption, and Labor 
Freedom. Tracked by The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage 
Foundation, the Index starts from 1995 and covers 183 countries. 
(Source: http://www.heritage.org/index/Explore.aspx?view=by-region-
country-year) 
Euro Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the target country and the 
acquirer country are European Union (EU) members that have adopted 
the euro (€) as their common currency and sole legal tender and 0 
otherwise. (Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/index.html) 
Common Language Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the target country and the 
acquirer country share a common language and 0 otherwise. (Source: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html) 
Geographic Distance The variable “distw” from CEPII. (Source: 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm) 
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Table 2.A.2 
Summary statistics. 
This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the regressions. Variable 
definitions are described in Table 2.A.1. 
 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Observations 
 Panel A: Country Pair Analysis 
Cross-border Pair Ratio: Counts 15.6138     20.6320    0.1364         100 2936     
Cross-border Pair Ratio: Transaction Values 17.3608     27.3115    0.0016         100 2936     
Changes in Real Exchange Rates 0.0172     0.2970   -0.9015 9.1547 42514        
Credit Private 82.0818     48.9452           0 231.6298 43596 
Credit Banking 98.8889     54.1820           0 320.5309 43596 
Capital Account Openness 1.0133     1.5635   -1.8438    2.4776 42630 
Freedom Index 67.5654     9.3839        45.1        90.5 28560     
Log GDP per capita 9.6640     0.8526    6.7021    11.2134 46326     
GDP per capita Growth Rate 2.4236      3.5392   -14.5684    13.6051 46200     
Common Language 0.1130     0.3165 0 1 46956     
Geographic Distance 7645.34     4979.253    160.9283    19539.48 46956      
 Panel B: Target Country Analysis 
Domestic Deal Ratio: Counts 57.8012     27.0287    6.6667         100 674     
Domestic Deal Ratio: Transaction Values 50.1908     35.7921    0.0299405 100 674     
Changes in Real Exchange Rates: Target Country 0.0249     0.1224   -0.8853    1.4294 1022      
Credit Private 82.0818     48.9682         0 231.6298 1038     
Credit Banking 98.8889     54.1820           0 320.5309 1038 
Freedom Index 67.5654     9.3907        45.1        90.5 680     
Capital Account Openness 1.0133     1.5642   -1.8438    2.4776 1015      
Log GDP per capita 9.6640     0.8529    6.7021    11.2134 1103     
GDP per capita Growth Rate 2.4236     3.5407   -14.5684    13.6051 1100     
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Table 2.A.3 
 Cross-border asset sales screening criteria. 
This table describes the complete set of screening criteria used to construct the cross-border asset 
sales sample. 
 
Request Data Item in SDC Request Description 
1 Date Announced 01/01/1985 to 12/31/2010 
2 Target Nation In the target and acquirer country list, see Table 2.A.8 
3 Deal Value Equal to or greater than 1 million U.S. Dollars 
4 Acquirer Nation In the target and acquirer country list, see Table 2.A.8 
5 Deal Status Completed or unconditional 
6 Deal Type NOT leveraged buyouts, tender offers, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-
tender offers, exchange offers, repurchases, and privatizations 
7 Form of the Deal “Acquisition of assets” or “acquisition of certain assets” 
8 Consideration Sought Category  Asset 
9 Acquirer Public Status NOT Government agency 
10 Target Public Status NOT Government agency 
11 Deal Attitude Friendly 
12 Acquisition Techniques Divestiture 
13 Acquisition Techniques  NOT Bankruptcy 
14 Cross-border deal flag Yes 
15 Location of the acquirer and the target 
firms 
The acquirer and the target firms are not located in the same nation. 
16 “% of Shares Acq.” and “% Owned 
After Transaction” 
“% of Shares Acq.”=100 and “% Owned After Transaction”=100: the 
asset must be wholly owned by the seller prior to the sale, and the 
transaction must transfer the seller's full ownership of the asset to the 
buyer. 
17 Primary SIC codes of the acquirer and 
the target firms 
Exclude the financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6799) and utilities 
industries (SIC codes 4900-4999). 
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Table 2.A.4 
Target and acquirer country list. 
This table reports the target and acquirer country names. 
 
Argentina (AR) Finland (FN) Japan (JP) Russia (RU) 
Australia (AS) France (FR) South Korea (SK) Singapore (SG) 
Austria (AU) Germany (WG) Luxembourg (LX) South Africa (SA) 
Belgium (BE) Greece (GR) Malaysia (MA) Spain (SP) 
Brazil (BR) Hong Kong (HK) Mexico (MA) Sweden (SW) 
Canada (CA) Hungary (HU) Netherlands (NT) Switzerland (SZ) 
Chile (CE) India (ID) New Zealand (NZ) Thailand (TH) 
China (CH) Indonesia (IN) Norway (NO) Turkey (TK) 
Colombia (CO) Ireland (IR) Philippines (PH) United Kingdom (UK) 
Czech Republic (CC) Israel (IS) Poland (PO) United States (US) 
Denmark (DN) Italy (IT) Portugal (PO)  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION, HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS, AND WORLD 
MARKET FOR CORPORATE ASSETS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Cross-border asset sales have experienced dramatic growth in the past decades.
1
 During the 
period from 1986 to 1990, the average annual count and transaction values are 134 and 28.13 
billion dollars, respectively. During the period from 2006 to 2010, the average count and 
transaction values have more than doubled, increasing to 289 and 63.46 billion dollars, 
respectively. In contrast, domestic asset sales did not significantly change during these two 
periods: 378 deals in counts and 48.97 billion dollars in transaction values over the first period 
and 685 deals and 77.90 billion over the second period.
2
 As a result, cross-border asset sales 
have been playing an increasingly important role in reallocating resources around the world. 
 
Moreover, as the process of global economic integration is expanding, the production of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) is increasing and firms are facing greater competition from 
                                                          
1
Several key features distinguish asset sales from mergers. Hege, Lovo, Slovin, and Sushka 
(2009) summarize the following (page 682). First, an asset sale is governed by contract law and 
the business judgment rule. Second, mergers are generally buyer-initiated, while asset sales are 
generally seller-initiated. Third, sellers of assets foster competitive and coetaneous bidding via 
an auction like process, followed by private negotiations between a seller and a selected buyer. 
2
These calculations are based on data from Securities Data Corporation Platinum (SDC). To 
mitigate the influence of business cycles, I report the averages for two five-year periods: 1986-
1990 and 2006-2010. Although only after 1992 does SDC cover deals of any value, the 
calculations may not be affected by the coverage of SDC as certain restrictions to identify the 
asset sales are imposed. 
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multinationals entering local markets. International production by TNCs, i.e., value added by 
foreign affiliates, is expanding, with sales, employment and assets of foreign affiliates all 
increasing, as shown in Table 3.A.3. As indicated in Figure 3.A.1, UNCTAD estimates that in 
2010 international production accounts for around 40% of TNCs' total value added, up from 
around 35% in 2005, and that it is more than one-tenth of global GDP and one-third of world 
exports. According to the findings of UNCTAD's annual survey of the 100 largest TNCs in the 
world, foreign employment accounts for more than 50% of their total employment, as shown in 
Table 3.A.4. 
 
These dramatic developments call for a study on how firms' heterogeneity, especially in terms of 
their competitiveness in the product market and their productivity, affects their corporate asset 
transactions both at home and abroad. Based on studies on domestic asset transactions, I extend 
the analysis to incorporate the world market for corporate assets. Abstracting from the dynamics, 
I introduce a new characteristic of firms, namely, the competitiveness in the product market, 
measured by the excess profitability, which affects firms' investment decisions, both in the 
domestic country and abroad. I investigate firms' decisions on whether to invest abroad and 
which mode to choose in the foreign country, i.e., making new investment or purchasing existing 
assets. 
 
The theoretical model featuring an open-economy set-up produces an endogenous self-selection 
pattern that links firms' asset purchases and sales to their fundamentals. I show that, other things 
being equal, firms with high competitiveness are more likely to buy assets on the overseas 
markets, and they are more likely to sell assets on the domestic market. Firms with high 
productivity are more likely to buy assets on both the domestic and overseas markets, and they 
are less likely to sell assets on the domestic market, which mirrors the established results 
regarding productivity. 
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The numerical analysis further shows that the relationship between the amount of assets sold and 
a firm’s of competitiveness is nonlinear. Specifically, when firms sell assets in the domestic 
country, as their excess profitability increases, the amount of assets sold first increases, but after 
their excess profitability reaches a threshold level, when firms become even more competitive, 
the amount of assets bought actually starts to decrease. 
 
Based on the theoretical results, I identify testable predictions. I then obtain comprehensive data 
on the asset transactions of U.S. firms, in the home country and overseas, from the Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) Platinum.
3
 I apply Logit models and Heckman selection models and 
find robust empirical evidence consistent with the model's predictions. The analysis also 
indicates that large firms are more likely to participate in asset purchases and sales in the 
domestic country, which is consistent with the findings inWarusawitharana (2008). In addition, I 
find that large firms also have a higher likelihood of purchasing assets abroad, which adds to the 
existing research. 
 
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The first one is research on the competitiveness 
of firms on product markets. Many papers investigate the impact of product market competition 
on firms' activities and performance from different perspectives. Gaspar and Massa (2005) find 
that a firm's monopoly power in the product market reduces the dispersion of earnings forecasts 
and lowers idiosyncratic return volatility. Hou and Robinson (2006) find that it lowers risk-
adjusted expected returns; Irvine and Pontiff (2009) find that it lowers idiosyncratic return 
volatility. Peress (2010) finds that competition in the product market stimulates trading, 
                                                          
3
Çolak and Whited (2007) use this data set to investigate divestitures. Warusawitharana (2008) 
and Borisova, John, and Salotti (2011) use this data set to examine asset purchases and sales. 
 
 
133 
 
including that by insiders, enhances the informativeness of stock prices, and improves the 
efficiency of capital allocation. Lyandres and Watanabe (2011) show that the expected returns of 
firms with reliable products can decrease with competition in the product market. Using data on 
firms from different countries, Healy, Serafeim, Srinivasan, and Yu (2011) find that corporate 
profitability mean reverts faster in countries where product and capital markets are more 
competitive. Giroud and Mueller (2011) find that weakly governed firms have lower labor 
productivity and higher input costs, and make more value-destroying acquisitions only in 
noncompetitive industries, which indicates that product market competition has impact on the 
effects of governance on firms' performance. Spearot (2012) shows that if varieties within an 
industry are close to perfect substitution, firms with high productivity choose to invest. 
 
In this paper, I study how competitiveness impacts the corporate asset transactions of firms both 
in the domestic country and abroad. The theoretical model captures the asset purchases as well as 
the sales in a unified framework. I find that firms with high competitiveness are more likely to 
buy assets on the overseas markets, and they are more likely to sell assets on the domestic market, 
which adds to the existing findings on the impact of product market competition. These findings 
do not mean that the valuation effects through the stock market on corporate investment or 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are not important. Clearly, a large proportion of M&As are 
financed by stocks, and the valuation of the acquirer or the target can have substantial effects, as 
emphasized in the literature. Instead, the findings in this paper that firms' characteristics 
regarding the fundamentals are also important in understanding firms' asset transactions 
worldwide, are best viewed as complementary to the existing literature. 
 
The second strand consists of the studies on firms' asset transactions. Based on studies on 
domestic asset transactions, I extend the existing analysis to an open economy and derive 
predictions on firms' investment decisions overseas. This paper is most closely related to 
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Warusawitharana (2008) and Yang (2008). Warusawitharana (2008) shows that profitability and 
firm size determine asset purchases and sales, and he provides supporting evidence for these 
predictions using data from SDC. Yang (2008) shows that changes in productivity, rather than 
productivity levels, affect firms' asset transaction decisions: Firms with rising productivity buy 
assets and firms with falling productivity downsize (rising buys falling). 
 
Other related studies on domestic asset transactions include that of Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2002), who model asset reallocation as firms' responses to aggregate demand shocks. Jovanovic 
and Rousseau (2002) show that asset sales are driven by cross-sectional differences in 
productivity and that firms with high productivity buy firms with low productivity (high buys 
low). Levine (2011) shows that low-cost producers seek to acquire firms with good projects 
which are not fully implemented due to high costs, and that the reallocation generates gains. 
Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) argue that management sells assets to obtain the cheapest funds 
to pursue its objectives rather than for operating efficiency alone. They also find that the typical 
firm in their sample performs poorly before the sale, and that the average stock-price reaction to 
asset sales is positive only when the proceeds are used for stock repurchases or to reduce the debt. 
Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2004) find that firms are more likely to divest segments 
from industries with a more liquid market for corporate assets, unrelated segments, poorly 
performing segments, and small segments. 
 
This paper is also related to studies on cross-border asset sales and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). In an international context, a few studies explore cross-country comparisons on cross-
border investment. Froot and Stein (1991) show that when entrepreneurs use external finance 
from the capital market with informational imperfections to bid for assets, the wealth effects 
caused by the depreciation of the target country currency enable foreign entrepreneurs to bid a 
higher price for the target country assets, and thereby acquire more assets in the target country. 
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Borisova, John, and Salotti (2011) study the cross-border and domestic divestitures by U.S. firms 
from 1998 to 2008. They find that asset sales to foreign buyers yield higher abnormal returns to 
the seller as compared with domestic sales. This incremental return is driven by liquidity-
constrained sellers engaging in cross-border transactions. Larger seller returns in these 
international deals are associated with foreign buyers' greater chance of asset overvaluation due 
to information asymmetry, foreign buyers' options to expand geographically, and favorable 
economic conditions in their respective home countries. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) 
investigate firms' choices between exporting and FDI when serving foreign markets. They show 
that the heterogeneity in productivity of firms can explain the different modes to serve foreign 
markets: Only the most productive firms engage in FDI. 
 
In order to reflect the increasingly important role of cross-border asset transactions and product 
market competition from foreign affiliates currently in the global economy, I extend the 
framework in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) in two dimensions. First, I exclude the firms' 
entry mode of exporting but add the asset purchases overseas as a new mode to obtain capital in 
foreign markets. Second, in addition to the firms' heterogeneity in productivity, I introduce the 
heterogeneity in the firms' excess profitability and the amount of assets-in-place. I make new 
predictions regarding the impact of firms' heterogeneous characteristics on asset transactions 
both at home and abroad, and in particular I link the firms' excess profitability in the product 
market to their cross-border asset reallocation decisions, thereby complementing the existing 
research on asset transactions.
4
 
 
                                                          
4
Makaew (2009), using data on cross-border M&As, compares the productivity of the acquirers 
with that of the targets, and finds that acquirers tend to be more productive and targets tend to be 
less productive. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develops a theoretical model on 
asset sales featuring firms with heterogeneous competitiveness, productivity, and assets-in-place. 
Section 3.3 solves the model numerically and presents comparative statics regarding firms' 
decisions. The simulation results are also presented in this section. The empirical analysis 
follows in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes the paper. All the proofs are collected in the 
Appendix. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Model 
3.2.1 General Setup 
Suppose that there are N countries in the world. In any industry of a typical country, there is a 
continuum  1,0  of firms. A representative firm is characterized by its competitiveness, 
productivity, and assets-in-place. Assets-in-place are the capital stock formed by former 
investment and generate revenues for the firm. I follow Yang (2008) in assuming that the firm 
uses only capital to produce goods, which allows us to focus better on the firm's investment 
decisions in its home country and overseas.
5
 Given its competitiveness, productivity, and assets-
in-place, the firm makes investment decisions to maximize its profit. To focus on the firm's asset 
purchases or sales decisions, I further assume that the markets for tangible assets are segmented, 
or in other words, physical goods are immobile across borders and there are no exports or 
imports of goods. However, as is standard in the literature, intangible assets, such as the 
technology used in production, is mobile. As a result, I focus on the multinational production 
worldwide. 
 
                                                          
5
Warusawitharana (2008) assumes that each firm uses capital and labor as inputs; however, he 
further assumes that the wage rate is exogenous, and thereby the labor input decision can be 
substituted out and the firm's profit can be written solely in terms of its capital stock. 
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3.2.2 Firm's Profit Maximization Problem 
Let us take a snapshot of the investment decisions of a representative firm at a certain time spot 
in this open economy. In country i , a representative firm, denoted as firm  vi, , produces the 
variety of good v , using only capital. This firm is characterized by a random vector
 vivivi SZ ,,, ,, , where vi,  is the competitiveness, viZ ,  is the productivity, namely the units of 
good v produced per unit of capital; and viS ,  is the assets-in-place. vi, , viZ , , and viS ,  
follow a 
certain joint distribution. The firm sells goods on a product market characterized by monopolistic 
competition. Specifically, the firm faces the inverse demand function of its output, 
   vivivivi YYp ,
1
,,,



 , where vip ,  and viY ,  are the price and quantity of good v demanded by the 
consumers,
6
 0 , and 10 ,  vi . Therefore, the firm enjoys a certain market power.
7
 
 
In order to adjust its amount of capital needed, the firm has two options: It makes new 
investment itself or participates in the asset markets to purchase or sell existing assets. There is a 
fixed cost, Df , for participating in domestic asset transfers and a fixed cost, Ff , for participating 
in cross-border transactions. These costs account for transaction costs such as legal fees. I 
assume that DF ff  ; that is, cross-border transactions incur a higher cost to search for partners 
overseas. I follow Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) in assuming that if the firm produces 
goods in the foreign country, it needs to pay a fixed cost If , which is the overhead cost of 
production. 
 
                                                          
6
The corresponding demand function   





 vivivivi ppY
,1
1
,,,

  can be derived from a utility 
maximization problem with a quasi-linear utility function. 
7
The demand elasticity of good viY , , 
vi
vi
pd
Yd
,
,
ln
ln
, equals 
vi ,1
1
  and is increasing in vi, . Therefore, the 
higher vi, , the more elastic the demand for good viY ,  and the less market power firm  vi,  
enjoys. 
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The firm makes two types of decisions: one is its production and investment decisions in its 
home country, and the other is those in the other 1N  countries. Following Helpman, Melitz, 
and Yeaple (2004), I assume that each firm independently maximizes the profit obtained from 
the home country and from these foreign countries, instead of maximizing the joint profit. To 
ease notation, I omit good index v  henceforth. I take the new investment as the numeraire, and 
as a result, the unit price of the new investment is normalized to 1, and the prices of existing 
capital in country i , denoted by iq , are endogenously determined in the equilibrium. The 
following two subsections describe the firm's profit maximization decisions in the home country 
and abroad, respectively. The equilibrium conditions are detailed in Appendix A. 
 
3.2.2.1 Profit Maximization in the Home Country 
I first analyze the firm's profit maximization in its home country i . When firm  vi,  chooses its 
optimal amount of working capital, it has two options: make new investment 0iiI , or purchase 
or sell existing capital on the asset market. If it does sell assets, it cannot sell more than what it 
has in hand, that is, iii SX  . Once the assets are installed, they are equally productive. 
Therefore, the total amount of capital available to the firm is 
,iiiiiii XISK   
 where iS , iiI , and iiX  are the assets-in-place, the new investment, and the assets transferred. 
The production function of firm  vi,  is 
  .iiiiiiii XISZY   
The cost of producing output iiY  is  
  ,1, 0 iixDiiiiiiiii fXqIXIC  
Where 1 is an indicator function denoting that the firm participates in asset purchases or sales on 
the asset market. 
 
The firm chooses 0iiI  and iii SX  to maximize its profit in the home country; that is, 
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   .1max 0
0,0



ii
iiiii
XDiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
SXI
fXqIXISZCYp
  
 
The firm chooses whether to participate in the domestic asset transaction market. So, the firm has 
two options: (1) non-participation )0( iiX , or (2) participation  0iiX . The firm compares 
the profits from these two options and makes the decision in its home country. To be specific, let 

ii , 0iiX , and 0iiX , denote the equilibrium profit in the home country, the profit under non-
participation and participation, and let * indicate the equilibrium for the relevant variables, the 
maximum amount of profit from the production in the home country is 
 ,,max 00   iiii XXii   
where   iiiiiiX IYpii 0  and  DiiiiiiiX fXqYpii 

 0
 . 
 
3.2.2.2 Profit Maximization Overseas 
Regarding the firm's profit maximization overseas, in any of the other 1N  countries, for 
example, foreign country j , without loss of generality, firm  vi,  can either make new 
investment (greenfield FDI) 0ijI  or purchase existing assets (cross-border asset purchases) 
0ijX  on the asset market in country j . As the firm takes only its production technology with 
it when producing goods locally in country j ,
8
 the total amount of capital available to the firm is 
.ijijij XIK   
The production function of firm  vi,  in country j  is 
  .ijijiij XIZY   
The cost of producing output ijY  is  
  .1, 0 IXFijjijijij ffXqIXIC ij    
The firm chooses 0ijI  and 0ijX  to maximize its profit in country j ; that is, the firm's profit 
                                                          
8
Regarding the multinational corporation, assets-in-place in the home country do not enter the 
firm's production function when it is producing goods locally in a foreign country. 
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maximization problem is 
   .1max 0
0,0
IXFijjijijiji
XI
ffXqIXIZ
ij
ijij
 

  
 
When the profit obtained from country j  is positive, the firm enters country j . In order to 
produce in country j , the firm chooses whether to participate in the asset transaction market in 
country j : (1) non-participation )0( ijX , i.e., the firm makes new investment and does not 
purchase existing assets from foreign firms; or (2) participation  0ijX , i.e., instead of making 
new investment, the firm purchases existing assets from foreign firms. The firm compares the 
profits in these two cases and determines its amount of investment in country j . The maximum 
amount of profit from the production in country j is 
 ,,max 00   ijij XXij   
where  IijijijX fIYpij 

0  and  IFijjijijX ffXqYpij 

 0
 . 
 
3.2.3 Equilibrium 
In this open economy, the equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions which are 
simultaneously satisfied in each country  Ni ,...,2,1 : (1) For any firm v , its profit is 
maximized, and (2) the asset market in each country is cleared. These conditions can be 
expressed in terms of the excess demand for the existing assets in each country i , which is a 
function of the price of existing assets in country i , iq . The equilibrium is characterized by the 
set of conditions that the excess demand in all the countries is equal to 0, i.e., 
       ,,...,2,1for  ,0
,1
NiqXEqXE jji
N
ijj
iii 


                            (3.1) 
where  E  denotes the integration over all the firms given the joint distribution of the firm 
characteristics  , Z , and S ,  iiX  is the quantity of assets transferred between firms of country 
i , and  jiX  is the quantity transferred between firms of country i (the target firms) and firms of 
country j (the acquirer firms) on country i 's asset market. 
In order to illustrate the intuition, I focus on the symmetric case where the N countries in the 
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world are identical. In this scenario, the prices of existing assets in all the countries are equalized, 
and I denote this price as q , and the set of conditions (3.1) boil down to the following equation 
in terms of the equilibrium price q : 
        .01   qXENqXE jiii                                           (3.2) 
 
3.3 Numerical Analysis and Simulation 
3.3.1 Numerical Solution 
The complexity of the model precludes analytical solutions, therefore, I solve the equilibrium of 
the model using numerical analysis. In order to do this , I further make assumptions on the 
distribution of the firm characteristics and specify the parameter values. I follow the procedures 
in Appendix B and solve the equilibrium numerically. 
 
Let  1ln 1  a ,
9
 Ss log , and Zz log . I assume that a , s , and z  follow a joint normal 
distribution, that is, 
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Since there are no well-established values for the parameters in the existing literature, the 
specific value to attach to the model's parameters is surely debatable. In order to simplify the 
computation, I analyze the case of two symmetric countries, i.e., 2N . I set the mean of the log 
of the productivity as )5.0log(z , the mean of the log of the assets-in-place as )5.0log(s , the 
mean of the competitiveness parameter as 1a , the standard deviations as 2.0 asz  , 
the correlation between the firm's competitiveness, productivity, and assets-in-place as 
                                                          
9
I use the Logistic transformation ae 1
1  to meet the restriction 10  . 
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0 szazas  , the demand parameter as 1 , and the fixed costs of investment as Df , 
Ff , and 02.0If . I illustrate the equilibrium in this example below. 
 
3.3.1.1 Equilibrium Price of Existing Assets 
Given the above parameter values, the equilibrium price of existing assets is 729.0q . The 
reason why q  is less than 1 is intuitive. The mechanism behind the equilibrium is the trade-off 
between the variable cost and the fixed cost in the firm's profit maximization decisions: If it pays 
the fixed cost, it receives a discount on the variable cost for per unit of assets transferred. Given 
the realization of the productivity and the excess profitability, firms with extremely large assets-
in-place would like to sell part of their assets; yet, for any expanding firms, if they would like to 
participate in the asset market that incurs the transaction cost, none of them would like to 
purchase assets if the price of existing assets is greater than or equal to 1, which is the cost of 
making new investment themselves. Therefore, relative to making new investment, if firms do 
participate in asset transactions, they only pay the discounted variable cost of q  per unit of 
capital transferred; however, in order to participate in asset transactions, they have to pay the 
fixed cost Df  or Ff . 
 
3.3.1.2 Investment Decisions 
I first analyze the overseas market for corporate assets. Figure 3.1 plots the decisions of the firms 
characterized by different combinations of competitiveness and productivity. The model predicts 
an interesting sorting pattern regarding firms' investment decisions abroad. Given firms' 
productivity, firms with low excess profitability do not engage in overseas investment; firms 
with medium excess profitability make new investment in the foreign country; and highly 
competitive firms purchase foreign assets from local firms in the foreign country. On the other 
hand, given firms' excess profitability, firms with low productivity do not make any investment 
in the foreign country; firms with medium productivity make new investment in the foreign 
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country; and highly productive firms engage in asset purchases on the foreign asset market. 
 
Next, I investigate the domestic asset market. In order to compare firms' decisions on the 
domestic market with those on the overseas market, I make additional assumptions on the 
amount of assets-in-place and illustrate how firms' decisions vary with the changes in excess 
profitability and productivity. In Figure 3.2, I fix the assets-in-place at the mean value  
)5.0log(s  and plot firms' investment decisions in the domestic country. Holding firms' 
productivity fixed, firms with lower excess profitability maintain their levels of investment, 
neither making new investment nor purchasing existing assets from or selling their assets to other 
firms, while firms with higher excess profitability sell their existing assets, which suggests that 
firms with higher excess profitability are more likely to sell assets on the domestic market. On 
the other hand, holding excess profitability fixed, firms with lower productivity downsize, while 
firms with higher productivity maintain their existing levels of investment. 
 
3.3.1.3 Excess Profitability 
In order to gain insight into how the quantities of the new investment and the assets transferred 
in equilibrium vary with firms' excess profitability, I plot firms' decisions on these quantities. 
Specifying all the other parameter values as above, I now set the standard deviations as 
610 sz  , and 2.0a , in other words, I shut down the impact of productivity and assets-
in-place. I also set the fix cost for participating in the cross-border asset transactions as 
05.0Ff . Figure 3.3 shows how changes in excess profitability affect the quantities of new 
investment and asset purchases in the foreign market, holding all other variables constant. Firms 
with lower excess profitability make new investment instead of purchasing existing assets, and 
the amount of new investment increases as the excess profitability increases. After firms' excess 
profitability passes a certain threshold, firms start to purchase existing assets in the foreign 
country, and a nonlinear relationship between the amount of assets purchased and the excess 
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profitability emerges. Specifically, when the firm's excess profitability increases, the amount of 
assets bought first increases; as the firm becomes more and more competitive, the amount of 
assets bought actually starts to decrease after the amount of assets bought reaches a maximum 
amount. 
 
Figure 3.4 shows firms' decisions in the home country. In this case, all the firms plotted sell their 
existing assets. As firms' excess profitability increases, they sell fewer existing assets; after the 
level of excess profitability reaches a threshold, as firms become even more competitive, the 
amount of assets sold starts to increase. 
 
3.3.2 Regression Analysis on Simulated Data 
In this section, I conduct regression analysis using simulated data and report the results. This 
analysis further sheds light on the relationship between the amount of assets transferred and a 
firm's characteristics and motivates subsequent analysis using actual data on asset transactions. 
I set the mean of the log of the productivity as )4.0log(z ; the mean of the log of the assets-in-
place as )5.0log(s ; the mean of the competitiveness proxy as 0a ; the standard deviations as 
2.0z , 4.0s , and 2.0a ; the correlation between the firm's competitiveness, 
productivity, and assets-in-place as 0as , 0az , and 3.0sz ; the demand parameter as 
9.0 ; and the fixed costs of investment as 02.0Df , 05.0Ff , and 02.0If . I obtain a 
sample of 10,000 firms. 
 
I first investigate the sample firms' likelihood of participating in asset transactions in the 
domestic country. I apply the Logit model to the asset purchasers and sellers separately. I include 
the firm's competitiveness and productivity as regressors. In order to capture the nonlinear 
relationship between the likelihood of participating in asset transactions and the firms' 
competitiveness, I also include the square term of the competitiveness in an alternative 
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specification. Specifically, I run the following two Logit regressions to analyze the correlation 
between the likelihood of asset transactions and the firm's characteristics: 
,310 vvvv Zy    
  ,3
2
210 vvvvv Zy    
where vy  is a dummy variable which equals 1 if firm v  buys assets on the domestic market; v  
and vZ  are the competitiveness and the productivity of firm v , and v  denotes the idiosyncratic 
term. I examine the likelihood of asset sales in a similar way. 
 
In Table 3.1, columns (1) and (2) report the results for the simulated data on the sample firms' 
participation in asset purchases in the domestic country. The coefficients on the competitiveness 
and its square term are statistically insignificant. The coefficients on the productivity in both 
specifications are positive and statistically significant, which suggests that more productive firms 
are more likely to buy assets. Columns (3) and (4) display the results for the sample firms' 
participation in asset sales in the domestic country. The coefficient on the competitiveness is 
positive and statistically significant, which suggests that more competitive firms are more likely 
to sell assets. The coefficient on its square term is negative, which is also consistent with the 
nonlinear relationship between the assets sold and the firm's excess profitability, as shown in 
Figure 3.3. The coefficients on the productivity in both specifications are negative and 
statistically significant, which suggests that more productive firms are less likely to sell assets. 
 
Regarding the sample firms' asset purchases in the foreign country, I apply the Heckman 
selection model. Column (5) presents the results. In the selection equation, the coefficients on the 
competitiveness and productivity are positive and statistically significant, which indicates that 
more competitive or more productive firms are more likely to buy assets in the foreign country. 
In the investment equation, the negative coefficients on the competitiveness suggests that more 
competitive firms tend to buy fewer assets in the foreign country, while the positive coefficient 
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on the productivity suggests that more productive firms tend to buy more assets in the foreign 
country. The coefficient on the square term of the competitiveness suggests that the negative 
correlation between the amount of assets purchased and the competitiveness is decreasing as the 
firm becomes more competitive. This result is also consistent with the nonlinear relationship 
between the assets purchased and the firm's competitiveness, as shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
3.4 Empirical Analysis 
Based on the above analysis, the model develops a number of empirical predictions on the 
impact of a firm's characteristics, specifically its competitiveness and productivity, on its 
decisions regarding asset transactions, both in the domestic country and abroad. In this section, I 
map the theoretical results into empirical strategies and test the model's predictions. 
 
3.4.1 Data and Variables 
In this section, I describe the data sources, the screening procedures, and the variables used in the 
regressions. 
 
3.4.1.1 Data and Sample 
Due to the availability of financial data, I focus on the U.S. buyers, or in other words, the buyers 
are U.S. firms, and the sellers are firms all around the world, including the U.S. firms. 
 
Regarding the asset transaction data, I impose certain searching criteria on the M&A database 
recorded by SDC to identify asset sales. Borisova, John, and Salotti (2011) use Thomson ONE 
Banker's Deals Analysis module to identify cross-border asset sales, which has the same data 
coverage as SDC.
10
 Warusawitharana (2008) also uses SDC to collect data on asset sales when 
studying domestic deals. The domestic asset transactions in my analysis meet the following 
                                                          
10
SDC and Thomson ONE Banker both belong to Thomson Financials Corporation. 
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criteria: the deal is announced between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2009, and is 
completed by the end of the sample period; to reduce measurement errors, the deal value must be 
at least 1 million U.S. dollars; the deal attitude is “Friendly”. Following the standard literature, I 
exclude leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers, 
repurchases, and privatizations from the sample. In addition, deals in which the target or the 
acquirer is a government agency are excluded from the sample.
11
 I also exclude asset sales due to 
bankruptcy, because the reasons for asset sales under bankruptcy are different from those of 
firms in good standing (Ofek, 1993). I further exclude deals involving financial industries 
(Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6000-6799). As to cross-border asset transactions, 
after the deal is identified by the cross-border deal flag of SDC, I further impose the restriction 
that the deals involve target firms which are not located in the U.S. 
 
Regarding the firms' financial data, I collect the annual data from Compustat. I then link the 
firms' financial data to their asset transaction data using each firm's CUSIP and the year. 
 
3.4.1.2 Variables 
In this section, I outline the variables used in the empirical analysis. The definitions and data 
sources of the variables are detailed in Table 3.A.1, and summary statistics are reported in Table 
3.A.2. 
 
To measure a firm's competitiveness, I use its excess price cost margin. I first calculate each 
firm's price cost margin, which is defined as its EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation) scaled by its total sales. I then compute the equally weighted average of the price 
                                                          
11
Karolyi and Liao (2010) investigate cross-border acquisitions led by government-controlled 
acquirers from 1990 to 2008, using corporate-led acquisitions as a benchmark. 
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cost margin for each two-digit SIC sector. The difference between each firm's price cost margin 
and this sector average is the firm's excess cost margin. 
 
Regarding the firm's productivity, I use the return on assets of each firm, which equals its 
EBITDA scaled by its book value of assets. As an alternative to the return on assets, I use the 
return per employee, which is defined as the EBITDA scaled by the total number of employees. 
 
Following the standard literature, I also control the size of the firm. I first take the log of the 
firm's book value of assets; in order to detrend the assets, I then take the difference of the log 
values between two fiscal years. Moreover, as the firm's valuation may be correlated with its 
asset transactions due to the wealth effect, I control the firm's market-to-book ratio in the 
regressions which equals the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. 
 
3.4.2 Empirical Results 
At the firm level, I analyze how firms' heterogeneity in their competitiveness and productivity 
are associated with their asset transaction activities. 
 
3.4.2.1 Asset Purchases in the Domestic Country 
Discrete choice models provide methodologies to analyze the characteristics of asset buyers and 
sellers. Regarding firms' asset transactions in the home country, I estimate the following Logit 
regression to analyze the firms' decisions to participate in domestic asset transfers: 
  ,,,4,3
2
,2,10, tvtvtvtvtv
P
tv etRZy    
where P tvy ,  is a dummy variable. If firm v  of the U.S. buys existing assets from another domestic 
firm in year t , 1, 
P
tvy ; otherwise, 0, 
P
tvy . tv,  and tvZ ,  stand for the competitiveness and the 
productivity. tvR ,  is a vector of control variables, and t is the year dummy. 
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Table 3.2 reports the results for the U.S. firms' asset purchase decisions in the domestic country, 
and it also reports the odds ratios corresponding to the parameter estimates. The odds ratios 
represent the relative increase in the odds in favor of an asset purchase relative to not purchasing 
assets for a unit increase in the independent variable. Standard errors are clustered by the 
acquirer firm to relax the assumption of independence within each cluster. Column (1) presents 
the baseline regressions. The coefficient on the competitiveness is positive but statistically 
insignificant, while that on the productivity is positive and statistically significant. This result 
indicates that productive firms are more likely to buy assets on the home market, but firms' 
competitiveness may not be correlated to their asset purchase decisions on the home market. This 
result is consistent with those from the simulated data. The coefficient on the firm's size is 
positive and statistically significant, which implies that growing firms are more likely to 
purchase assets in the home country. Regarding the economic magnitude of the coefficient 
estimates, as indicated by the result in column (1), if the return on assets increases by one 
standard deviation, the odds of being an asset purchaser are expected increase by about 12.11%. 
 
In column (2), I use the return per employee as an alternative measure for the return on assets, 
and the results are similar to those in column (1). In columns (3) and (4), I control for the 
market-to-book ratio. As the data on the market-to-book ratio are only available for recent years, 
the sample size shrinks. The coefficients on the return on assets and return per employee are still 
statistically significant while the coefficient on the market-to-book ratio is positive and 
statistically insignificant. 
 
In order to investigate whether there is a nonlinear relationship between the decision to purchase 
assets and the firm's competitiveness, I include in Table 3.3 the square term of the 
competitiveness and conduct similar exercises as those in Table 3.2. Across all the specifications, 
the coefficient estimates on the competitiveness and its square term are positive and statistically 
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insignificant. The coefficient estimates on the return on assets or return per employee are 
positive and statistically significant although the magnitudes are smaller. The coefficients on the 
firm's size remains positive and statistically significant, while those on the market-to-book ratio 
are still statistically insignificant. 
 
3.4.2.2 Asset Sales in the Domestic Country 
Similarly, I investigate the firms' asset sales decisions in the home country. Specifically, I 
estimate the following Logit regression to analyze the U.S. firms' decisions to sell assets on the 
domestic market: 
  ,,,4,3
2
,2,10, tvtvtvtvtv
S
tv tRZy    
where S tvy ,  is a dummy variable. If firm v  of the U.S. sells its assets to another firm in year t , 
1, 
S
tvy ; otherwise, 0, 
S
tvy . tv, , tvZ , , tvR , , and t  stand for the same meaning as in the asset 
purchases regression. 
 
Table 3.4 reports the results for the U.S. firms' asset sales decisions in the domestic country. 
Column (1) presents the baseline regression. The coefficient on the competitiveness is positive 
and statistically significant, which indicates that other things being equal, competitive firms are 
more likely to sell assets. The coefficient on the productivity is negative and statistically 
significant, which suggests that productive firms are less likely to sell assets on the home market. 
These results match the findings from the simulated data reported in column (3) of Table 3.2. 
Regarding the economic magnitude of the coefficient estimates, if the excess price cost margin 
increases by one standard deviation, the odds of being an asset seller are expected to increase by 
about 6.62%. A unit standard deviation increase in return on assets decreases the odds in favor of 
the asset sales by 27.59%. The coefficient on the firm's size is positive and statistically 
significant, which implies that large firms are more likely to sell assets in the home country. 
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In column (2), I use the return per employee as an alternative measure for the return on assets; 
the results are similar to those in column (1). If the return per employee increases by one 
standard deviation, the odds of being an asset seller are expected to decrease by about 28.47%. In 
columns (3) and (4), I control for the market-to-book ratio. The coefficients on return on assets 
and return per employee remain statistically significant while the coefficient on the market-to-
book ratio is positive and statistically insignificant. 
 
In order to investigate whether there is a nonlinear relationship between the decision to sell asset 
and the firm's competitiveness, in Table 3.5, I include the square term of the competitiveness and 
conduct similar exercises as those in Table 3.4. Across all the specifications, the coefficient 
estimate on the competitiveness is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient on its 
square term is negative and statistically significant, which matches the result from the simulated 
data. This finding indicates that the effect of the competitiveness on the likelihood of selling 
assets in the home country is decreasing. The coefficient estimates on the return on assets or 
return per employee remain negative and statistically significant and the magnitudes are similar 
to the corresponding regressions in Table 3.4. The coefficients on the firm's size remains positive 
and statistically significant, while those on market-to-book ratio are still positive and statistically 
insignificant. 
 
3.4.2.3 Asset Purchases Overseas 
Regarding the firms' asset purchases overseas, I estimate the Heckman selection model 
  ,,1,4,3
2
,2,10, tvtvtvtvtv
O
tv utRZy    
,0 ,0 ,2,3,2,1,  tvtvtvtv
O
tv uRZy   
where Otvy ,  is the amount of assets purchased by a U.S. firm from a firm in a foreign country. If 
firm v  buys assets in country j  in year t , then 0, 
O
tvy ; otherwise, 
O
tvy ,  is not observable. tv, , 
tvZ , , tvR , , and t stand for the same meaning as before. This two-step approach first estimates the 
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selection equation and then estimates the investment equation. The amount of asset purchases in 
the foreign country is measured by the transaction values of each cross-border deal reported by 
SDC. 
 
Table 3.6 reports the results for the U.S. firms' asset purchase decisions in foreign countries. 
Table 3.1 column (5) provides the simulation counterpart. Table 3.6 column (1) presents the 
baseline regression. In the selection equation, the coefficient on the competitiveness is positive 
and statistically significant, which indicates that competitive firms are more likely to purchase 
assets abroad. Similarly, the positive coefficient estimate for the productivity suggest that other 
things being equal, productive firms are more likely to purchase assets abroad. The coefficient on 
the firm's size is positive and statistically significant, which implies that large firms are more 
likely to buy assets in the foreign country. If the excess price cost margin increases by one 
standard deviation, the odds of purchasing assets in the foreign country are expected to increase 
by about 16.78%. A unit standard deviation increase in return on assets increases the odds in 
favor of the asset purchases in the foreign country by 17.57%. In the investment equation, the 
coefficient on the competitiveness is negative and statistically significant, which indicates that 
other things being equal, competitive firms are less likely to purchase assets overseas. The 
coefficient on the square term of the competitiveness is positive and statistically insignificant. 
The coefficient on the return on assets is positive and statistically insignificant. 
 
In column (2), I use the return per employee as an alternative measure for the return on assets; 
the results are similar to those in column (1). In the investment equation, the coefficient on the 
return per employee is positive and statistically significant. If the return per employee increases 
by one standard deviation, the amount of assets purchased overseas increases by about 0.12 units 
of standard deviation. In columns (3) and (4), I control for the market-to-book ratio. The 
coefficient on the competitiveness is negative and statistically significant, and those on return on 
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assets and return per employee remain statistically significant. In column (3), in the selection 
equation, the coefficient on the market-to-book ratio is positive and statistically significant, 
which indicates that firms with high market-to-book ratio are more likely to purchase assets on 
the foreign market. In contrast, in the investment equation, the coefficient on the market-to-book 
ratio is positive and statistically insignificant, which suggests that the market-to-book ratio may 
not be correlated with the amount of assets purchased in the foreign country. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Cross-border asset transactions have increased dramatically and firms are facing competition 
from foreign firms entering the local market. Based on these new developments, this paper 
incorporates the world market for corporate assets and analyzes the firms' asset transactions both 
in the domestic country and abroad. I introduce a new characteristic of the firm, namely, the 
competitiveness in the product market, which is measured by the excess profitability and 
investigate how the competitiveness and productivity affects the firm's investment decisions. I 
show that, other things being equal, firms with high competitiveness are more likely to buy 
assets on the overseas markets, and that they are more likely to sell assets on the domestic market. 
Firms with high productivity are more likely to buy assets on both the domestic and overseas 
markets, and they are less likely to sell assets on the domestic market, which mirrors the 
established results regarding the firm's productivity. 
 
Using the comprehensive data on the asset purchases and sales of the U.S. firms in the domestic 
country and overseas, this paper finds empirical evidence which supports the model's 
implications. In particular, the competitiveness and productivity of the firm predict the likelihood 
that a firm purchases assets overseas. If the excess price cost margin increases by one standard 
deviation, the odds of purchasing assets in the foreign country are expected to increase by about 
16.78%. A unit standard deviation increase in the return on assets increases the likelihood of 
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asset purchases in the foreign country by 17.57%. 
 
The findings in this paper add to the research on the impact of the product market competition on 
firms' activities. It also extends the studies on asset transactions to an open economy setting. 
Future research on how the financing considerations influence the firms' asset purchase and sales 
decisions worldwide could prove fruitful, as they have impact on firms' asset sales in the 
domestic country (Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; Warusawitharana, 2008). Given the findings 
on value losses or creation in M&As (Moeller, Schlingemann, Stulz, 2005; Chari, Ouimet, and 
Tesar, 2010) and asset sales (Borisova, John, and Salotti, 2011), it could also be interesting to 
incorporate the product market competition and explore the links between a firm’s valuation and 
its asset purchases and sales worldwide. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. Firm's Profit Maximization Problem 
In this appendix, I characterize the solutions to the firm's profit maximization problems in the 
home country and the foreign country. 
 
A1. Profit Maximization in the Home Country 
As shown in section 3.2.2.1, in the home country, depending on whether to participate in the 
domestic asset transaction market, the firm has two options: (1) non-participation )0( iiX , and 
(2) participation  0iiX . The firm's decisions are detailed below. 
 
Case 1. Non-participation )0( iiX   
In this case, there are two scenarios. 
 
Scenario (a). In this scenario, the firm maintains its assets-in-place inherited from the last period, 
neither making new investment nor purchasing existing assets from or selling its assets to other 
firms. The firm's decision is characterized by the following expressions: 
    . , ,0 ,0 11 iiiiiiiiiiii SZYZSpXI 
                                  (3.4) 
And the restriction on the parameter values   ii SZ  

 11
1
 needs to be satisfied in equilibrium. 
 
Scenario (b). In this scenario, the firm makes new investment using its assets-in-place inherited 
from the last period, instead of purchasing existing assets from or selling its assets to other firms. 
The firm's decision is characterized by the following expressions: 
    . ,
1
 ,0 , 1
1
1
1
11
1


 

    iii
i
iiiiiiii ZY
Z
pXSZI                         (3.5) 
And the restriction on the parameter values   ii SZ  

 11
1
 needs to be satisfied in equilibrium. 
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Case 2. Participation  1 if 0  iii qX  
 
In this case, the firm purchases or sells assets on the domestic asset market, and the equilibrium 
is characterized by the following expressions: 
    . , , ,0 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
1


 

 
  iiii
i
i
iiiiiiiii qZY
Z
q
pSqZXI            (3.6) 
The firm compares the profits in these two cases and makes the decision in its home country. 
Specifically, the maximum amount of profits from the production in the home country is 
 ,,max 00   iiii XXii                                                      (3.7) 
where   iiiiiiX IYpii 0  and  DiiiiiiiX fXqYpii 

 0
 . 
 
A2. Profit Maximization Overseas 
As shown in section 2.2.2, in the foreign country, the firm has two options: (1) non-participation 
)0( ijX , and (2) participation  0ijX . The firm's decisions are detailed below. 
 
Case 1. Non-participation )0( ijX  
  
In this case, the firm makes new investment instead of purchasing existing assets from foreign 
firms. The equilibrium is characterized by the following expressions: 
    , ,
1
 ,0 , 1
1
1
1
11
1


 

    iij
i
ijijiij ZY
Z
pXZI                           (3.8) 
and the maximum profit obtained in the foreign country is  IijijijX fIYpij 

0 . 
 
Case 2. Participation  1 if 0  jij qX  
 
In this case, instead of making new investment, the firm purchases existing assets from foreign 
firms; the equilibrium is characterized by the following expressions: 
    , , , ,0 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
1


 

 
  jiij
i
j
ijjiijij qZY
Z
q
pqZXI                  (3.9) 
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and the maximum profit obtained in the foreign country is  IFijjijijX ffXqYpij 

 0
 . 
 
When the profit obtained from country j is positive, the firm enters country j . Depending on the 
amount of profit, the firm either makes new investment or purchases existing assets on the asset 
market in country j . The firm compares the profits in these two cases and determines its amount 
of investment in country j . The maximum amount of profit from the production in country j  is 
 ,,max 00   ijij XXij                                                      (3.10) 
where  IijijijX fIYpij 

0  and  IFijjijijX ffXqYpij 

 0
 . 
 
B. Numerical Algorithm 
This appendix describes the algorithm of computing the equilibrium. The steps are summarized 
as follows. 
 
Step 0: Define the finite grid for the equilibrium price q  over   1,0  . Define the finite grids for 
a , s , and z  over the interval of 3 standard deviations centering around the corresponding 
means: a , s , z , respectively. 
 
Step 1: Solve each firm's profit maximization problem in the domestic country, use equations 
(3.4), (3.5), and (3.6) to compute ,iiI  ,iiX  ,iip  and iiY . Use equation (3.7) to compute ii . 
 
Step 2: Solve each firm's profit maximization problem in the foreign country, use equations (3.8) 
and (3.9) to compute ,ijI ,ijX  ,ijp  
and ijY . Use equation (3.10) to compute ij . 
 
Step 3: Given the joint distribution of a , s , and z , as defined in expression (3.3), compute the 
aggregate excess demand for the existing assets. 
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Step 4: Apply the grid search method, use the market clearing condition, equation (3.2), to solve 
the equilibrium price q  of existing assets. First, find the minimum value of the excess demand, 
1exd , and its corresponding value of q ,  1q . Then, determine the value of q  satisfying the 
following two conditions: (1) it has the closest grid index to 1q ; (2) it corresponds to the value of 
excess demand which has the opposite sign to 1exd . Denote this value of q  as 0q . Define a 
finite grid for q  over  10 , qq . Repeat Steps 1 to 3 and find the minimum value of the excess 
demand, exd , and its corresponding value of q . This value of q  is the equilibrium price 
q . 
 
Step 5: Use 
q  and equations (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6) to compute iiI  and 

iiX ; use 
q  and 
equations (3.8) and (3.9) to compute ijI  and 

ijX . 
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Figure 3.1 
Firms’ investment decisions overseas. 
This figure plots how firms’ overseas investment decisions vary with changes in the productivity 
and the degree of competitiveness. The exogenous parameters are specified as follows.    
        ;       ;            ;       ;    ;       ;      ;      ;      ;    ; 
       ;        ;        ; and    . The equilibrium price of existing assets is  
  
     . 
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Figure 3.2 
Firms’ investment decisions in the domestic country:     . 
This figure plots how firms’ investment decisions in the domestic country vary with changes in 
the productivity and the degree of competitiveness when the assets-in-place is fixed at the mean 
value   . The exogenous parameters are specified as follows.            ;       ;    
        ;       ;    ;       ;      ;      ;      ;    ;        ;        ; 
       ; and    . The equilibrium price of existing assets is  
       . 
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Figure 3.3 
Equilibrium quantity of investment: in the home country. 
This figure plots how firms’ investment in the domestic country varies with changes in their 
competitiveness. The exogenous parameters are specified as follows.            ;      
  ; 
           ;      
  ;    ;       ;      ;      ;      ;    ;        ; 
       ;        ; and    . The equilibrium price of existing assets is  
       . “X-
domestic” is the quantity of assets transferred in the domestic country, and “I-domestic” is the 
quantity of new investment in the domestic country. 
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Figure 3.4 
Equilibrium quantity of investment: in the foreign country. 
This figure plots how firms’ investment varies with changes in their competitiveness when they 
invest in the foreign country. The exogenous parameters are specified as follows.            ; 
     
  ;            ;      
  ;    ;       ;      ;      ;      ;    ; 
       ;        ;        ; and    . The equilibrium price of existing assets is  
  
     . “X-foreign” is the quantity of assets purchased in the foreign country, and “I-foreign” is 
the quantity of new investment in the foreign country.  
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Table 3.1 
Regressions on the simulated data. 
This table reports the regression results of the simulated data. The exogenous parameters are 
specified as follows.            ;       ;            ;       ;    ;       ;     
   ;      ;      ;      ;        ;        ;        ; and    . The equilibrium 
price of existing assets is         . Regressions (1) and (2) report the results of the Logit 
regression where the dependent variable is the amount of assets purchased by the sample firms in 
the domestic country. Regressions (3) and (4) are the Logit regressions where the dependent 
variable is the amount of assets sold by the sample firms in the domestic country. Regression (5) 
reports the result of the Heckman selection model for the asset purchases in the foreign country. 
In the Heckman selection model, the number of uncensored observation is reported. Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses below regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical 
significance at the1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Asset purchases in the domestic 
country 
Asset sales in the domestic country Asset purchases 
in the foreign 
country 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Investment equation      
Competitiveness 0.6152 
(0.7965) 
-17.1446 
(12.3604) 
1.6270*** 
(0.4291) 
-8.4549 
(6.2869) 
-0.2687*** 
(0.0307) 
Competitiveness Squared 
 -17.7710 
(12.3404) 
 -10.1033* 
(6.2867) 
-0.3072*** 
(0.0312) 
Productivity 5.3994*** 
(0.3611) 
5.4005*** 
(0.3613) 
-2.6729*** 
(0.2166) 
-2.6778*** 
(0.2167) 
0.6182*** 
(0.0013) 
Constant  
-4.4348*** 
(0.4511) 
-8.8305*** 
(3.0892) 
2.0744*** 
(0.2461) 
-0.4139 
(1.5670) 
-0.0482*** 
(0.0075) 
Selection equation      
Competitiveness 
   
 
430.5858*** 
(57.6309) 
Productivity 
   
 
522.2255*** 
(72.7802) 
Number of Observations 5584 5584 9208 9208 8417 
Pseudo    0.0507 0.0512 0.0132 0.0134 - 
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Table 3.2 
Logit regressions: domestic asset purchases. 
This table reports results from Logit regressions of domestic asset purchases, competitiveness, 
productivity, and other control variables. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if the firm purchases assets on the domestic market, and 0 otherwise. Variable 
definitions and data sources are as described in Table 3.A.1, and summary statistics are reported 
in Table 3.A.2. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by the acquirer firm are 
reported in parentheses below regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical 
significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Competitiveness 0.0002 
(0.0005) 
1.0002 
(0.0005) 
0.0014 
(0.0009) 
1.0014 
(0.0009) 
0.0011 
(0.0007) 
1.0011 
(0.0007) 
0.0004 
(0.0005) 
1.0004 
(0.0005) 
Return on assets 0.5841** 
(0.2549) 
1.7934** 
(0.4572) 
  1.5435*** 
(0.1039) 
4.6808*** 
(0.4863) 
  
Return per employee   0.0027*** 
(0.0002) 
1.0027*** 
(0.0002) 
  0.0034*** 
(0.0002) 
1.0034*** 
(0.0002) 
Size 0.4272*** 
(0.0196) 
1.5329*** 
(0.0300) 
0.4670*** 
(0.0187) 
1.5952*** 
(0.0298) 
0.3981*** 
(0.0243) 
1.4890*** 
(0.0361) 
0.4021*** 
(0.0240) 
1.4950*** 
(0.0359) 
Market-to-book     0.0002 
(0.0001) 
1.0002 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0001) 
1.0002 
(0.0001) 
Observations 118636 118636 110798 110798 48585 48585 46721 46721 
Pseudo R² 0.0375 0.0375 0.0367 0.0367 0.0324 0.0324 0.0284 0.0284 
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Table 3.3 
Logit regressions: domestic asset purchases with quadratic competitiveness. 
This table reports results from Logit regressions of domestic asset purchases, competitiveness, 
productivity, and other control variables. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if the firm purchases assets on the domestic market, and 0 otherwise. Variable 
definitions and data sources are as described in Table 3.A.1, and summary statistics are reported 
in Table 3.A.2. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by the acquirer firm are 
reported in parentheses below regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical 
significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Competitiveness 0.0007 
(0.0010) 
1.0007 
(0.0010) 
0.0023 
(0.0015) 
1.0023 
(0.0015) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
1.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
1.0001 
(0.0004) 
Competitiveness squared 0.0000 
(0.0000) 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
1.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Return on assets 0.1162*** 
(0.0307) 
1.1232*** 
(0.0345) 
  0.2304*** 
(0.0593) 
1.2591*** 
(0.0747) 
  
Return per employee   0.0001** 
(3.93e-05) 
1.0001** 
(3.93e-05) 
  0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
1.0004** 
(0.0002) 
Size 0.2665*** 
(0.0067) 
1.3054*** 
(0.0088) 
0.5575*** 
(0.0183) 
1.7464*** 
(0.0319) 
0.2778*** 
(0.0088) 
1.3202*** 
(0.0116) 
0.2779*** 
(0.0084) 
1.3204*** 
(0.0111) 
Market-to-book     -2.04e-05 
(2.70e-05) 
1.0000 
(2.70e-05) 
-2.02e-05 
(2.68e-5) 
1.0000 
(2.68e-05) 
Observations 118636 118636 110798 110798 48585 48585 46721 46721 
Pseudo R² 0.0805 0.0805 0.0381 0.0381 0.0687 0.0687 0.0658 0.0658 
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Table 3.4 
Logit regressions: domestic asset sales. 
This table reports results from Logit regressions of domestic asset sales, competitiveness, 
productivity, and other control variables. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if the firm sells assets on the domestic market, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions and 
data sources are as described in Table 3.A.1, and summary statistics are reported in Table 3.A.2. 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by the acquirer firm are reported in 
parentheses below regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Competitiveness 0.0247*** 
(0.0077) 
1.0250*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0268*** 
(0.0078) 
1.0271*** 
(0.0080) 
0.0015 
(0.0112) 
1.0015 
(0.0112) 
0.0097 
(0.0115) 
1.0098 
(0.0116) 
Return on assets -1.6492*** 
(0.1310) 
0.1922*** 
(0.0252) 
  -2.2590*** 
(0.2352) 
0.1045*** 
(0.0246) 
  
Return per employee   -0.0073*** 
(0.0006) 
0.9927*** 
(0.0006) 
  -0.0067*** 
(0.0009) 
0.9933*** 
(0.0009) 
Size 0.2847*** 
(0.0115) 
1.3294*** 
(0.0153) 
0.2777*** 
(0.0117) 
1.3201*** 
(0.0155) 
0.3297*** 
(0.0238) 
1.3906*** 
(0.0331) 
0.2787*** 
(0.0215) 
1.3214*** 
(0.0284) 
Market-to-book     0.0076 
(0.0153) 
1.0077 
(0.0155) 
0.0063 
(0.0162) 
1.0064 
(0.0163) 
Observations 137103 137103 125074 125074 51662 51662 49840 49840 
Pseudo R² 0.0433 0.0433 0.0439 0.0439 0.0443 0.0443 0.0398 0.0398 
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Table 3.5 
Logit regressions: domestic asset sales with quadratic competitiveness. 
This table reports results from Logit regressions of domestic asset sales, competitiveness, 
productivity, and other control variables. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if the firm sells assets on the domestic market, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions and 
data sources are as described in Table 3.A.1, and summary statistics are reported in Table 3.A.2. 
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by the acquirer firm are reported in 
parentheses below regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Competitiveness 0.1301*** 
(0.0289) 
1.1390*** 
(0.0329) 
0.1380*** 
(0.0292) 
1.1479*** 
(0.0335) 
0.1155*** 
(0.0443) 
1.1224*** 
(0.0497) 
0.1221*** 
(0.0452) 
1.1299*** 
(0.0510) 
Competitiveness squared -0.0149*** 
(0.0039) 
0.9852*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0157*** 
(0.0039) 
0.9844*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0156*** 
(0.0058) 
0.9845*** 
(0.0057) 
-0.0153*** 
(0.0059) 
0.9848*** 
(0.0058) 
Return on assets -1.7092*** 
(0.1321) 
0.1810*** 
(0.0239) 
  -2.3134*** 
(0.2376) 
0.0989*** 
(0.0235) 
  
Return per employee   -0.0075*** 
(0.0006) 
0.9925*** 
(0.0006) 
  -0.0069*** 
(0.0009) 
0.9931*** 
(0.0009) 
Size 0.2893*** 
(0.0116) 
1.3355*** 
(0.0155) 
0.2823*** 
(0.0118) 
1.3262*** 
(0.0156) 
0.3340*** 
(0.0240) 
1.3965*** 
(0.0336) 
0.2825*** 
(0.0216) 
1.3265*** 
(0.0287) 
Market-to-book     0.0060 
(0.0154) 
1.0060 
(0.0155) 
0.0046 
(0.0163) 
1.0046 
(0.0163) 
Observations 137103 137103 125074 125074 51662 51662 49840 49840 
Pseudo R² 0.0438 0.0438 0.0445 0.0445 0.0451 0.0451 0.0405 0.0405 
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Table 3.6 
Heckman selection model: cross-border asset purchases with quadratic competitiveness. 
This table reports results from Heckman selection model: cross-border asset purchases. The 
dependent variable is the amount of assets purchased in a foreign country by a firm in a year. 
Variable definitions and data sources are as described in Table 3.A.1, and summary statistics are 
reported in Table 3.A.2. The table reports the number of uncensored observations. Standard 
errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered by the acquirer firm are reported in parentheses 
below regression coefficients, and ***, **,* indicate statistical significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Investment equation     
Competitiveness -18.9784** 
(9.3887) 
-15.1517** 
(6.5353) 
-35.6427** 
(14.9104) 
-28.0346*** 
(9.6751) 
Competitiveness squared 1.0903 
(0.8435) 
0.9011 
(0.6638) 
1.7575 
(1.2114) 
1.3873* 
(0.8347) 
Return on assets 72.6844 
(49.1422) 
 41.8668 
(66.9040) 
 
Return per employee  0.6241*** 
(0.1187) 
 0.6725*** 
(0.1836) 
Market-to-book   2.3913 
(5.2656) 
-1.1871 
(4.4455) 
Selection equation     
Competitiveness 0.0693*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0636*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0476*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0450*** 
(0.0041) 
Return on assets 1.2827*** 
(0.1094) 
 1.2700*** 
(0.1305) 
 
Return per employee  0.0008*** 
(0.0001) 
 0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
Size 0.4395*** 
(0.0334) 
0.4978*** 
(0.0305) 
0.3437*** 
(0.0479) 
0.4162*** 
(0.0451) 
Market-to-book   0.0682*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0654*** 
(0.0061) 
Observations 3037 3080 1944 1922 
 
  
 172 
 
Table 3.A.1 
Variable definitions and data sources. 
This table describes the definitions and data sources of all the variables used in the regressions. 
 
Variable Definition  
Asset Purchases in the Domestic Country Dummy variable which equals 1 if a firm purchases assets in the 
domestic country and 0 otherwise. (Source: SDC) 
Asset Sales in the Domestic Country Dummy variable which equals 1 if a firm sells assets in the domestic 
country and 0 otherwise. (Source: SDC) 
Amount of Assets Purchased in the Foreign Country Transaction values of a cross-border deal with a U.S. firm as the 
acquirer and a non-U.S. firm as the target (Source: SDC) 
Excess Price Cost Margin The difference between the price cost margin of a firm and that of the 
two-digit SIC sector which this firm belongs to. A firm's price cost 
margin is defined as its EBITDA scaled by its total sales. The price 
cost margin of a two-digit SIC sector is the equally weighted average 
of the price cost margin of each firm in this two-digit SIC sector. 
(Source: Compustat) 
Return on Assets A firm’s EBITDA scaled by its book value of assets. (Source: 
Compustat) 
Return per Employee A firm’s EBITDA scaled by its total number of employees. (Source: 
Compustat) 
Market-to-book The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. 
(Source: Compustat) 
Size The difference of the log values of a firm's book value of assets 
between fiscal year t and fiscal year t-1. (Source: Compustat) 
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Table 3.A.2 
Summary statistics. 
This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the regressions. Variable 
definitions are described in Table 3.A.1. 
 
Variable 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Observations 
 Panel A: Domestic Country 
Asset Purchases in the Domestic Country 0.0913 0.2881 0 1 153354            
Asset Sales in the Domestic Country 0.0237 0.1523   0 1 142740 
Excess Price Cost Margin 2.0274     2.5956   -0.0475 7.6683 151144        
Return on assets 0.0256 0.1957 -0.4166    0.2266 156237          
Return per employee 8.2353     46.0436   -88.3333 82.3240 142020        
Market-to-book 2.3805     2.2866   -0.4358 7.2329 62577          
Size 0.0897    0.2520 -0.2875 0.5901 140131          
 Panel B: Overseas 
Amount of Assets Purchased in the Foreign Country 148.0981      607.0350           1.0000 17639.9700 3788        
Excess Price Cost Margin 2.2411     7.3837   -27.8620     49.0483 182478     
Return on assets -0.0649 0.6210 -4.5292 0.4552 187925            
Return per employee 16.6121     49.2810       -77.2000  103.2086 164736      
Market-to-book 2.2412     2.0108   -0.1309    6.5854 77033     
Size 0.0889   0.2326 -0.2650 0.5461 168101           
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Table 3.A.3 
Selected indicators of FDI and international production, 1990–2010. 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011, Table I.5, page 24.  
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Table 3.A.4 
Internationalization statistics of the 100 largest non-financial TNCs worldwide and from 
developing and transition economies (Billions of dollars, thousands of employees and per cent). 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011, Table I.6, page 27.  
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Figure 3.A.1 
TNCs account for one-quarter of world GDP, 2010 (Per cent and trillions of dollars) 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2011, Figure I.22, page 25. 
 
